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A guiding idea underlying this thesis is that when making decisions, it is often advisable to
take the insights of many different people into account. I have diligently followed my own
advice in this regard, as this thesis has profited from the ideas, suggestions and support of a
great deal of people. In good decision-theoretic tradition, they will be named in backward
order (taking some liberties), starting from those who contributed to the completion of
this dissertation, and solving backwards to its origin.
Positioned at the final end of this chain are my supervisors. I am thankful for Aurélien
Baillon to have advised me on just about every aspect of academic life. From research –
ranging from the discussion of big picture questions to correcting the indexing in appendix
proofs – to dealing with students, co-authors, journals and presentations, he not only
continuously helped me to improve, but also led as a glowing example.
He was also the one to put me in contact with the second supervisor of this thesis,
Dražen Prelec. It was a great honour to be able to discuss many of the methods in
this thesis with the person who created an entire research field devoted to dealing with
unverifiable subjective data – a topic at the heart of three chapters in this thesis. With his
original and refreshing perspective on just about every topic, meetings with Dražen were
always a delight and more than sometimes tremendously improved my understanding. It
is said that “Poor is the pupil who does not surpass his master(s)”. If that is true, I expect
to stay a rather poor pupil.
During the last four years, I have spent many hours with my office mate Yan Xu,
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discussing not only research, but various topics ranging from personal life to the intricacies
of the Chinese education system and German case reflections (good luck in Vienna, Yan!).
I have had the pleasure to share a PhD office with a marvelous view over the Maas
river with Merel van Hulsen, Francesco Capozza, Cem Peker and Xiao Yu. The Corona
outbreak shortened this enjoyable time to just one month – but I already miss it! I will
also remember the afternoons I spent with Tong Wang over buggy MATLAB code and
evasive mathematical theorems, the result of which can be seen in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
I have generally been glad to be a member of the behavioral economics group at Erasmus
University. It has been great to be a colleague of Han Bleichrodt, Paul van Bruggen
Aysil Emirmahmutoglu, Ðura-Georg Granić, Jan Heufer, Chen Li, Kirsten Rohde, Vitalie
Spinu, Jan Stoop, Jingni Yang and Sophie van der Zee. It is great that in this group, junior
members are not regarded as cheap sources of labour, but trained as the researchers of
the next generation.
This dissertation also marks the end of my time at the Tinbergen Institute, which
started when I entered the Tinbergen research master in 2014. I want to thank Maria
Cotofan, Sam Taylor, David Garces Urzainqui, Pim Kastelein, Laura Remie, Timo Klein,
Magda Rola-Janicka, Robin Döttling and Huaiping Yuan for Sinterklaas presents, King’s
Day celebrations, poker nights, fancy and not-so-fancy dinners, and so much more. I
also don’t want to miss the time I spent with Jenny Kudymowa, Vadim Nelidov, Huyen
Nguyen, Sanna Stephan and Dieter Wang during the early days in Amsterdam which
helped me get through the bleak Dutch winter.
I am also grateful for the help of the Tinbergen Institute, which started with correspon-
dence with an understanding Judith van Kronenburg over an overdue English proficiency
test at my application, continued with Ester van den Bragt listening to a near-nervous-
breakdown at the beginning of the MPhil and Christina Månsson and Carine Horbach
handling my job applications in Fall 2019, and found its logical conclusion with Carolien
Stolting guiding me through the printing process of this thesis.
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This thesis is about methods to receive information from groups of individuals – possibly
very large groups – and to map this information into a decision. I have spent the last
four years working on such methods because I am convinced that for many high-stake
decisions, relevant bits of knowledge are held by a large number of people and that there
is a lot of room for improvement in how we utilize this knowledge. Throughout the
thesis, I focus on methods which reward or aggregate judgments in probabilistic form.
The underlying framework in doing so is Bayesian decision theory, both in its descriptive
and in its normative form. Descriptively, Bayesian decision theory is used to describe the
knowledge possessed by an individual as a probability distribution over possible worlds.
Normatively, Bayesian decision theory is used to evaluate which methods of combining
knowledge is best.
All methods which try to induce large numbers of people to contribute to the solution
of a problem face numerous challenges, and the probabilistic judgment aggregation and
reward systems analyzed in this thesis are no exception. Two particularly important
challenges are what will be called the “incentive problem” and the “aggregation problem”.
The incentive problem is the problem of choosing rewards for information revelation such
that all members of the human ’crowd’ have reason to seek information, and will accurately
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report it in the process. The aggregation problem concerns how to map the individual
judgments of all crowd members into a single decision.
All four chapters in this thesis are devoted to at least one of these problems. Moreover,
the methods described in these chapters aim to be simple enough such that humans, with
all our cognitive shortcomings, can interact with them – not only highly mathematically
sophisticated, dispassionate Bayesians.
Chapter 2
In this chapter, I analyze the strategic aspects of the logarithmic market scoring rule
(LMSR) – a betting system which was proposed by Robin Hanson (2003; 2007). The
important gap in the literature filled by the LMSR is that Bayesian decision-makers usually
should not be willing to bet against each other: if somebody else disagrees with your
probabilistic assessment, this should be reason to revise your assessment, not to bet against
them. In the LMSR however, people never bet directly against each other. Instead, the
designer of the betting market – the “market-maker” – makes a first probabilistic statement
about whether some potential event in the future will occur. For instance, by 2035, there
may have been (i) another Moon landing (ii) the first human Mars mission, (iii) both a
Moon and a Mars landing (iv) neither of the two. The market-maker then sets a probability
for each of the possibilities (i)-(iv). Anyone can sign up to the market and make another
probabilistic judgment about the future. They will be rewarded for the accuracy of this
judgment, but in exchange must commit to rewarding the market-maker for the initial
statement. Any subsequent market participant is also ensured to be rewarded, but in
return must pay the reward for the previous participant.
The LMSR allows information to flow into the market continuously, until the future
event resolves. I show in Chapter 2, that this scheme is also robust against manipulations,
in the sense that truthful and immediate revelation of information is an equilibrium. That
2
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is, if other respondents expect everyone else to update their probabilities correctly and to
be truthful – then it is in their best interest to do and be so as well. This extends an earlier
result by Chen et al. (2010). In their model, the betting market is on a single proposition
which can be true or false. The question on space missions could then only take simpler
forms, e.g. “Will there be a successful Mars mission by 2035 or not?”. In contrast, my
result can be applied to possibilities such as (i)-(iv) above and in my model, participants
can repeatedly receive new information. In the example, they could then, for instance,
react to announcements by NASA, ESA or SpaceX, or on their private conversations with
aerospace engineers. In addition to the formal treatment of these two generalizations, I
discuss other generalizations informally, and make various suggestions for future work.
Chapter 3
This chapter is based on the paper “Follow the Money: Bayesian Markets to Extract
Crowd Wisdom” which is on-going joint work with Aurélien Baillon and Tong V. Wang.
In contrast to Chapter 2, we are interested in beliefs about events which are not verifiable,
building on pioneering work by Prelec (2004).
In prediction markets such as the LMSR, probabilistic statements are rewarded by
comparing them to the true events as they unfold. For some statements, this is impossible.
This is so, for instance, for answers to questions which relate to subjective experience.
There is no reliable way to verify whether you are responding truthfully to the question
“How happy are you right now?”. Verifiability also fails for questions relating to the very
far future. Suppose for example that the question on space missions is not on a Mars or
moon mission until 2035, but whether humanity will spread to other star systems before
the year 2200. Yet another question with unverifiable answers would be a question about




Just as the LMSR considered in Chapter 2 simultaneously solves the incentive prob-
lem and the aggregation problem for forecasts of verifiable events, the “Follow the money”
(FTM) mechanism studied in Chapter 3 simultaneously solves the incentive problem and
the aggregation problem when verification is impossible. We ensure incentives by using
“Bayesian markets” introduced by Baillon (2017) and the underlying method of aggrega-
tion is based on the Surprisingly Popular Algorithm (SPA) introduced by Prelec et al.
(2017). Building on a similar theoretical setting as those two papers, my co-authors and
I show that for sufficiently large crowds, the SPA optimally aggregates information. Fur-
thermore, selecting an answer according to those respondents who made the most money
on the Bayesian market (thereby “following the money”) approximates the selection of
the SPA – and is thus itself (approximately) an optimal aggregator. This is encouraging
as Bayesian markets elicit responses by simple economic means, with simple, binary bets
which require limited cognitive effort from each individual crowd member. This makes
them an attractive method for practical implementation. Majority voting – arguably the
most natural form of judgment aggregation – will often fail to make optimal use of the
information provided by the crowd, even when the crowd is large.
We further suggest empirical methods to enrich the application of the FTM in practice,
making it more functional for decision-makers who do to not fully adhere to Bayesian
updating. A limitation of the FTM is that it is restricted to a setting in which the
underlying question we want to be answered can only have two possible answers.
We test the FTM in a large online sample of US students. We used a task developed
for the experiment reported in Chapter 5 that ensures that the informational assumptions
of the model are satisfied. We compared our method to the majority opinion and to the
SPA. Despite using less information than the SPA, our method had comparable accuracy
rates. Both the FTM and the SPA substantially improved upon majority voting.
4
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Chapter 4
Just like Chapter 3, Chapter 4 deals with beliefs about events which are not verifiable,
extending the incentive scheme discussed in Chapter 3. This chapter is based on work
I published with Jaksa Cvitanić, Dražen Prelec and Blake Riley. We introduce choice-
matching, an incentive compatible mechanism for eliciting honest responses to a multiple
choice question (MCQ), such as the space mission question discussed above – allowing any
number of possible answers.
Under choice-matching, respondents are compensated for an auxiliary task, e.g., a
personal consumption choice or a forecast. Their compensation depends both on their
performance on the auxiliary task, and on the performance of those respondents who
matched their response to the MCQ.
The idea is to link explicit opinions or judgments, which are answers to an MCQ, with
an auxiliary task that reveals the respondents’ “types”, but only implicitly. A guiding
example we use is one of a firm which launches a new product, and supplies a panel of
potential customers with a trial product. How much each panel member liked the trial
product is an unverifiable question, of the type relating to subjective experience.
To see how choice-matching works in this example, suppose that the firm asks each
member to rate the hypothetical product on a scale from 1 to 5 stars and to additionally
give a monetary evaluation for a product which already exists. The firm can use an
incentive compatible pricing mechanism to incentivize the latter. The payoff of this task
can then be linked to the answer to the MCQ: With some positive probability, the firm uses
the respondents’ own reservation price for the price mechanism and with the remaining
probability uses the average reservation price of those respondents who gave the same
rating to the hypothetical product. When the valuations of the trial product and the




We further show how to create an auxiliary task when a plausible link like in the ex-
ample above is not obvious. In this “canonical version” of choice-matching, the auxiliary
task asks respondents to predict how often each answer option in the MCQ was chosen
by the other respondents. A respondent’s score is then a weighted sum of a prediction
accuracy score and the average prediction accuracy score of all the respondents who en-
dorse the same answer to the MCQ. We show that under plausible assumptions about the
updating process, truthfully revealing the answer to the MCQ and predictions is again a
strict Bayes-Nash Equilibrium.
Chapter 5
The final chapter zooms in on the aggregation problem. I show that the Surprisingly
Popular Algorithm proposed by Prelec et al. (2017) – and therefore the scheme analyzed
in Chapter 3 – is not an optimal aggregator for Bayesian decision-makers if the sample is
small.
To overcome this issue, I propose “self-aggregation” (SELF), a new aggregation scheme.
In a binary choice setting, SELF asks individuals to vote for an option and to simulta-
neously provide a threshold of the number of people that would convince them of the
opposite. SELF then picks an option if more people vote for it than the average threshold
provided in the group. In a model in which individuals update their beliefs in a Bayesian
fashion, SELF has a higher probability of leading to the correct decision than a number of
benchmarks; other than the SPA, I consider majority voting and different methods based
on confidence-levels. In an experimental test of the model, respondents solve a binary
decision problem in a stylized urn experiment. Responses and aggregation results can
be directly compared to the Bayesian prescription. In the experiment, SELF compares




Market Scoring Rules in a Dynamic
Bayesian Setting
2.1 Introduction
Hanson (2003) proposed the use of market scoring rules. A market scoring rule (MSR) is a
subsidized betting market in which agents sequentially report beliefs about a future event
and are rewarded for their accuracy. A market maker sets a baseline probability report and
subsequent market participants report their own belief. In doing so, they agree to insure
the market-maker against the previous report, in exchange for being rewarded for their
own. As a result, the market-maker only ever pays for one report. In this chapter, I show
that a specific market scoring rule – the logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR) – induces
participants to report their knowledge truthfully and instantaneously, and aggregates the
information held by all participants for a fairly large class of information structures. A
crucial underlying assumption is that individual information is independent conditional on
the outcome of the future event. This means that what two different individuals believe
is only informative about each other because both are related to the actual outcome.
The result proved in this chapter further strengthens market scoring rules as a candi-
7
CHAPTER 2. MARKET SCORING RULES
date to solve a puzzle at the heart of economic theory: namely to provide a rational foun-
dation of an institution which exchanges individual bets. Starting with Ramsey (1931),
De Finetti (1931) and Savage (1954), subjective probabilities – a key ingredient of eco-
nomic decision theory – have been interpreted as a “willingness to bet”.1 This acceptance
to bet – or, analogously, to sell or buy a contingent contract – is behind classic economic
results on the information properties of markets. And indeed, in the real world, we can
observe betting as a widespread social phenomenon. Bets are placed on a diverse spec-
trum of events, ranging from the geo-political sphere to celebrity gossip and sports. The
theoretical challenge however in economic theory is that the micro-level specifics of the
macro-level information property are unclear: When two decision-makers disagree on the
probability of a future event, neither should accept to bet on it, as not both of them can
rationally expect to make a profit from this bet.2
This negative result may explain why despite promising practical trials (e.g. Forsythe
et al., 1992; Gillen et al., 2017) and a generally supportive attitude among economists
(Arrow et al., 2008, Wolfers et al., 2012), prediction markets have not yet played a central
role in societal decision making – or as an object of economic study.
Hopefully, this chapter adds to our theoretical understanding of how to design predic-
tion markets and can further promote their study and practical implementation.
2.1.1 Related Literature
Market scoring rules were proposed by Hanson (2003) and a particular case for the use
of the logarithmic market scoring rule (to be defined in Section 2.4) was made in Hanson
(2007). Hanson discusses consistency with Bayesian updating only informally, focusing
1For instance, if a decision-maker believes that event E occurs with probability p and that event E′
occurs with probability q < p, then the decision-maker should prefer to receive some prize when E occurs,
rather than on the condition that E′ occurs. Similarly, when choosing to receive or pay the same amount
if E does or does not occur, the decision-maker should prefer to bet on the event E if and only if it is
more likely than not to occur (or p > 12 ).2The canonical articulation of this idea is the no-trade theorem of Milgrom and Stokey (1982).
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on implementation of market scoring rules for event spaces in which the market-maker is
interested in finding efficient ways to allow betting on conditional beliefs. Furthermore,
while Hanson discusses the model in terms of a time dimension, this dimension is not
explicit in the model.
A survey of different forms of prediction markets, including market scoring rules, is
Chen and Pennock (2010). As pointed out already by Hanson (2003), and analyzed
more thoroughly by Chen and Pennock (2007), any market scoring rule has an equivalent
formulation as a more traditional prediction market in which individuals can buy Arrow
securities (which pay 1 unit of currency if an event occurs, and nothing otherwise). Upon
each individual purchase of a security, prices are adapted using a pricing mechanism which
makes the decision problem of a market participant equivalent to a market scoring rule.
The properties of market scoring rules ensure that individual buying decisions can be
interpreted as individual probability judgments, avoiding problems with the interpretation
of prices in traditional, pari-mutuel prediction markets pointed out by Manski (2006 – see
also Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2006). Chen and Vaughan (2010) relate market scoring rules
to no-regret learning.
The Arrow security formulation of market scoring rules is used in applied work by
Dreber et al. (2015) and Camerer et al. (2016) and in on-going follow-up work. Accord-
ing to Chen and Pennock (2010), it has also been used for internal analytics by Inkling
Markets, Consensus Point, Yahoo!, and Microsoft. Translating market scoring rules to
a pricing mechanism has the advantage of offering a more familiar environment to re-
spondents. While the pricing rule may be opaque to some respondents, each purchasing
decision is a simple trade of a security for a single price.
Ostrovsky (2012) discusses market scoring rules in the context of the general infor-
mation aggregation properties of markets and allows only myopic strategic behavior, i.e.
behavior in which participants do not condition their beliefs on the beliefs of others – and
don’t expect others to do so. When participants are myopic, it is straightforward that
9
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MSRs induce truthful information revelation. Accordingly, Ostrovsky uses market scoring
rules to illustrate information aggregation without the problem of revelation. Similarly,
Carvalho (2017) studies aggregation properties of equilibrium prices under the logarith-
mic market scoring rule for myopic traders. Strategies are also assumed to be myopic
in Dimitrov et al. (2015) who consider risk-averse traders. Buckley and O’Brien (2017)
experimentally test the effect of manipulations in a real prediction market. They show
that manipulations of market prices reduce the accuracy of prediction market forecast in
the short-term, but are corrected by other traders relatively quickly. While this is an en-
couraging finding, fear of manipulation may still lead traders to choose not to participate,
or not to fully reveal information in the market.
Closest to the model and results in this chapter is Chen et al. (2010), which com-
bines results by Chen et al. (2007) and Dimitrov and Sami (2008). Chen et al. (2010)
study the robustness of the logarithmic market scoring rule to manipulation for a market
which trades forecasts on a binary event, and in which each market participant observes
a single signal as the market opens. In contrast, in the model I introduce below, market
participants continuously receive information and the event can be non-binary. Especially
allowing more than a single period in which market participants receive private informa-
tion is an important contribution of this chapter. While the model in Chen et al. (2010)
is dynamic in the sense that participants are allowed to change their forecasts over time,
there is little reason for doing so since truth-telling would imply that all participants re-
port their forecast in the first period. The strategic aspects analyzed in their paper could
then be solved by simply letting every market participant report once, and only once. The
repeated updating thus only seems sensible if we assume that information can arrive at
various times, which indeed seems like a more accurate description of prediction markets
in the real world.
The novel dynamic element of the model in this chapter makes the setting similar to the
dynamic belief elicitation problem discussed in Chambers and Lambert (2020) who only
10
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consider single decision-makers, but allow that decision-makers may not be risk-neutral or
have preferences over the forecasted outcomes. Future work on prediction markets could
likely profit from synergies with this related dynamic elicitation problem.
2.1.2 Organization of this Chapter
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2.2, I provide an example of
how market scoring rules work. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 constitute the formal model, where
Section 2.3 introduces the information structure underlying the market and Section 2.4
describes the incentives provided by market scoring rules as an extensive form game. The
main result that the restricted logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR) induces honest
information revelation is proven in Section 2.5. Other practical aspects and properties
of the LMSR are discussed informally in Section 2.6. These issues are fertile ground for
future formal analysis. I conclude in Section 2.7.
2.2 Market Scoring Rules Illustrated
Suppose that we wish to forecast the GDP growth of India in the following year. For
simplicity, suppose we are just interested in the probability that GDP growth will be
above or below 5%. Suppose further that we would like to get a variety of opinions, and
thus do not like to ask only a specific set of experts for an opinion, but rather would like
to crowd-source the forecast. How could people be encouraged to participate in such a
forecasting exercise, and how can they be encouraged to provide forecasts to the best of
their knowledge? One way to do so, would be to reward each single participant with a
proper scoring rule.
The idea behind a proper scoring rule is as follow: A forecaster i reports a probability
ri that GDP growth will be above 5%. Let E = 1 denote that GDP growth will be above
5% and E = 0 denote that GDP growth will be below 5%. After observing the actual
11
CHAPTER 2. MARKET SCORING RULES
GDP in the following year, we can assign a score to forecaster i according to a scoring
rule R (ri, E). Suppose then that the forecaster i’s subjective belief that GDP growth
will be above 5% is pi. The forecaster can then calculate piR (ri,1) + (1−pi)R (ri,0), the
subjectively expected score for making report ri. A proper scoring rule R has the property
that maximizing this expectation with respect to ri yields ri = pi as the unique solution.3
From the perspective of the forecaster, it is thus optimal to report the true belief pi.
The problem with using a single scoring rule for each participant is that it could be very
costly. Letting the forecasters bet against each other could reduce those costs.4 However,
if the forecasters are sophisticated Bayesian agents, they will not accept bets against each
other, as they should immediately agree about the GDP forecast upon learning about
their disagreement (Aumann, 1976, Milgrom and Stokey, 1982).
Hanson (2003) proposed a solution. Suppose there are n participants in the crowd-
sourced forecasting project and let p1, ...,pn represent each forecaster’s probabilistic belief
that E = 1. The market-maker sets an initial “probability report” r0. Afterwards, the
first forecaster can change this probability report to r1, the second forecaster can change
the report to r2, and so on. After every forecaster has made their forecast, and GDP
growth materializes, the i-th forecaster receives a score R (ri,E)−R (ri−1,E), where R is
a proper scoring rule. When R is the logarithmic scoring rule (given by R (ri,1) = log(ri),
R (ri,0) = log(1− ri)), the market scoring rule is called the logarithmic market scoring rule
(LMSR).
Since R is proper and the i-th forecaster cannot influence the score R (pi−1,E), the
score R (pi,E)−R (pi−1,E) also constitutes a proper scoring rule. Moreover, propriety of
R ensures that each forecaster expects their score to be positive (since we must have that
3Scoring rules with this property are often called “strictly proper scoring rule”, with a proper scoring
rule not requiring uniqueness. Since non-strictly proper scoring rules are not particularly interesting in
the context of this chapter, I use the simpler term here.
4As will become clearer after the introduction of the model, the cost difference for individual elicitation
and elicitation via a betting market is essentially that for individual elicitation, a market-maker will
have to pay for shared information, whereas in a betting market, each participant receives the marginal
contribution of their information in expectation.
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i expect R (pi−1,E) to be smaller than R (pi,E)). This way of incentivizing thus ensures
both participation and truthful reporting. Moreover, note that because the forecasters
mutually insure each other, the market-maker’s cost is just R (rn,E)−R (r0,E). In par-
ticular, the maximal cost does thus not change with the number of forecaster – a crowd
of 100,000 forecasters could be financed by the same funds as a panel of five.
Despite its elegance, Hanson’s argument leaves some open questions. First, we have
fixed the forecasters’ beliefs p1, ..., pn. It would be reasonable to expect them to include
the information provided by previous reports. In fact, it seems desirable from the market-
makers perspective that forecasters do so, such that the final report includes all information
held by participants. However, if market participants update their beliefs upon learning
each others’ reports, is there value in misleading others about one’s information? Similarly,
could there be value in delaying entry – in order to profit from the information provided
by other participants?
As I show in this chapter, the logarithmic market scoring rule is robust to manipulation
and encourages early entry under fairly general conditions. This is so even if respondents
repeatedly receive information until the forecasted event materializes, and are allowed to
make multiple forecasts. The next two sections introduce the terminology and assumptions
used in order to formally state and prove this result.
2.3 The Model – Information Structure
In the next two sections, I will formally describe the prediction market defined by a market
scoring rule as a game between its participants. I start with describing the information
structure underlying the market. Strategic aspects are modeled in Section 2.4.
13
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2.3.1 The Information Structure - Setup and Notation
There is a set of time periods T = {1, ..., T} and a set of individuals N = {1, ...,n} – the
individuals who can participate in the market. In time period T +1, the future event e∈ E
materializes, where E = {1, ..., ...,nE}. We would like to elicit beliefs from individuals for
each of the nE possible outcomes of the event. In each time-period t ∈ T , individuals
receive a signal sit ∈ S = {0, 1, ...,nS}. Signals with value zero are uninformative signals






is i’s signal history at t. hi = hiT is i’s




is a signal history (for all the
players). If there is no ambiguity, I will also call hit a signal history, or just a history. H
and Ht (for t ∈ T ) denote the set of all possible signal histories and of all signal histories
at t, respectively. It will also sometimes be convenient to allow for a history at time 0,
with H0 only containing the empty set. I take h−it to be the collection of all histories of
individuals other than i, with the twist that it contains j’s history at t if j < i and j’s
history at t−1 if j > i.5
Together with the set of all the possible values of e, the set of all possible signal
histories forms the state space Ω = E ×H. I denote by P a probability measure on the
sigma algebra F = 2Ω. As will be formally captured through the equilibrium concept in
Section 2.4, the probability measure P is common knowledge among all respondents, but
signals are only privately known. With respect to the probability space (Ω, F , P), each
individual i’s signal at time t is a random variable Sit , so that each ω ∈ Ω corresponds to
a specific event Sit = sit, where sit ∈ S will be called a “realization” of Sit . I will use capital
letters to denote random variables and tuples of random variables throughout, so that we












, and so on.
5This small complication in definition will be useful due to the timing provided by market scoring
rules: When i is to move at t, i knows the reports of all individuals j < i from period t, but for j > i,
only the reports up until period t− 1. While the timing structure of the model assumes that signals of
all individuals at t are determined simultaneously, the notation h−it will be mostly used in the strategic
analysis of market scoring rules, and thus defining it according to the market scoring rule timing is useful.
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With slight abuse of notation, for an event f ∈ F , I write P(E |f) for the vector of
probabilities
(
P(E = 1 |f), ..., P(E = nE |f)
)
and analogously P(f |E) for the vector of
probabilities
(
P(f |E = 1), ..., P(f |E = nE)
)
. I further write p0 = P(E) for the common
belief about the event at the beginning of the market.
2.3.2 The Information Structure - Properties
I will next define some assumptions on P which are made throughout this chapter.
Definition 1. Two events f,g ∈ F are conditionally independent with respect to E if we
have :
P(f |g, E) = P(f |E) .
Furthermore, two random variables X and Y on (Ω, F , P) are conditionally indepen-
dent with respect to E if the events X = x and Y = y are conditionally independent with
respect to E for all realizations x, y.
Next, let f,g ∈ F be two events which are conditionally independent with respect to
E and let P(E |f) reflect the “current state of information” after learning about f . Then,
learning in addition that g, we get for all e ∈ E :
P(E = e |f, g) = P(E = e|f) P(g |E=e)P(g |f)
= P(E = e |f) P(g |E=e)∑
e′∈E P(E=e′ |f)P(g |E=e′)
And in more compact notation,
P(E = e |f, g) = P(E = e |f) P(g |E = e)
〈P(E |f) , P(g |E)〉 (2.3.1)
with 〈u,v〉 denoting the dot-product of two vectors u and v. I will next relate the
definitions above to the individual signals.
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Assumption 1. For any pairs (i, t) 6= (j,u) where i, j ∈N and t, u ∈ T , the two random
variables Sit and Siu are conditionally independent with respect to E.
Since this assumption permits that i = j, signals of the same individual at different
time periods are also assumed to be conditionally independent. Note that conditional
independence does not require that the signals of two different individuals, or of the same





= 0 for some s ∈ S.6
A second assumption on P is stochastic relevance:
Assumption 2. For all i∈N , t∈ T , and for all s,s′ ∈ S, the random variable Sit satisfies










Together, Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that for t ∈ T and any h ∈H−it :
P
(




E|Sit = s′, H−it = h
)
(2.3.3)
Thus, stochastic relevance of individual signals persists after conditioning on the signals
of other individuals. The relevance for the prediction market is that even after learning
about the information held by others, each individual piece of information determines a
unique probabilistic belief about the event E.
A further implication of Assumption 1 is that knowing P
(
E |H−it = h−it
)
and Sit , an
individual i can use Equation 2.3.1 to calculate:
P
(


















E |H−it = h
)〉 (2.3.4)
6As a result, this model nests the model in Chen et al. (2010), in which each individual can receive




= 0 for all s /∈ Si.
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Thus, at time point t, an individual does not need to have access to the entire history
h−it−1. It is enough to know the probability vectors P (St = s |E) and P
(
E = e |H−it = h
)
.
This reduces the computational burden for individuals.
The next assumption is that no signal history determines the event with certainty.
Assumption 3. For all signal histories h ∈H and all e ∈ E :
P(E = e |H = h) 6= 1 (2.3.5)
This assumption is mostly made for technical convenience, but can also be seen as a
normative commitment that no belief about an empirical event should be 1 until the event
has realized. Finally, as mentioned above, Sit = 0 denotes that i does not receive any new
information at time t. We can now formally express this as follows: For all i ∈ I and all
s,s′ ∈ S, for any t ∈ T and any f ∈ F :
P
(
E |Sit = 0, f
)
= P(E |f) (2.3.6)
Note that this is a vacuous assumption (since we can always add 0 to any existing set




> 0. The purpose of including zero-signals is that
we can capture that individuals do not receive information by describing them as receiving
a specific signal. For the strategic setting, we can then treat individuals who are “waiting
out” the market by claiming that their probabilistic beliefs have not changed as a special
case of them misstating the information they have received. It is completely compatible
with the model however, to make the assumption that individuals have to receive relevant
information in every period.
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2.3.3 Scoring Rules and KL-divergence
Before turning to the interactive aspects of strategic reports made by multiple decision-
makers, it will be useful to recall the central concept of individual belief elicitation. A
scoring rule R can be thought of as mapping a probabilistic forecast of E and the actual
realization of E into a real-value:
R : ∆nE ×E → R (2.3.7)
with ∆nE the nE-dimensional probability simplex. A proper scoring rule has the





peR (r,e) = p (2.3.8)
This has the following interpretation, mirroring the explanation in Section 2.2: Suppose
that a decision-maker observes event f ∈ F and thus has subjective beliefs p = P(E |f).
The decision-maker can then calculate the expected payoff ∑e∈E peR (r,e) when reporting
to have the belief r∆nE . A proper scoring rule has the property that this expected payoff
is maximized when r = p, i.e. when the decision-maker reports her true belief.
Closely connected to the notion of proper scoring rules is the measure of the divergence
of two probability vectors x, y ∈ ∆m. The so-called Kullback–Leibler divergence (KL-










As can be easily checked, we have L(x, x) = 0 and L(x, y)> 0 whenever x 6= y, a fact
known as the Gibbs’ inequality.
To see the connection to proper scoring rules, note that we can restrict x to only take
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values at the edges of the simplex ∆nE . We could interpret these as outcomes of the
event E, where xe = 1 denotes that E = e. Then, the scoring rule R (r,e) = c+ log re can
be written as c−L(r,x). This scoring rule is called the logarithmic scoring rule (LSR).
Furthermore, when R is the logarithmic scoring rule, the maximization problem in 2.3.8
can be rewritten as minimizing L(p, r). Since this minimization problem has the unique
solution r = p, the LSR is proper.
A key feature of the information structure introduced thus far is captured in the fol-
lowing Lemma:
Lemma 1. Let f, f ′ ∈ F be two events and let G ⊂ F be a partition on Ω such that any
event g ∈ G is, conditionally on E, independent of f and f ′. Then, we have for any g ∈ G :
P(E = e|f) P(E = e |f ′, g)
P(E = e |f ′) P(E = e |f, g) =
P(g |f)
P(g |f ′)
Proof. Using Bayes’ rule:
P
(
E = e |g, f ′
)
= P(g |f
′, E = e)
P(g |f ′) P
(
E = e | f ′
)
,
P(E = e |g, f) = P(g |f, E = e)
P(g |f) P(E = e | f) ,
Since P(g |f, E) = P(g |f ′, E) = P(g |E) by assumption, we get
P(E = e |g, f)
P(E = e |g, f ′) =
P(E = e | f)
P(E = e | f ′)
P(g |f ′)
P(g |f)
which can be rearranged to yield the Lemma.








P(E = e |f, g)
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The first term is the log-likelihood ratio for predicting the event E = e from events f
and f ′, the second term is the same ratio, but with additional conditioning on an event
g which is conditionally independent of f and f ′. The lemma says that the difference in
these two log-likelihoods is the log-likelihood ratio for predicting the event g and thus does












= ∑g∈G P(g |f) log(P(g |f ′)P(g |f)
)
= L(P(g |f) , P(g |f ′))> 0.
This property will be important when analyzing payment schemes building on the log-
arithmic scoring rule. Suppose that an individual predicts the event E = e and misstates
their information as event f ′, rather than f . Other individuals, conditioning on the mis-
stated event f ′ also predict E, taking their own information g into account. The original
individual, when taking expectations, according to the equation above, expects that the
predictive error without conditioning on g is larger than with conditioning. Essentially,
this property of an information structure in which individual private information is con-
ditionally independent makes the LMSR robust to strategic manipulation. The details of
this idea will be spelled out in the next section.
2.4 The Model – Strategic Behavior
In this section, we will treat market scoring rules with the tools of game theory. I first
recall the definition of market scoring rules, in a slighlty more general and formal way:
Definition 2. A market scoring rule is defined through the following procedure. Let
R = int(∆nE ), the interior of the simplex ∆|nE |. At period 0, the market maker sets
the “initial belief” r01 equal to p0 (the prior probabilities regarding the event E). At
20
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every t ∈ T , each individual i ∈ N makes a report rit ∈ R, upon learning all previous






are made, and the event
E resolves, each individual i receives the payment:












where r0t is defined as rnt−1 for all t > 1 and R is a proper scoring rule. If R is the
logarithmic scoring rule, then we speak of the logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR).
Note that while the index ordering of individuals is deterministic in the model, one
could in practice think of drawing them randomly before the start of the market, or even
draw them anew at each period. See Section 2.6 for further discussion.
The definition is identical to the one in Hanson (2003) and in Chen et al. (2010), except
for the restriction that each report has to be in int(∆nE ). This avoids the issue of infinite
payoffs on off-equilibrium paths when the logarithmic scoring rule is used. As a further
restriction, in what follows, I will only allow pure strategies for all players in N . This is
purely to avoid notational complexities. Outcomes determined by mixed strategies would
not be measurable by P. With slight abuse of terminology, I will refer to an assessment
in which each i ∈ N plays a pure strategy as a pure strategy profile. While the state of
the world player W is in principle an “ordinary” player of the game, the fact that W has
only one available strategy, makes it mute to specify W ′s strategy in a description of an
assessment.
In principle, the payment scheme by an MSR defines an extensive form game of in-
complete information, i.e. a game in which participants move consecutively and in which
participants are uncertain about some aspects of the payment structure. This latter fact
is since respondents do not know which future information they receive, what the outcome
is of the event they are scored for, and so on. To be able to apply standard equilibrium
concepts, a game of incomplete information is usually translated to a game of imperfect
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information, in which all payments are specified but participants do not always know pre-
vious moves by other players. The player set then includes a “nature player” whose unique
strategy is determining events according to the information structure (in case of the MSR,
determining the event E and informing individuals about their signals Sit).
2.4.1 Extensive Form Games
The following definition of an extensive form game is similar to the canonical one given in
Mas-Collel et al. (1995) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).
Definition 3. A game Γ is a collection 〈P ,A,D,O, o, u, I, α, φ〉. The set P is a finite
set of players and A is a set of actions. D is a set of decision nodes and each d ∈ D is a
sequence of actions a1, ...,an, ai ∈A.  is a successor relation on D, where a node for which
there is no successor is called a terminal node. O is a set of outcomes and the outcome
function o maps each terminal decision node into an outcome. (ui)i∈P is a collection of
utility functions which map O into the real numbers. I is a collection of information sets,
forming a partition on D (so that each information set in I is a set of decision nodes), the
action function α assigns a set of available actions to each information set and the player
function φ assigns each information set to a player of the game.
In intuitive terms, an extensive form game of imperfect information is played by players
P who move sequentially at decision nodes d, with the player function p determining who
moves at which point.  describes the order of moves, O determines what happens at
final nodes and u expresses the players preferences. The collection of information sets I
expresses the imperfect information by containing all decision nodes which a player cannot
distinguish when making a move. Thus, in the game it is more apt to say that players
move at information sets, rather than at decision nodes.
Given a game Γ, we can further define the notion of strategies and strategy profiles,
again largely following Mas-Collel et al. (1995).
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Definition 4. Let Ii = {I ∈ I |φ(I) = i}, the set of all information sets to which player i
is assigned. A pure strategy σi (or just strategy) for player i∈ P is a mapping Ii→A such
that for each I ∈ Ii, σi (I) ∈ α (I) (that is, σ must assign an action which is available at
I). A mixed strategy is a probability assignment on the set of pure strategies. A collection
of σi for all i ∈ P is called a strategy profile.
The idea of translating a game of incomplete information into a game of imperfect
information by the introduction of a nature player is due to Harsanyi (1968).
Definition 5. Let player W be the nature player. At each node such that φ(d) =W , the
nature player only has a single available strategy, pre-specified by the game.
In addition to a strategy profile σ, we also define a system which will govern the beliefs
of the players throughout the game:
Definition 6. The belief system µ specifies, at every information set I ∈ I, a probability
distribution µ(I) over each d ∈ I, i.e. for all I ∈ I, ∑d∈I µ(d) = 1 and µ(d) ≥ 0 for all




and a belief system µ form an assessment (σ, µ).
2.4.2 Games on the Information Structure
The next definition describes a class of extensive form games which are compatible with
the information structure described in Section 2.3.1.
Definition 7. Let 〈Ω, F , P〉 be the information structure as defined in Section 2.3.1 and
consider a game Γ. The game Γ is a valid game on 〈Ω, F , P〉 if it satisfies the following
description:
1. The set of players includes all individuals in N and a nature player W .
2. The game starts with a move by the nature player determining E, who plays the
action E = e with probability P(E = e).
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3. The collection of information sets I can be partitioned into sets I1, ...,IT , with the
interpretation that for any I ∈ It, the player φ(I) moves at time t.
4. The first move of player W at t is to choose Sit = s for all i ∈N , where for all s ∈ S,
Sit = s happens with probability P
(
Sit = s|E = e
)
.
5. At each I ∈ It at which a player in N moves, a player knows all previous choices
Si1, ...,S
i
t by player W , but cannot distinguish different choices for E or for S
j
t for
any j 6= φ(I).
Conditions 1 and 2 make sure that the underlying information structure of the game is
given by 〈Ω, F , P〉. Conditions (3-5) mean that the rest of the game must be compatible
with the timing of the information structure and must leave the privacy of information
intact. Given these restrictions, the game could still be quite different from the game
played by participants of a market scoring rule. For instance, a valid game could have
each player make predictions without knowing the previous probability assessments of
other players. There could also be more elaborate structures in which for instance, at a
time point t, individuals can “challenge” the reports made by other individuals, and then
individuals make additional probabilistic reports. It is also possible that the nature player
moves again, e.g. by tossing a coin to determine which player receives a payoff. Some of
these other forms are discussed in Section 2.6. Further formal treatment and comparisons
of market scoring rules with other valid games on 〈Ω, F , P〉 seem like a fruitful area of
future research.
2.4.3 Equilibria and Information Revelation
A strategy profile σ and a belief system µ fully determine the moves made by all players
(including W ), and thus pin down a probability for any decision node to be reached
starting from any information set I. Suppose that I ∈ It and φ(I) = i. Since each such
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decision node corresponds to a specific signal history and event E = e, we can define a
probability measure representing the beliefs of individual i at t over the signal histories
and about the event E. Let µI ( . |σ) denote this probability measure taken at information
set I ∈ I (conditioning on strategy σ) and let µ0 ( .|σ) denote the case that I ∈ I0 (and
thus I only contains d0). Using this notation, we can define the following restriction on a
belief system µ:
Definition 8. The assessment (σ, µ) is consistent with Bayes’ rule if for any I ∈ I and
any d ∈ I




In similar fashion, we can also write µI (o |σ), to denote the probability of outcome
o ∈O as seen from information set I, given belief system µ and strategy profile σ. We can
use this notation to define our equilibrium concept:
Definition 9. Let Γ be a valid game on 〈Ω, F , P〉. The assessment (σ, µ) is a Perfect
Bayes-Nash equilibrium (or just equilibrium) if (σ, µ) is consistent with Bayes’ rule and






ui (o)dµI (o|σ̃) (2.4.2)
for any σ̃ such that all of the following three conditions hold:
1. σ̃i (I) 6= σi (I) ,
2. σ̃i (I ′) = σi (I ′) for all I ′ from which I can be reached,
3. σ̃j = σj for all j 6= i.
In words, at any information set I, reporting according to strategy σi leads to a higher
expected payoff than a deviating strategy σ̃i, as measured by µI at this information set.
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This is under the restriction that all other players stick to their strategy and that σ̃
is identical to σ for all information sets preceding I. The latter restriction reflects the
dynamic nature of the setting. It may happen that at some information set, an individual
regrets having reported according to σi earlier, because new information makes i expect
that different actions would have led to a higher pay-off. However, for an equilibrium
strategy σ, at the time of acting, each plan of future actions according to σ has the highest
expected payoff.
Definition 10. Consider information sets I, I ′ ∈ Iit which only differ with respect to the
signal Sit . An equilibrium assessment (σ, µ) is separating if for all i ∈N and all such I, I ′
which are reached with positive probability, we have σi (I) 6= σi (I ′).
That is, if a player has the same information at information sets I, I ′ ∈ Iit , except
that according to I, i learns at t that Sit = s and according to I ′, i learns at t that
Sit = s′ 6= s, then i chooses a different action at the two information sets. In a separating
equilibrium assessment, the market-maker can infer the signals by observing the players’
actions. Therefore, I will say in the following that:
Definition 11. A valid game Γ induces information revelation, if there is a separating
equilibrium assessment (σ, µ) in Γ.
2.4.4 Market Scoring Rules as Games
With the notion of a valid game, we can define a market scoring rule game (MSR game)
as a valid game in which each player moves exactly once at t, and the information set
of each player att contains all previous reports made by all other players, and the signal
realizations si1, ..., sit. For MSR games, we can simplify the definition of a Perfect Bayes-
Nash equilibrium somewhat. Note that the probability measure µI we constructed above
also assigns probabilities over signal histories: for some history h, we can simply define
µI (h |σ) as the sum over the probability assigned by µI (. |σ) to all decision nodes which are
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reached under history h. Note further that a strategy profile σ and a history h completely
determine the outcome o ∈ O in an MSR game, which I will denote σ (h). Then:
Remark 1. An assessment in an MSR game (σ, µ) is a Perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium if
it is consistent with Bayes’ rule and for any i ∈N , and any I ∈ Ii:
∑
h∈H
µI (h |σ) E
[





µI (h |σ) E
[
πi (σ̃ (h) , E) |H = h
]
(2.4.3)
for any σ̃ which differs from σ at I and is identical for all information sets preceding I.
Finally, I will make the following restriction.
Definition 12. A restricted MSR game allows only probabilistic reports rit such that there













As explained above, this restriction simplifies the description of strategies and thereby
the statement and proof of the main result.
2.5 The Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule Game -
Results
2.5.1 The LMSR Game - Defining Truthfulness
Having defined a market scoring rule as a game, and simplified the notion of a Perfect
Bayes-Nash equilibrium for such games, we will next analyze specific strategies in an MSR
game and in particular show that “reporting truthfully” forms an equilibrium.
Definition 13. A report history r=
(
r0, ...., r11...., r
n
1 , ..., r
1




is explained by the signal
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at (t, i) if
rju = P
(




for all (u,j) such that (i) u < t or (ii) u= t and j < i. Furthermore, a report history r
is believable at (t, i) if there is a signal history which explains it at (t, i).
A restricted MSR game can thus also be defined as an MSR game in which only
believable reports are allowed. Note that the set of believable reports is a finite set – and
thus a set of measure zero among all possible reports. In practical implementation, this
means that the market-maker needs to know the probability measure P precisely. As I
argue in the Discussion below, this practical limitation makes it desirable to extend the
results in this chapter to market scoring rules without the restriction.
Believable report histories naturally extend to believable information sets:
Definition 14. Let r be the report history in all decision nodes in information set I ∈ It
at which player i is to move. Then I is explained by the signal history ht if r is explained
by ht at (t, i).
The next definition clarifies what it means for market participants to make truthful
reports:
Definition 15. A strategy profile σ is truthful if for any information set I which is
explained by the signal history ht
σi (I) = P
(
E |H−it = h−it , Hit−1 = hit−1
)
(2.5.1)
A truthful profile is thus one in which individuals always report their probabilistic
beliefs, taking the signals implied by previous probabilistic reports at face value.
I also introduce the notion of a trusting belief profile
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Definition 16. Let information set I be explained by the signal history ht at (t, i−1)
and let hit be i’s true signal history at I. In an MSR game, a belief profile µ is trusting if









E = e |H−it = h−it , Hit = hit
)
if h̃−it = h−it
0 else
(2.5.2)
for any d ∈ I.
That is, in a trusting assessment, an individual assigns all probability mass to deci-
sion nodes consistent with the history explaining the information set. Among these, the
decision nodes are assigned a probability according to the event outcome e ∈ E that char-
acterizes them. As there is exactly one decision node corresponding to each e ∈ E among





E = e |H−it = h−it , Hit = hit
)
= 1
we can conclude that ∑d∈I µ(d) = 1.
In a restricted MSR game, all information sets are believable. We can then see by
induction that there is only a unique assessment which is trusting and truthful: When
individual 1 makes a report in period 1, the only trusting belief about the signal history
is to assign probability 1 to h0, and the only truthful report is P(E |S11 = s11). For the
inductive step, note that if the entire signal history can be inferred before an individual
i moves at t, and i makes a truthful report at t, then i’s signal at t can be inferred as
well from the stochastic relevance property from Equation 2.3.3. Therefore, when the
strategy is truthful, a trusting belief system must assign probability mass 1 to decision
nodes representing the true signal history, according to the true conditional probability
P
(
E = e |H−it = h−it , Hit = hit
)
. There is thus only a single trusting and truthful assess-
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ment in the restricted MSR game
Definition 17. In a restricted MSR game, let the (unique) trusting and truthful assess-
ment be called the max-trust assessment.
The max-trust assessment is consistent with Bayes’ rule, since for any decision node d







E = e |H−it = h−it , Hit = hit
)
= µI (d |σ) .
where µ0, µI are defined as in Definition 8.
In the unrestricted MSR game without the restriction, we would also need to specify
what σ and µ prescribe at non-believable history nodes to complete the description of an
assessment. There is then not a unique trusting and truthful assessment. For the result
stated in this chapter however, Equations (2.5.1) and (2.5.2) are sufficient.
2.5.2 Information Revelation
It is straightforward to see that the max-trust assessment is separating. Thus, if it is a
Perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the restricted LMSR game, we can conclude that the
restricted LMSR induces information revelation. We will next prove that this is indeed
the case, the main insight of this chapter.
Proposition 1. If P satisfies conditional independence, the restricted LMSR induces in-
formation revelation. Specifically, the max-trust assessment is a Perfect Bayes-Nash equi-
librium in the restricted LMSR game.
Proof. To begin the argument, suppose that all individuals report truthfully and have
trusting beliefs. Consider some i ∈ N . We want to show that any deviation from the
truthful strategy leads to a lower expected payoff for i. The underlying idea of showing
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this is as follows: The “instantaneous payoff” for i for reporting at any t∈ T (that is, the
payoff for just this report, after the event E is observed) is given by a proper scoring rule.
Since proper scoring rules score higher in expectation for truthful probabilistic reports,
a profitable deviation could only come from misleading other participants, and gaining
from correcting their reports at a later point in time. However, under the conditional
independence information structure, the gain from correcting this belief will always be
lower in expectation than the loss from the initial misreport, as we can show by making
use of Lemma 1.
To make this argument precise, fix an individual i, and consider an arbitrary strategy
profile σ̃ in which i is not truthful at some information set. Fix a signal history h̄ which
induces reports in which i is not truthful, let t be the first time period in which i does
not report truthfully and let I be the corresponding information set. We will construct a
new strategy σ from σ̃ in which i instead reports truthfully at t in history h̄. Moreover,
σ ”behaves like σ̃ everywhere else”, in the following sense. All other individuals stick to
the max-trust strategy for each report which is reached with positive probability starting
from I (given the strategy profile σ̃). Therefore, when individual i is to move at time
period t+1, the entire signal history H−it can be inferred. Whenever two information sets
I ′ and I ′′ can be reached with positive probability starting from I according to σ and σ̃,
respectively, we then let σ (I ′) = σ̃ (I ′′) whenever the inferred signal history is identical for
I ′ and I ′′. That is, we pair information sets from the path starting from I according to σ
and information sets starting from I according to σ̃ which have the same signal history,
and set σ’s report at each member of the pair equal to what σ̃ specifies for the other
member. We can leave σ unspecified for all other information sets, as they occur with
probability zero as viewed from information set I, and thus do not affect the expected
payoff as viewed from I.
To simplify notation, let i= 1. The report just before i’s next report is thus rnt . As a
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further simplification, let t = 1.7 Denote 1’s true signal at time period 1 by s. Then, we





≡ r11 = P
(








E = e |S11 = s̃
)
≡ r̃11 (2.5.3)
Note next that by construction the payoff difference for strategy σ̃i and strategy σi is
only determined by the score i receives for the report in period 1 and the score i has to
pay in period t+ 1.
In expectation, the payoff difference for strategy σ̃i and strategy σi is given by:
∑
h∈H
µI (h |σ) E
[





µI (h |σ) E
[
π1 (σ̃ (h) , E) |H = h
]
(2.5.4)
We further have that the payoffs from σ and from σ̃, as viewed from information set I,
only differ at periods 1 and 2. Under strategy σ, if the event realization is e∈ E , individual
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− log (r̃n1 (e)) under
strategy σ̃. Note that by construction of the strategy σ, the reports r̃12 (e) and r12 (e) are



























. Since P̃ is a
probability measure and satisfies conditional independence, we could replace P by P̃ in all steps of the
proof. Moreover, instead of taking expectation over all histories, we would take expectation over all
histories h which agree with h̄ up until t. Setting t = 1, avoids this notational complexity while leaving
all arguments intact.
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∣∣∣S11 = s), P(H−11 = h |S11 = s̃))> 0.
We have thus shown that the expected payoff for following strategy σ is higher than
for following strategy σ̃. Recall that we considered an arbitrary history h̄ in which σ̃
specified at least one untruthful probability report. In this history h̄, there can only be a
finite number of misstated probabilistic beliefs. Let l be this number. We can construct
a sequence σ1, ...,σl where σ1 = σ and for k > 1, σk replaces the first lie of strategy σk−1
by a truthful report. Since each such σk is a deviation from the truthful strategy in h̄,
it follows from the above that σk has a higher expected payoff than σk−1. Consequently,
σl, which is truthful throughout h̄, has the highest expected payoff. Since we are showing
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this relation for an arbitrary history h̄ , we can infer that the truthful strategy improves
upon any deviation σ̃, at all signal histories. This proves the proposition.
2.6 Discussion
The main result of this chapter is that market scoring rules are robust to strategic manipu-
lation, even if individuals update on the information provided by other market participants
and by new information they receive privately – and expect other participants do to so
as well. In previous work, individuals are either considered ’myopic’, i.e. they disregard
information provided by other participants, or individuals receive information only once,
at the beginning of the market.
As a further, more technical, contribution of this chapter, I introduced a distinction
between two versions of market scoring rules. In the restricted market scoring rule, the
market-designer knows the underlying information structure of the setting, and can rule
out probabilistic reports which cannot possibly reflect market participants’ subjective be-
liefs (because there is no information they could have received which would make it their
subjective belief). Participants can still mislead the market-maker or other individuals
about their private information, but in doing so, they need to pretend to have received
some information which occurs with positive probability. In an unrestricted market such
reports are allowed, and the designer does not need to know the information structure.
Restricting the market scoring rule simplifies the description of equilibrium strategies and
allows to highlight the main mechanics of how the LMSR induces truth-telling. However,
in practice, the market-designer may not know the distribution of private information.
A market which only allows specific types of reports could also be seen as intranspar-
ent. Therefore, it seems preferable to use the LMSR in an unrestricted way, and indeed
it has been in all practical applications. A particularly important avenue of theoretical
investigation would therefore be to study the properties of the unrestricted LMSR.
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A crucial assumption in deriving the main result is that individuals’ signals – their
privately held information – is independent conditional on the outcome of the true event.
To further illustrate what is entailed by this assumption, I will next give an example in
which it is violated. Suppose we have E = {1,2}, S = {1,2}, T = 2 and P(E = 1) = 12 .
Suppose now that
P(S11 = 0) = 1
That is, with certainty individual 1 does not receive an informative signal in period
1.8 Moreover, we have:
P(S21 = 1,S12 = 1|E = 1) = 12 − ε, P(S
2
1 = 1,S12 = 2|E = 1) = ε2 ,
P(S21 = 2,S12 = 2|E = 1) = 12 , P(S
2
1 = 2,S12 = 1|E = 2) = ε2 ,




1 = 1,S12 = 1|E = 0) = ε2 ,




1 = 2,S12 = 2|E = 0) = ε2 .
where 12 > ε > 0. Note that for small ε, the state E = 1 thus corresponds to signal
distributions in which the signals S21 and S12 are almost always identical, and in the state
E = 0 the signals are almost always different from each other. Realizations of the two




















For small ε, the information contained in the individual signal S21 does thus not move
the posterior of individual 2 far away from the prior of 12 . However, if individual 2 were
to know S21 and S12 , the situation is quite different: if S12 = S21 then E = 1 with near
8With this assumption, the game essentially becomes the “Sequence Selection Game” considered in
Chen et al. (2010).
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certainty and else E = 0 with near certainty. This configuration means that the max-trust
assessment is not an equilibrium. We assumed that individual 1 does not learn anything
in period 1. Thus, in period 1, individual 1 reports r11 = 0.5. Next, individual 2 is to move.
Suppose individual 2 observes S21 = 1. Truth-telling would require reporting r21 = 12 (1− ε).
If instead 2 reports 12+ε however, individual 1 would conclude that individual 2 observed
S21 = 2. Then, if S12 = 1, individual 1 would conclude that E = 1 and if S12 = 2, then
individual 1 would conclude that E = 2 – both with near certainty – and report accordingly.
In both cases, individual 2 can infer S12 and would conclude that the state is in fact the
opposite. Individual 2 can then make a large expected profit by reporting in period 2. In
contrast, the expected loss from misreporting in period 1 is only L
(
1





can be arbitrarily close to 0 for sufficiently small ε.
Note that this example is quite drastic. Where conditional independence stipulates
that upon knowing the event E, knowing S21 adds no information about the signal S12 (and
thus knowing the event E annihilates the predictive value of S21 for S12), in the example
knowing the event E increases the ability to predict S12 from S21 . It is difficult to imagine
practical settings in which this is a plausible assumption. It can further be shown that
Proposition 1 continues to hold if one assumes that knowing the event E never increases
the ability to predict S12 from S21 . However, if conditional independence is replaced by
this more general assumption, the updating formula given by Equation (2.3.4) does not
hold anymore. The current market price does then not reflect all relevant information
– participants need to know the entire report history to compute their posterior beliefs.
Thus, the fundamental property of prediction markets to have prices reflect all relevant
information is quite closely linked to the assumption of conditional independence, and
should thus only be applied when conditional independence can be plausibly assumed.
Another notion which is discussed in studies of the myopic strategic properties of
MSRs, but which has been completely neglected in this chapter so far, is “sybil-proofness”
(Douceur, 2002). A sybil is an additional participant in the market, who is in fact the
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same person as an already existing member. Sybil-proofness is important in an online
setting in which one cannot verify the identity of every new member, and there is value
in having a large number of participants. Both of these requirements seem reasonable in
the context of prediction markets. Suppose that the set of individuals N , and their labels
1, . . . , n are fixed. If a new entrant gets the label n+ 1, then it is easy to see that the
LMSR is sybil-proof: When the sybil is to move, it is best – as per Proposition 1 – to
report the true belief, which will simply be the previous report, as the sybil does not in
fact have any new information. The payoff of the sybil is then zero, and there is no effect
on other market participants. A different situation arises when the order is not fixed,
but randomly determined at each time period, or determined after individuals had the
possibility to create sybils. In this case, by creating an additional market participant, an
individual i can increase the chance to make a report earlier within the same period. When
the other market participant controlled by i is to move, i can simply let the report equal
the preceding report – ensuring a payoff of zero for this report. For the same reason that
the LMSR is robust to strategic misstatements, the LMSR with a randomly determined
order is susceptible to sybil-attacks: it is attractive for market participants to report as
early as possible.
The problem of sybil-attacks is not severe if signals occur relatively rarely over time.
In this case, the market-maker can choose T to be very fine-grained (allowing reports at
every millisecond, say). By default, market participants would be “inactive”, i.e. just
reporting what the previous report said. The market-maker could then charge a minimal
fee for entering the market. For a very fine-grained T , the benefit of reporting early within
a time-period decreases, since for most periods, most participants will not make “active”
reports (changing the probability of the previous report). In expectation, creating a sybil
may then be too costly to be profitable.
As a result, the LMSR can deal with the problem of sybil attacks much more efficiently
than a rival incentive scheme in which each individual simply is rewarded by a proper scor-
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ing rule for their individual reports. As was noted in the introduction, such a scheme may
lead to unlimited costs for the market-maker, as the number of participants increases.
This could be counteracted by dividing every participants’ payoff by the number of partic-
ipants. However, such a scheme would still be open to sybil-attacks, as participants could
essentially double their payments by creating a sybil (and triple by creating two sybils,
and so on). Moreover, multiplying payments by 1n has the disadvantage that even very
informative reports might lead to a very small payoff. This way, unlike in the LMSR, the
payoff of a very well-informed individual could be drastically reduced by a large crowd of
noisy market participants. It seems like a fertile area of future research to characterize
other valid payment schemes on the information structure which have similar properties
with respect to sybil-attacks and payments for information, and which properties fully
characterize the LMSR.
Finally, it would be of interest to loosen the assumption of risk neutrality. Risk neu-
trality is assumed in most of the prediction market literature, and can sometimes be
justified through the observation that the behavior of large financial players can be ap-
proximately described by risk-neutrality. However, in case of the LMSR it is an explicit
goal to aggregate information from a large number of participants, some of which may be
quite budget-constrained. Therefore, extensions of the LMSR which make it robust to risk
aversion seem desirable. This would open up connections to a large literature on belief
elicitation for decision-makers who are not risk-neutral, and may not behave according
to expected utility theory (e.g. Kothiyal et al., 2010; Lambert, 2018; Offerman et al.,
2009). In principle, it should be possible to replace the scoring rules in the LMSR by
these more general individual schemes. However, if one keeps the goal of a fixed loss to
the market-maker, and the assumption that informative reports should not decrease in
value simply because the number of market participants increases, bad forecasts need to
be inevitably connected to a financial loss some of the time. This puts some limits on
what can be achieved for risk averse decision-makers. What can and cannot be achieved
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by LMSRs which are adapted for non-risk neutral decision-makers,9 is yet to be spelled
out.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
The model provided in this chapter gives a setting in which the LMSR induces information
revelation. I have further outlined some fruitful avenues of future research which could
make LMSRs applicable to a larger class of decision-makers – and to a wider class of
practical applications. Given the promising aspects of LMSR, it is encouraging that it
is already employed in practice (with Dreber et al., 2015 and Camerer et al., 2016, 2018
as particularly noteworthy applications). This gives rise to the hope that in the near
future, prediction markets to aggregate beliefs about verifiable, near term, events may be
in widespread use, and that these markets will inform and improve public policy-making.
9As an example how this could work, consider the classic idea to transform payoffs from a scoring rule
into probabilities of winning a fixed prize. Due to the bounded loss assumption, it seems necessary that
respondents not only win the prize some of the time, but also need to pay it to other participants. For
some decision-makers, incentive compatibility will be restored if they are allowed to determine the size of
the payoffs (essentially picking a scalar a ∈ [0, 1] with which to multiply the prize). Future work could




Follow the money, not the majority:
Incentivizing and aggregating
expert opinions with Bayesian markets1
3.1 Introduction
A centerpiece of economic theory is the idea that markets are efficient aggregators of
information (Hayek, 1945; Hurwicz, 1960; Fama, 1970). Historically, this idea has been
a descriptive one, explaining the success of market institutions as we encounter them in
the real world. In line with an ongoing shift from mere description towards applying
economic theory to also create institutions (Roth, 2002, 2018), economists have more
recently argued for the use of artificially designed markets (“prediction markets”) with
information aggregation as a designated goal (Arrow et al., 2008; Hanson, 2003, 2013).
Successful applications range from forecasts of political elections (Forsythe et al., 1992;
Berg et al., 2008) to business sales (Cowgill and Zitzewitz, 2015; Gillen et al., 2017) and
the replicability of experiments in social science (Dreber et al., 2015; Camerer et al.,
1This chapter is based on an eponymous paper co-authored with Aurélien Baillon and Tong V. Wang.
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2016, 2018). For those tools to be successful it is however necessary, both for theoretical
and practical reasons, that the true answer to the question they are applied to can be
determined within a relatively short time frame. This poses a challenge when we wish to
apply them to questions such as whether extraterrestrial life exists or whether genetically
modified food is dangerous. For such questions, not only is the answer presently unknown,
but it is also uncertain when and how the answer will be known, if at all. This creates
what we call the “incentive problem”: When asking experts (or a crowd of laypeople) to
give an answer, how can we incentivize their truth-telling if we do not know whether or
when the correct answer will be known?
Besides the incentive problem, we furthermore face an “aggregation problem”: which
opinion to select if experts disagree? The obvious candidate is the majority opinion, but
there is no guarantee that it is the best approach. For instance, imagine each expert
can design and run an experiment to test whether a statement is true. Running an
experiment can be seen as drawing a binary signal (“support” or “falsify”) about the
state of nature (whether the statement is true or not). In some extreme cases, a single
falsification among many attempts should lead to the rejection of the statement. This
would be the case under a strictly Popperian scientific methodology (Popper, 1959) or when
validating a mathematical statement, where a single counterexample would be sufficient
to establish its falsity. Obviously, in most scientific endeavours, especially in the social
sciences, experiments can be noisy and one may expect some experiments falsifying a
statement even if it is true. However, the main argument remains: some opinions, based
on signals that are more difficult to get, should drive the conclusion even if they are a
minority.
In this chapter, we study a mechanism which solves both the incentive problem and
the aggregation problem simultaneously. We design a market in which experts report their
opinions about a statement (endorse it or not) and trade an asset whose value is determined
by the total endorsements. Those who endorse the statement are offered to buy the asset
42
BENJAMIN TEREICK: MAKING CROWDS WISER
from a center at price p, where p is randomly drawn. Essentially, buying the asset is
betting that more than p% of others will endorse the statement. Those not endorsing the
statement can sell the asset to the center. Baillon (2017) showed that such a “Bayesian
market” provides incentives to report opinions truthfully, avoiding the no-trade theorem
(Milgrom and Stokey, 1982) through the intermediary role of the center. By making a small
adjustment to this mechanism—making the price individualized, independently drawn for
each market participant—we show that Bayesian markets have desirable properties with
respect to aggregation as well. With sufficiently many participants, experts with the
signal that indicates the actual state of nature, and only them, will make a profit. Hence,
by “following the money”, we can infer the state of nature without relying on what the
majority thinks.
The intuition of our result is based on an argument put forward by Prelec et al. (2017).
If signals are correlated with the states of nature, there will be more signals supporting
a state of nature when this state is the actual one than when it is not, and therefore,
than we would have expected ex ante. Prelec et al. (2017) proposed the surprisingly
popular algorithm (SPA) in which people are asked to endorse a state and predict the rate
of endorsement. The algorithm picks the state that is more often endorsed than people
predicted. Prelec et al. (2017) demonstrated theoretically and experimentally that this
approach improves upon majority and confidence-weighted aggregation.
Bayesian markets allow us to obtain the same improvement but with less information
and requiring less cognitive efforts from the participants. We can estimate people’s pre-
dictions by fitting supply and demand curves for the asset. Furthermore, our method
simultaneously provides incentives to truthfully report opinions even if the state of nature
is unobservable. Our market approach is not only simpler for participants than the method
of Prelec et al. (2017). It also opens up the possibility of continuous markets, extending
prediction markets to unverifiable events.
The next section of the chapter introduces the theoretical setting and the market. We
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analyze payoffs at the equilibrium and show how the endorsement of those with positive
payoffs indicates the actual state of nature. If the statement is true, those endorsing it can
make a profit from betting on others’ endorsement rate. If it is not true, those rejecting
it can make a profit. The profits realize even in the absence of verification of the actual
state of nature, because bets are based on endorsement rates, not on states.
Section 3.3 describes an experiment we ran on a large sample of US students. We
used a task developed for the experiment reported in Chapter 4 that ensures that the
informational assumptions of the model are satisfied. Under these assumptions, homo
economicus would behave exactly as our model predicts. Our experiment allowed us to
test whether our method also worked for homo sapiens, without having to worry whether
the informational part of the model perfectly described the reality. We compared our
method to the majority opinion and to the SPA. Despite using less information than the
SPA, our method had comparable accuracy rates. Both methods substantially improved
upon the majority opinion.
3.2 Theory
3.2.1 Setting
Let {Y,N} be the state space, with Y andN the two possible states of nature. For instance,
these two states can represent whether a statement is true or not. Which state S we are
in, is assumed to be unobservable.
A group of n≥ 4 expert agents however has private information about the state.2 The
common prior of the agents is that the probability of state Y is r. Each agent gets a
private signal si ∈ {0,1}, with the following sampling probabilities: P (si = 1 |Y ) = ωY ,
P (si = 1 |N) = ωN , and ωY > ωN . This implies that signals are informative about the
2n≥ 4 is required for technical reasons (Baillon, 2017).
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state of nature, si = 1 providing support for Y and si = 0 for N . We do not require
ωY > 0.5 > ωN , which would be necessary for the majority of signals to be correct (in an
infinite group of agents). The assumption ωY > ωN is as mild as can be. Equality would
mean that si is non informative and therefore, all agents would stick to the prior belief
r. The opposite inequality would simply change the interpretation of the signal (si = 0
providing support for Y and si = 1 for N). Together, we call the triplet 〈ωY ,ωN , r〉 a
signal technology.
Using Bayesian updating, agents form posterior beliefs about the actual state according
to
r1 ≡ P (Y |si = 1) =
rωY
rωY + (1− r)ωN
; (3.2.1)
r0 ≡ P (Y |si = 0) =
r(1−ωY )
r(1−ωY ) + (1− r)(1−ωN )
. (3.2.2)
For simplicity, we assume that ωY , ωN , and r are such that r1 > 0.5 and r0 < 0.5. It allows
us to equate an agent’s signal with the state the agent believes more likely to be the actual
state. If this assumption is not satisfied, signals would be informative but a single signal
would not suffice to reverse one’s belief. A sufficient condition for this assumption is
r = 0.5, as used in our experiment.
Apart from the agents’ posterior beliefs about states, we can also infer posterior ex-
pectations about the proportion of agents who received signal 1 in the population. We
denote the actual value of this proportion by ω. Since the expectation of a proportion
under random sampling equals the sampling probabilities, agents who received signal 1
expect ω to be
ω1 ≡ E [ω |si = 1] = r1ωY + (1− r1)ωN , (3.2.3)
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whereas agents with signal 0 expect
ω0 ≡ E [ω |si = 0] = r0ωY + (1− r0)ωN . (3.2.4)
A center wants to find out which state we are in (the actual state). This center can be a
policy maker consulting experts, but could just as well be an employer querying employees
or a scientific association surveying its members. We make the usual assumption that the
signal technology is common knowledge among the agents. However, as in Prelec (2004),
Baillon (2017) and Prelec et al. (2017), the center does not know the signal technology.
Expressed in the terms of our model, the incentive and aggregation problem can be
stated as follows. Each agent will report an endorsement ei, where ei = 1 denotes that
agent i endorses state Y and ei = 0 that i endorses state N . The center wants to reward
the agents in such a way that it becomes profitable for them to endorse a state if and
only if they believe it more likely to be the actual one. Furthermore, upon learning the
endorsements e1, . . . , en, the center selects one of the two states, and wishes to maximize
the probability that it is the actual one. Since the state S is unobservable and the signal
technology is unknown to the center, it is not possible to make the payments or selection
of a state dependent on the actual state, nor the selection of the state dependent on
the parameters ωY and ωN . Thus, it is impossible to use traditional methods to elicit
agents’ signals or beliefs because the signals are private (impossible to directly reward
truth-telling) and the beliefs are about unverifiable states Y and N (bets and scoring
rules cannot be applied). Second, even knowing signals or beliefs would not enable the
center to determine the state of nature because the center does not know the values for
ωY and ωN . In other words, for anyone unaware of the signal technology, observing 20%
of signal 1 does not say which state we are in.
The next subsection introduces the mechanism of our solution concept, called the
Bayesian market. Subsection 3.2.3 presents the underlying idea for an infinitely sized
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group of expert agents, and addresses the incentive problem and the aggregation problem.
It allows us to simplify many practical aspects of the mechanism; for instance, sample
proportions and probabilities are equated, with ω = ωY in state Y and ω = ωN in state N .
In Subsection 3.2.4 we restate the results for a finite group of agents. While many of our
results translate to the finite case, our approach still works better the larger the group of
experts is.
3.2.2 Bayesian market
The center and each agent i trade an asset whose settlement value vi is defined as the





where excluding agent i’s own report prevents agent i from influencing the asset value.
The center organizes a Bayesian market for these assets:
1. Agents simultaneously report ei to the center only.
2. For each agent i, the center draws3 a price pi from a uniform distribution over (0,1)
and proposes the following trade to the agent, and the agent can decide to take up
the offer (di = 1) or not (di = 0):
(a) If ei = 1, agent i can buy the asset at price pi from the center;
(b) If ei = 0, agent i can sell the asset at price pi to the center.
3. All endorsements ei and buying/selling decisions di are revealed.
(a) If an agent decides to buy at price pi, then there is trade under two conditions:
3It is important that the agents are convinced that the prices are independent of their report. To
ensure it, the center may draw the prices before step 1, seal them in an envelope, and open it in step 2.
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(i) There exists another agent j selling at pj ≤ pi and (ii) there is at least one
other agent k who also endorses state Y .
(b) If an agent decides to sell at price pi, then there is trade under two conditions:
(i) There exists another agent j buying at pj ≥ pi and (ii) there is at least one
other agent k who also endorses state N .
4. Those agents who bought the asset collect vi and pay pi; those who sold it collect pi
and pay vi.
Step 2 differs slightly from the mechanism proposed in Baillon (2017) in which a single price
p is drawn for all agents. The motivation for the change is to learn as much as possible
from the decisions of different agents. When only a single price is drawn and, e.g., all
potential buyers reject the trade, the center only learns that the price was larger than the
buyers’ reservation price, but not by how much. An alternative would be to directly ask
agents for their reservation prices. The center could then draw only one random price p
for all agents. This would correspond to the Becker-DeGroot-Marshak mechanism (Becker
et al., 1964), but with the trading rule (step 4) in place. The advantage of binary decisions
in step 2 is that they require less information from the agents, and therefore less cognitive
effort. It is easier to buy/sell at a given price (equivalently, to take/reject a bet on the
asset value) than to report a reservation price.4
Our mechanism as stated induces a game played among the agents. In this game,
a strategy profile is a collection (e,d) = ((e1,d1) , ...,(en,dn)), where ei determines which
state individual i is going to endorse depending on the signal si, and the trading strategy
di assigns to each possible signal a range of prices in the (0,1)-interval which i is going
to accept when receiving a buy or sell offer from the center. Note that this definition of
4Asking for reservation prices, however, has advantages regarding the logistical aspects of practical
implementation: In our design, a random price must be drawn for every respondent. When asking for
reservation prices, respondents can be contacted by a “pen and paper” survey in which they submit
their reservation prices and a public price is later credibly drawn. Whether these practical considerations
outweigh the cognitive simplicity of a binary decision, will depend on the application.
48
BENJAMIN TEREICK: MAKING CROWDS WISER
strategies precludes mixed strategies and the existence of an external coordination device
among agents, so that the actual endorsements made by agents are fully determined by
their signal and strategy. In Section 3.5, we discuss this strategy restriction in light of our
empirical results.
The mechanism assigns a payoff Ui(e,d) to each agent. Importantly, these payoffs
cannot depend on the actual state of nature S or its ωS . A Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of the induced game means that, conditioning on their signal, no agent expects a higher
payoff by moving to another strategy, i.e.,














for any (e′i,d′i) 6= (ei,di) and all signal realizations si ∈{0,1}. We further say that a strategy
profile is truthful if ei(1) = 1 and ei(0) = 0 for any agent i.
We assume that all agents are risk-neutral and care only about their own monetary
payoff, so that Ui(e,d) is just i’s monetary payoff. If ei = 1, agent i is potentially a buyer,
and we denote by π1(vi,pi) agent i’s monetary payoff if deciding to buy (di = 1), as a
function of the asset value vi and individualized buying price pi. Then
π1(vi,pi) =

vi−pi if trade happens;
0 otherwise.
(3.2.5)
Symmetrically, π0(vi,pi) denotes agent i’s monetary payoff as a potential seller if deciding
to sell (di = 0):
π0(vi,pi) =

pi−vi if trade happens;
0 otherwise.
(3.2.6)
We will first present the intuition of Bayesian markets through the case of an infinite
population.
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3.2.3 The case of an infinite population
Three simplifications come with an infinite group of expert agents, which together, imply
that the asset value is simply ωY or ωN at the truth-telling equilibrium. First, with n
infinite, the proportion of a signal in the population naturally equates the probability to
get that signal. Second, excluding the agent’s own signal or not from the asset value
has no impact, and therefore, the asset individualization becomes equivalent to all agent
trading the same asset. The third simplification is related to the trading conditions in
step 4 of the Bayesian market definition. That someone else is accepting to buy or to
sell at the same price is still important but the information that someone could make
such a choice becomes trivial in an infinite group. There will always be at least one
other experts receiving the same signal and one with the opposite signal. Moreover, for
any nondegenerate proportion of agents endorsing each signal, there will also always be
someone being offered any possible price. Hence, trade happening does not bring more
information about the signal distribution than si does, unlike in a finite group of agents.
Fortunately, we will see in the next subsection that what there is to learn is negligible
when n is finite but sufficiently large.
With the three simplifications in mind, we first address the incentive problem by the
following proposition.
Proposition 2. Let 〈ωY ,ωN , r〉 be a signal technology and n infinite. In the game induced
by the Bayesian market, truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which agents’
betting strategies are such that:
(i) agents whose signal is 1 buy the asset if and only if pi ≤ ω̄1;
(ii) agents whose signal is 0 sell the asset if and only if pi ≥ ω̄0.
Proof. The main result in Baillon (2017) is essentially unaffected by the introduction of
individualized prices. To get an intuition for the result, we can inspect Equations (3.2.3)
and (3.2.4). It is immediate that ω0 <ω1 since r0 < r1 and ωN <ωY . Thus, signal-1 agents
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expect more signal-1 agents than signal-0 agents do. Consider then agent i with si = 1
and assume all other agents are telling the truth, such that the asset value vi equals the
true share of signal-1 agents in the population. Agent i expects vi to be ω1. For pi less
than ω1, agent i will be willing to buy the asset. Agent i also knows that no one would
buy it at a higher price (so i has no reason to pretend to be a seller) but that some agents
will be willing to sell at prices between ω0 and ω1. For this price range, agent i foresees a
profit and has the incentives to endorse ei = 1 to become a buyer. Outside this range, no
trade will go through. The case si = 0 is symmetric.
The fact that agents trade an asset whose value they disagree on may raise the question
why the no-trade theorem (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982) is not applicable here. The reason
lies in the role of the center: For a trade to go through, it is sufficient that there exists a
single agent who was willing to take the opposite bet. The center will verify this condition
for each individual bettor, without providing further information about who the agent
with the opposite bet is. Since 0< ωN < ωY < 1, agents already know that there must be
at least one disagreeing agent and thus the occurence of trade does not provide further
information about the actual ω. Since trades are facilitated by the center,5 the agents
remain uncertain about the share of other agents disagreeing with them, which makes our
setting different to the settings in Aumann (1976) or Milgrom and Stokey (1982) in which
disagreement is impossible.
In the following proposition, we consider the aggregation problem and derive what
conclusions the center can draw in the truth-telling equilibrium.
Proposition 3. If n is infinite and the Bayesian market is at the truth-telling equilibrium,
at least one agent has a positive payoff, all those with positive payoffs have endorsed the
actual state, and all those with negative payoffs have endorsed the opposite state.
Proof. At the truth-telling equilibrium, the settlement value vi is ωN in state N and ωY in
5The center will typically incur a loss from this role. The mechanism is thus not budget-balanced.
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state Y. And according to Proposition 2, trades only occur for prices in the range [ω0,ω1].
Hence agents’ payoffs, defined in Equations (3.2.5)-(3.2.6), can be simplified as
π1(vi,pi) =−π0(vi,pi) =

ω−pi if pi ∈ [ω0,ω1];
0 otherwise.
Notice that Equations (3.2.3)-(3.2.4) imply
0< ωN < ω0 < ω1 < ωY < 1. (3.2.7)
In state Y , when trade occurs, signal-1 agents pay less than ω1 and therefore less than
the settlement value ωY . They make a profit while sellers (signal-0 agents) sell the asset
at a price too low. The opposite applies in state N . Hence, the center, seeing that people
endorsing Y make a profit, can conclude that we are indeed in state Y , even though the
state itself is not directly observable. Sellers making a profit indicates state N .
In this infinite case, at the truth-telling equilibrium and under the actual state of
nature S, the average payoff for agents with the same signal s is equal to the expected
payoff for agents with that signal:
πY1 ≡ Ep[π1(vi,p) |Y ]







(ωY −ω0)2− (ωY −ω1)2
]
=−πY0 ≡−Ep[π0(vi,p) |Y ];
(3.2.8)
πN0 ≡ Ep[π0(vi,p) |N ]







(ω1−ωN )2− (ω0−ωN )2
]
=−πN1 ≡−Ep[π1(vi,p) |N ].
(3.2.9)
52
BENJAMIN TEREICK: MAKING CROWDS WISER
Under state Y , πY1 > 0 and πY0 < 0; and under state N , πN1 < 0 and πN0 > 0.
The value ωs is the prediction of the proportion of signal 1 in the population by agents
with signal s. Hence, ωS−ωs is the prediction error of signal-s agents when S is the actual
state of nature (note that this error can be positive or negative). The average payoff of
signal-s agents are therefore half the difference between the squared prediction error of
agents with signal 1− s and their own squared prediction error. Agents endorsing the
actual state of nature are better able to guess the signal distribution in the population,
and therefore, the opinions of others. Bayesian markets favor them and allow them to
make a profit.
Figure 3.2.1: Demand and supply curves (thick black and gray lines), settlement value
(dotted red line), and average payoff of signal-1 agents (shaded area) in state Y when the
majority endorses N .
Figure 3.2.1 displays the supply and demand curve of the Bayesian market when Y
is the actual state and when only a minority of agents (ωY < 0.5) endorsed it. Supply
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exceeds demand at prices between ω0 and ω1. The settlement value ωY is also displayed
in the graph. Equation (3.2.8) applies. The squared prediction error of signal-0 agents is
represented by square ACIG, and the squared prediction error of signal-1 agents by the
smaller square BCFE. The average payoff of signal-1 agents, πY1 , hence corresponds to the
shaded area (half the difference between ACIG and BCFE).
We can also provide an interpretation of the graph in terms of surplus. Because prices
are individual and uniformly distributed, the triangle DEG is both the expected and the
average ex ante surplus of buyers (the difference between their willingness to pay and the
price they pay). The (expected and average) ex ante surplus of sellers is GEH. The total
ex ante surplus of trading is DEHG and is shared equally between buyers and sellers on
the Bayesian market. The payoff of an agent is the sum of the ex ante surplus and of the
prediction error. For instance, a buyer with pi = ω0 gets the maximum ex ante surplus
DG, plus the prediction error AD. For buyers, prediction errors are lucky surprises if the
state is Y . The asset is worth more than they expected. A seller with pi = ω1 gets the
maximum ex ante surplus (EH) but the prediction error BH is an unlucky surprise in state
Y . The asset is more costly than expected. The polygon ABEG represents the sum of the
ex ante surplus and of the prediction errors. In state Y , both terms are positive for buyers
but only the former is for sellers. The state N is entirely symmetric, with all statements
reversed for buyers and sellers.
3.2.4 Adjustments to a finite population
We presented the results with n infinite. However, with a small group of agents, the
individualized prices may affect the equilibrium strategies. For a buyer, the existence of
an agent being offered to sell at a specific price is informative about the number of sellers,
and therefore informative about the asset value. Agents may then accept to buy or sell at
prices that do not give rise to the aggregation property pointed out by Proposition 3.
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Intuitively, the information contained in the existence of an agent on the opposite side
of the market should decrease with the number of agents. Below, we make this intuition
rigorous: a “sufficiently large” group of agents restores properties used by Propositions 2
and 3. Specifically, we show that for any signal technology there is a truth-telling equi-
librium in which agents endorsing the actual state make a positive payoff with arbitrarily
large probability, given that n is larger than some finite threshold n∗. Thus, as the number
of market participants increases, the center can be almost certain that the agents making
money are the ones who correctly identify the actual state.
Proposition 4. Let 〈ωY ,ωN , r〉 be a signal technology. Then: (i) truth-telling is an
equilibrium in the game induced by the Bayesian Market, and (ii) in this equilibrium,
for any ε > 0, there exists n∗ such that for all n ≥ n∗, the probability that at least one
agent has a positive payoff, and all those with positive payoffs have endorsed the actual
state, and all those with negative payoffs have endorsed the opposite state, is at least 1−ε.
The proof is in Section 3.7.2. The biggest obstacle for observing the side of the market
who endorsed the actual state is the possibility of no trade. This is especially so in cases in
which the proportion ω is near the extremes 0 and 1, so that there are only few individuals
of one of the types, making it posible that none of them observe a price acceptable to them.
There are two main ways to address this issue. First, any information about the signal
technology (for instance a lower bound on ωN or an upper bound on ωY ) would allow
the center to draw prices in a more specific region instead of uniformly between 0 an 1,
thereby increasing the probability of trade. Second, the absence of trades does not mean
that no information was collected. From the agents’ endorsements and trade decisions,
the center can recover reservation prices and use the surplus analysis described in Figure
3.2.1 to infer the actual state. The next subsections describes how.
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3.2.5 Algorithms for empirical data
Propositions 3 and 4 concerns limit behavior of perfectly rational agents. In perfect con-
ditions, all agents endorsing the actual (opposite) state have a nonnegative (nonpositive)
payoff, and at least one agent will have a positive payoff. In practical implementation, a
small group may lead to no trade. Furthermore, agents may make mistakes when endors-
ing a state or when deciding to trade, making the supply and demand curves less “sharp”
than those depicted in Figure 3.2.1. In the presence of noise, agents not endorsing the
actual state may still make a profit. We propose two follow-the-money (FTM) algorithms
which can be used empirically by the center to find the actual state in those non-ideal
situations.
The simpler algorithm computes the payoff of each agent and compares the average
payoff of the sellers to that of the buyers. The algorithm picks the side with the higher
average payoff and tosses a coin if no trade occurred. We call this algorithm FTM-A (for
average). FTM-A is able to accommodate some moderate noise in agents’ behavior but
does not solve the no-trade issue.
To account for noise and for no-trade situations, we propose a more elaborate algorithm,
fitting logistic curves, called FTM-L. With F the logistic function,6 FTM-L first estimates
ω̂1 and ω̂0 (which can be interpreted as the reservation prices for an infinite group at the
truth-telling equilibrium) from
Prob(di = 1 |p,ei) =

F (β(p− ω̂1)) if ei = 1
F (β(ω̂0−p)) if ei = 0
(3.2.10)
imposing ω̂0 ≤ ω̂1. Parameter β captures the level of noise/imprecision and is assumed to
be the same for sellers and buyers (for parsimony). FTM-L then computes the expected
6If F is the probit function, we can define another algorithm called FTM-P. All the reported results
are robust to this specification. We will focus on FTM-L from now on.
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payoffs for buyers and sellers for an infinite group using Equations (3.2.8) or (3.2.9),
substituting ω̄1 and ω̄0 with estimated reservation prices ω̂1 and ω̂0, and ω with the
proportion of endorsements 1, and picks the side with a positive expected payoff.



















Figure 3.2.2: Simulation results for FTM-A and FTM-L under different group sizes.
Figure 3.2.2 displays the accuracy, defined as the number of times the actual state is
selected, of both algorithms in the same simulations as described in the preceding subsec-
tion. The simulation does not include noisy agents and therefore, FTM-A cannot improve
much with respect to requiring that all agents make a profit to trust their endorsement. By
contrast, FTM-L reaches an 80% accuracy with groups as small as 20 agents. It reaches a
95% accuracy with 300 participants, which is not an unusual sample size in social sciences.
The cases in which FTM-L is inaccurate correspond to signal technologies that are only
very weakly informative. In all other cases, FTM-L recovers all necessary information
even in the absence of trades.
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3.3 Experimental design
3.3.1 Stimuli
We conducted an experiment with abstract tasks (urns and balls) ensuring that the theo-
retical assumptions were satisfied. We considered groups of n= 100 agents. In each task,
the participants of the experiment were presented with two urns, as depicted in Figure
3.3.1. Urns Left and Right represent the two states of nature, N and Y respectively. Par-
ticipants were told that one of the two urns was selected randomly (r= 0.5) and that each
of the 100 participants of a group would get one ball from that urn. Denoting a yellow
ball si = 1 and a blue ball si = 0, Urn Left would give ωN = 0.10 and Urn Right ωY = 0.40
in this particular example. Urn Right always contains more yellow balls than Urn Left.
Thus Urn Right is state of nature Y and Urn Left is state of nature N .
Figure 3.3.1: Experimental task setting (an example of Task 6)
There were 30 tasks with ωN ranging from 0.05 to 0.75 and ωY from 0.25 to 0.95,
spanning the unit interval in a systematic way. In twelve tasks, both urns had a minority
of yellow balls, i.e., ωN < ωY < 0.5. Another set of twelve tasks mirrored them such that
ωY > ωN > 0.5, and in six tasks the majority would always guess the correct state of
nature (ωY > 0.5 > ωN ). Table 3.7.1 in Section 3.7.3 lists all the task parameters. The
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number of yellow balls differs across states of nature by a minimum of 20 and a maximum
of 30. Larger differences would mean that the signal technology discriminates very well
between state of nature and the majority (as well as FTM) would be right most of the
time. By contrast, smaller differences would imply very narrow trading intervals [ω0,ω1]
and it could be that none of the 100 participants of a group gets a price in that range.
In each task, the participants were first presented with the urns (as in Figure 3.3.1)
and asked to press a button to draw their ball. Once the color of their ball was revealed,
they were asked to guess which urn the ball comes from (i.e. to endorse a state). The
next question differed between two experimental treatments, FTM and SPA.
Figure 3.3.2: Screenshot of the FTM treatment
In the FTM treatment, we implemented the betting mechanism of the Bayesian mar-
kets. In Figure 3.3.2 for instance, participants were asked whether they were willing to
bet that the number of participants guessing Urn Right (i.e. endorsing Y ) was at least
41, i.e. whether they were willing to pay p = 0.41 for the sample proportion ω. For the
sake of symmetry, participants guessing Urn Left were asked whether they would bet that
the number of participants guessing Urn Left would be at least 59, i.e. whether they were
willing to accept p= 0.41 for v. Payment was explained in a training preceding the exper-
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iment. The participants were told that the number (e.g. 41) was random and that their
payment would be the actual number of Urn Right guesses minus that number if someone
took the opposite bet (betting that at least 59 participants would guess Urn Left). It
would be 0 otherwise.
Figure 3.3.3: Screenshot of SPA.
In the SPA treatment, we followed the approach of Prelec et al. (2017) and asked
participants to predict the number of people who guessed the same urn as they did (Fig-
ure 3.3.3). Prelec et al.’s (2017) algorithm first computes the average prediction across
all participants and then selects the state of nature that was endorsed more often than
predicted. Predictions were incentivized using the quadratic scoring rule. Participants
received 200− x
2
50 , with x the difference between their prediction and the actual number
of guesses.
In none of the treatments was payment directly based on the task parameters. Even
though we, the experimenters, knew them, we aimed to mimic situations in which no one
knows the actual state of nature and in which the center (paying the agents) does not
even know the signal technology.
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3.3.2 Deviations from Section 3.2.2
The implementation of the Bayesian market in our experiment differs from the Bayesian
market mechanism proposed in Subsection 3.2.2 in two ways. First, the settlement value v
did not exclude the agent’s own endorsement. It allowed us to present all relevant values
as shares of 100 (and not 99 or 101). Furthermore, the draws from the urn (i.e., the
signals) were made without replacement. As a consequence, the settlement value could
only be ωY or ωN , as in the infinite case.
3.3.3 Implementation
The experiment was conducted on Prolific in August 2019, with 473 participants in the
FTM treatment and 462 in the SPA treatment. They were all US students. We restricted
participation to students for their probable familiarity with abstract tasks as those used in
our experiment. Participants watched a short video explaining the experimental tasks and
then went through five training rounds where they received feedback about their payments
and how these payments were calculated (see Section 3.9 for details). We split the 30 tasks
into two sets of 15. After the training, each participant completed one of the two sets,
with the task order being randomized within that set at the participant level. There was
no feedback after the tasks. Payment, described in the next paragraph, occurred once all
participants had completed the experiment.
Participants received a fixed reward of £1.5 and a bonus of up to £3.7 All amounts
(prices, bets, scores) were presented in tokens. The bonus in pounds was the number of
tokens divided by 1,000. In the FTM treatment, participants could (in theory) win or lose
up to 100 tokens in each task. Hence, they were endowed with 100 tokens for each task to
avoid net losses at the end of the experiment. In the SPA treatment, the quadratic score
was also expressed in tokens. It was equivalent to endowing them with 200 tokens and
7Prolific requires payments in pounds.
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imposing a quadratic loss ranging from 0 to 200. In both treatments, the final number of
tokens was naturally bounded by 0 and 3000. This allowed us to recruit participants with
the same information about bonus ranges. However, the average bonus was likely to be
lower for the FTM treatment than for the SPA treatment ex ante and, in fact, it was ex
post (SPA £2.85, FTM £1.60).
To compute the bonus of a participant in a given task after the end of the experi-
ment, we randomly selected a state of nature8 and 100 participants such that the group
(including this particular participant) had the exact combination of signals shown in the
task. In other words, participants were not assigned to a given group ex ante. Instead,
we constructed (random) groups matching the information provided to the participants.
3.4 Results
To be consistent, we report data and results in terms of our theoretical setting. In par-
ticular, a yellow ball is signal 1 (si = 1) and a blue ball is signal 0 (si = 0). A participant
guessing Urn Right is endorsing state of nature Y (ei = 1) and guessing Urn Left is en-
dorsing N (ei = 0).9 We also define truth-telling as reporting ei = si.
3.4.1 Raw data - Endorsements
According to the model, truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the FTM treat-
ment. The empirical truth-telling rate was 87.6%.10 About 53% of the participants told
8This random selection of a state of nature resulted in 50.2% of state Y selected for bonus calculations
of participants in the SPA treatment, and 48.9% for the FTM treatment. Both proportions are not
significantly different from 0.5 (proportion tests: for SPA, Z-statistic= 0.333, p = 0.739; and for FTM,
Z-statistic= 1.904, p = 0.057).
9Predictions elicited in the SPA treatment were about the number of participants guessing the same
urn, but we deduct the predictions of participants endorsing N from 100 to be the predictions of number
of participants endorsing Y . Bets in the FTM treatment were also expressed in terms of the number of
participants guessing the same urn, but we deduct the prices in the bets for participants endorsing N from
100 to be the the prices to sell the asset whose settlement value is the number of participant endorsing Y .
10The empirical truth-telling rates were not significantly different for easier questions with ωY > 0.5 >
ωN and for other questions with ωY > ωN > 0.5 or 0.5 > ωY > ωN (87.0% and 87.7% respectively; pro-
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the truth in all 15 tasks they faced. About 25% guessed the opposite urn (or lied about
their guess) 1 to 3 times out of 15. Less than 4% had a majority of lies / wrong guesses
(Table 3.7.2 in Section 3.7.4). The incentives provided in the SPA treatment did not make
truth-telling a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, but we observed a very similar truth-telling
rate (SPA: 87.8% of the cases, not significantly different from FTM, with proportion test
Z-statistic= 0.376 and p= 0.704).
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Figure 3.4.1: Number of Bayesian guesses and payment in FTM.
The truth-telling rate of the FTM treatment was sufficiently high to reward those
who correctly reported their signal and to penalize those who lied or misreported. Figure
3.4.1 displays earnings as a function of the number of times people told the truth. It
shows a positive correlation, with a fitted line slope of 0.010 (p < 0.001). People did
not get feedback during the experiment (only in the five training rounds). Figure 3.4.1
illustrates that feedback about payment could have improved truth-telling rate by allowing
portion test Z-statistic= 0.755 and p = 0.450).
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participants to learn that correctly reporting their signal is rewarded. It further shows
that in future experiments one can announce in the instructions that a previous study
showed that participants who tell the truth more often can earn more in such a setting.
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14












Figure 3.4.2: Number of ex-post correct guesses and payment in FTM.
So far, we studied what the raw data told us about participants’ strategic behavior,
illustrating the incentive properties of Bayesian markets (Proposition 2). To illustrate the
aggregation properties (Proposition 3), we can check whether correctly guessing the se-
lected urn led to higher earnings in our experiment. The prediction is supported by Figure
3.4.2, which is a box plot of earnings as a function of the number of times participants
guessed the actual state. The fitted line slope is 0.008 (p< 0.001). Thus, Bayesian markets
reward expertise. While in our experiment, this expertise is artificially created,11 in many
applications one may expect that the number of times someone guesses the actual state of
the world to be influenced by a more natural notion of expertise, i.e. domain knowledge.
11It consists of receiving informative signals, in combination with a truth-telling strategy.
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3.4.2 Raw data - Predictions and trades
If participants are Bayesian, they should report the posteriors ω0 and ω1 in the SPA
treatment, at least if they expect everyone else to tell the truth. Figure 3.4.3 displays the
average predictions as a function of theoretical posteriors for both type of guess. Predic-
tions are very close to Bayesianism for ω0 < 0.5 and ω1 > 0.5. Interestingly, participants
seemed to have much more difficulty to predict that a majority of people would guess Y
when they themselves guess N or that only a minority would guess Y when they them-
selves guess Y . The SPA uses the average prediction across both guesses, which mitigates
this issue.
















Figure 3.4.3: Theoretical ω0 and ω1 vs. average predictions in SPA.
We do not have people’s predictions in the FTM treatment but we can compare the
participants’ decisions di to the theoretical predictions. Table 3.4.1 compares the theo-
retical and empirical proportions of di = 1 (the willingness to buy / to sell) for five price
intervals, defined with ωN , ω0, ω1, and ωY . Buyers should be willing to pay at most ω1
and sellers willing to accept not less than ω0. If participants do not compute the Bayesian
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posterior but use ωY and ωN instead, i.e. the distribution of balls of the urn they guessed,
buyers would be willing to pay at most ωY and sellers willing to accept not less than ωN .
If they were extremely risk averse, buyers would be willing to pay at most ωN and sellers
willing to accept not less than ωY .
The empirical willingness to sell was increasing with price and the empirical willingness
to buy was decreasing, as predicted in the truth-telling equilibrium. However, for several
participants the acceptance and rejection ranges of bets were not consistent with the
equilibrium prediction. About 30% of bets that are losing for sure under truth-telling
were accepted and about 10% of bets that are winning for sure under truth-telling were
rejected (see leftmost column of the seller row and rightmost column of the buyer row).
In total, there was a clear tendency to bet much more than predicted by equilibrium play.
Table 3.4.1 also reports the average payoffs of the participants for each price interval.
The results confirm that participants who accepted bets that would have been losing for
sure if everyone else had told the truth, still bore a loss on average in our experiment.
Overall, trading decisions were noisy and substantially deviated from the theoretical pre-
dictions. This underlines that the performance of the FTM algorithms will depend on
their ability to recover aggregate reservation prices from the noisy trades.
Table 3.4.1: Theoretical and empirical bet acceptance (in %) and average payoffs (in
tokens) in the FTM treatment by price interval
p ∈ [0,ωN ) [ωN ,ω0) [ω0,ω1] (ω1,ωY ] (ωY ,1]
guessed N (seller)
theo. acceptance 0% 0% 100% 100% 100%
emp. acceptance 30.4% 55.5% 67.6% 80.8% 90.6%
average payoff -27.2 -6.1 2.2 10.8 19.3
guessed Y (buyer)
theo. acceptance 100% 100% 100% 0% 0%
emp. acceptance 89.9% 80.3% 67.7% 48.4% 29.1%
average payoff 21.0 9.9 1.3 -6.9 -25.0
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3.4.3 Accuracy comparison
The final part of the analysis aims to compare accuracy of the various methods. We want
to assess the ability of the majority rule, SPA, and FTM algorithms to identify the actual
state of nature using the participants’ answers.
To make full use of the answers of all respondents who provided answers to a task,
we ran 1,000 simulations for each task, state of nature, and treatment, randomly making
groups of 100 participants. For instance, consider one of the simulations for the task
described in Figure 3.3.1 with ωY = 0.40 and ωN = 0.10 (Task 6), state of nature Y ,
and the FTM treatment. We randomly composed a group of 100 FTM participants,
such that exactly 40 of them had gotten si = 1. We then use the answers from the
100 participants to determine the state using majority rule, FTM-A, and FTM-L. Figure
3.4.4 shows the results from the FTM-L algorithm by fitting Equation (3.2.10). It is the
empirical counterpart of Figure 3.2.1. The estimated ω̂0 and ω̂1 are more extreme than
the theoretical ω0 and ω1, and visually indistinguishable from ωN and ωY respectively.12
Once the curves displayed in the figure are obtained, the FTM-L algorithm uses the sample
proportion v, ω̂0, and ω̂1 to determine the expected payoffs of the representative buyers
and sellers. In the case described in Figure 3.4.4, FTM-L could still detect the actual state
Y .
Similarly, we randomly composed 1,000 groups of 100 SPA participants in the same
way to determine the state using majority rule and SPA. Repeating the same procedures
for each of the 30 tasks and two possible states of nature, we obtained 60 accuracy rates
for each method. Table 3.4.2 summarizes the average accuracy rates for each algorithm
and for the majority rule. We conducted Wilcoxon tests to test for differences.
Table 3.4.2 distinguishes two cases. If ωN < 0.5 < ωY (top row), then the majority
rule should determine the actual state all the time. In the other cases (bottom row), the
12Note that this observation is not generally applicable to all the 1000 simulations.
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Figure 3.4.4: An example of a simulation in Task 6 under state Y.
Table 3.4.2: Average accuracy rates from simulations
cluster of questions majority rule SPA FTM
data SPA data FTM FTM-A FTM-L
ωY > 0.5> ωN 95.7% 99.7% 93.2% 87.3% 91.5%
ωY > ωN > 0.5 or 0.5> ωY > ωN 51.0% 53.8% 73.9% 62.8% 75.0%
majority rule finds the actual state 50% of the time, by pure chance. Our results are
consistent with these predictions (see columns ‘majority rule’), both for the data from the
SPA treatment and for the data of the FTM treatment. The SPA, our benchmark, should
always identify the actual state if participants were Bayesian and reporting truthfully all
the time. Non-Bayesian answers and noise make the SPA perform worse (Wilcoxon signed
rank test p= 0.031) than majority when ωN < 0.5< ωY but substantially improved upon
majority when following the majority is equivalent to tossing a coin (Wilcoxon signed rank
68
BENJAMIN TEREICK: MAKING CROWDS WISER
test p < 0.001). In that case, the average accuracy increased by 22.9 percentage points
(pp).
Computing average payoffs on Bayesian markets, as our FTM-A algorithm does, led
to worse results than SPA, whether ωN < 0.5< ωY (Wilcoxon signed rank test p= 0.054)
or not (Wilcoxon signed rank test p = 0.001). FTM-A is highly sensitive to noise and
we noticed earlier that our data were clearly noisy. To account for noise, FTM-L fits
logistic supply and demand curves on the buy and sell decisions and only then computes
expected payoffs. FTM-L substantially improved upon FTM-A (Wilcoxon signed rank test
p< 0.001), especially when ωY >ωN > 0.5 or 0.5>ωY >ωN , with an increase of 12.2pp. It
yielded results that were not significantly different from SPA (Wilcoxon signed rank tests;
top row p= 0.322 and bottom row p= 0.845). Interestingly, it gave results comparable to
SPA with less information. SPA uses, as input, an endorsement and a prediction (number
between 0 and 1), directly asking participants for ω0 and ω1. FTM-L uses an endorsement
and a trade decision, which is binary. FTM-L compensates the information loss by using
(simple) econometric techniques to recover reservation prices, which should be ω0 and ω1
at the truth-telling equilibrium.
The accuracy analysis so far was based on groups of 100 participants. We can also
study how sensitive results are to group sizes. We replicated the analysis (with 1,000
simulations for each combination of method, task, and state of nature) for various group
sizes ranging from 20 to 100. Figure 3.4.5 depicts the accuracy rates as a function of
group size. FTM-L is more sensitive to group size than SPA. In the left panel, when
ωN < 0.5 < ωY , accuracy of FTM-L increases from around 75% for groups of 20 to more
than 90% for groups of 100. SPA performs better for small groups but accuracy increases
less with group size. In the right panel (ωY > ωN > 0.5 or 0.5 > ωY > ωN ), SPA is very
stable, with accuracy rates between 72% and 74%. The accuracy of FTM-L is lower than
that of SPA for groups of 20 but slightly higher for groups of 100. These results are not
surprising, knowing that, for groups of 20, FTM-L has to determine reservations prices
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from very few binary decisions (buying or selling).13





















majority rule assumption holds 
majority rule (SPA data)
















majority rule assumption does not hold
Figure 3.4.5: Accuracy comparisons for different group sizes.
3.5 Discussion
In our experiment, each agent received an endowment to avoid losses. Even without
providing an endowment, agents can expect a strictly positive payoff (Baillon, 2017),
which can motivate them to participate. The center, who plays the role of the market
maker, subsidizes the market and acts as an intermediary between the agents, who do
not trade with each other. Absent this intermediary role of the center, agents would infer
others’ signals from their willingness to buy or sell. Similar to the classical reasoning
in Aumann (1976) and Milgrom and Stokey (1982), they would then agree on the state,
leaving no room for trade based on disagreement.
To communicate the same information to all potential participants, we fixed the bonus
range from £0 to £3. The SPA was more expensive (SPA £2.85, FTM £1.60). If anything,
the SPA participants, with an endowment of 200 tokens and a quadratic loss should have
13There may be as little as one buyer or one seller in some groups even if everybody reports truthfully.
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been more motivated than the FTM participants. The SPA treatment only incentivized
predictions, not truthful endorsement. The latter could have been done using the Bayesian
truth serum of Prelec (2004) but the payoff rule is difficult to explain to participants.
Experiments that have been using this truth serum did not explain the payoff function
in detail, but rather used an “intimidation method”, telling participants it is in their
interest to tell the truth. We refrained from such an approach, and instead included
instructions and training to explain our payoff rules. An alternative for future research is
to incentivize the SPA using choice-matching, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
Choice-matching elicits predictions and endorsements with a simpler payment formula.
Regarding our theoretical model, four restrictive assumptions warrant some further
discussion. First, recall that that we treated strategies as maps from signals to endorse-
ments, such that agents could not make their endorsements depend on any other event
or randomization devise, and did not allow asymmetric strategies. Second, we allowed
no communication between agents. Third, we only considered a binary underlying state
space and fourth, our market setting is a one-period, static setting. We discuss each of
those in turn.
It is important that agents cannot coordinate on events other than type realizations.
Among the remaining symmetric equilibria, the truth-telling equilibrium is (ex-ante)
Pareto optimal.14 It is behaviorally plausible, as conjectured by Baillon (2017), that
truth-telling is focal and, in our experiment, there was indeed little evidence of agents
trying to find a reverse strategy. More than half of the participants consistently told the
truth and a negligible share of participants chose to systematically misstate their type (see
Table 3.7.2 in Section 3.7.4). Without the aforementioned restriction, agents could try to
coordinate on some other signal, in which the probability of receiving a 0-signal in state Y
14To see this, note first that it is pay-off equivalent to the “reverse” equilibrium in which everyone
endorses the state that they believe to be less likely to be the actual one. The two other equilibria have
universal endorsement of either state Y or of state N and thus obviously lead to a universal payoff of zero
since there is never any trade.
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and a 1-signal in state N is very low. Then, a small number of agents will make a loss of
(almost) 1, and a large share of agents will make a profit of (almost) 1. In expectation, all
agents thus have a high expected payoff. Note that this coordination does not only require
mere communication among respondents but also some credible randomization device. To
avoid such coordinated attacks, the center should make it an active feature of design that
market participants are (at least partially) anonymous, as is the case in our experiment.
As suggested by the previous paragraph, our approach cannot be used if there is public
discussion of private signals or if agents can form coalitions. If it is possible to bring all
experts together, other approaches to the aggregation problem have been proposed in the
literature, such as the Delphi method developed in the 1950s at the Rand Corporation
(Okoli and Pawlowski, 2004). These approaches do not solve the incentive problem though.
In our setting, experts do not have other incentives than those we provide to hide or
manipulate their private information. The literature on committee decisions studies how
agents may agree to share their private signals with each other in order to look united if
their reputation is at stake (Visser and Swank, 2007; Swank et al., 2008).
We considered a binary state space. If the state space is non-binary, one may organize
several Bayesian markets, with different agents. Consider three states A, B, and C, and
assume agents can choose which state they would like a signal about (e.g., an agent can
design an experiment testing whether we are in state A or not-A). The center can assign
agents to markets, inform them about which state their market will be about, let them
run their experiment for that state, and then organize the Bayesian markets.
Bayesian markets and their aggregation properties can further be translated to a setting
in which a market is run continuously. Suppose that there are T periods and that for each
t = 1, ..., T , a Bayesian market is set up to trade on an asset vt that represents the share
of buyers in the Bayesian market at time t. All of these markets are only settled at the
final period T , so that in particular agents do not learn the value of the assets. At each
t, the incentive and aggregation properties of Bayesian markets are not affected by the
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markets in other periods. A continuous market can sometimes be advantageous for the
center: Suppose for instance that the signal technology is constant across all periods, but
that the actual state S (and therefore ωS) may vary with t. Once the center has found a
market-clearing price p∗ (i.e. a price at which each agent is willing to either buy or sell
the asset), this price can be chosen for any subsequent period. Since the signal technology
is the same, this price will now lead to trade in each period, thereby reducing the payoff-
uncertainty faced by the agents. Then, the center can make inferences about the change of
the state over time by computing which side would make a profit if the market was settled.
Furthermore, if the signal technology is not fixed, this will be reflected in the buying and
selling decisions of the agents, and henceforth the center can detect such changes.
The literature on the wisdom of crowds started with the intuition that asking many
people may be better than relying on a few experts. Some have raised doubts on the mere
possibility to “chase the experts” within a group (Larrick and Soll, 2006). However, there
is still value to ask large groups of experts. DellaVigna and Pope (2017) found that the
aggregated opinion of academic experts is closer to experimental results than estimates
based on a meta-analysis of previous empirical findings. In a follow-up study, DellaVigna
and Pope (2018) also showed that academic experts better predict than non-experts, even
though degrees of expertise (among experts) such as academic rank or citations do not
correlate with performance. Aggregating the opinions of very large group of experts be-
comes more and more common, for instance the International Panel on Climate Change
or surveys of economists and financial specialists about future economic indicators.
Increasingly in companies, prediction markets are used internally among employees to
forecast short-term company performance and external events for decision making. Ex-
amples include Siemens (Ortner, 1998), Nokia (Hankins and Lee, 2011), Hewlett-Packard
(Plott and Chen, 2002), Intel (Gillen et al., 2017), Google (Cowgill et al., 2009), and Ford
Motor Company (Cowgill and Zitzewitz, 2015). Results are promising, showing the poten-
tial of markets as an effective information aggregation tool in practice. For instance, in the
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case of Ford where weekly auto sales forecasts are taken extremely seriously for planning
procurement and production, forecasts from the internal prediction markets still outper-
formed other forecasts available to management (Cowgill and Zitzewitz, 2015). Since
Bayesian markets do not require the predicted events to be verifiable in the short-term
or at all, companies can potentially use internal Bayesian markets to forecast long-term
events or even counterfactual events.
3.6 Conclusion
Prediction markets are increasingly used to incentivize and aggregate expert opinions.
They are not applicable though if the state of the world is not objectively observable. In
such a case, payoffs cannot be state-contingent, creating an incentive problem. Further-
more, in many plausible situations, one may prefer not to rely on the majority opinion,
at least if experts themselves, aware of the signal structure, would not. We demonstrated
theoretically and empirically how to solve both the incentive and the aggregation prob-
lem at once. Agents bet on others’ endorsement and their payoffs reveal the state of
nature. When implemented in a large online experiment, our follow-the-money approach
performed as well as a recent alternative, the surprisingly popular algorithm, but made use
of less information from participants. With these results, we hope to add to the promise
of prediction markets (Arrow et al., 2008), the promise of Bayesian markets.
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3.7 Proofs
To simplify the notations in Sections 3.7.1 to 3.7.2, we define ω−i =
∑
j 6=i sj
n−1 , P̃s(.) ≡
P (. |si = s,ω−i ∈ (0,1)) and Ẽs[.] ≡ E [. |si = s,ω−i ∈ (0,1)], ommitting the conditioning
on i’s signal being s and the fact that there is at least one signal-1 agent and one signal-0
agent other than i. Furthermore, r̃s ≡ P̃s(Y ) and ω̃s ≡ Ẽs [ω−i]. Finally, for any agent i let
E−is (p′, p′′) be the event that there exists an agent j 6= i such that sj = s and p′ ≤ pj ≤ p′′.
All the following proofs establish the results for si = 1. Equivalent proofs for si = 0
can be immediately obtained by replacing si, ei, ω−i, pi by 1− si, 1− ei, 1−ω−i, 1− pi.
Recall that n≥ 4 for all the proofs.
3.7.1 Lemmas
The following lemmas are used to establish Proposition 4 (Lemma 1 being used to establish
Lemma 6). The lemmas are not especially surprising, and the proofs are more cumbersome
than truly informative. We therefore relegated them to Section 3.8.
Lemma 1. limn→∞ ω̃1 = ω̄1 and limn→∞ ω̃0 = ω̄0.
Lemma 2. For any ε > 0, there exists n∗ such that for all n≥ n∗, P (ω−i > ω̄1 |Y )> 1−ε,
P (ω−i < ω̄0 |N)> 1− ε, P (ω−i > ω̃1 |Y )> 1− ε, and P (ω−i < ω̃0 |N)> 1− ε.









is decreasing in p′′ and increasing in p′.
























ω−i |E−i1 (p′ p′′)
]
are continuous in p′ and p′′.
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Lemma 7. There exists n∗ such that for all n≥ n∗, there are prices p∗, p∗∗ such that
p∗− Ẽ0
[




























for all p′ < p≤ p′′.
3.7.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof of (i) Suppose that all agents are truth-telling, so that v−i = ω−i. For p′, p′′ ∈
[0, 1], consider the expectation Ẽ1
[
ω−i |E−i0 (p′, p′′)
]
. From Lemma 7, there are prices
p∗, p∗∗ such that p∗−Ẽ0
[
ω−i |E−i1 (p∗, p∗∗)
]
= 0 and Ẽ1
[
ω−i |E−i0 (p∗, p∗∗)
]
−p∗∗= 0 for suf-
ficiently large n. Suppose next that signal-1 agents will buy at any price p≤ p∗∗ and signal-
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0 agents will sell at any price p≥ p∗∗. From Lemma 8, we have ∂∂pẼ1
[





ω−i |E−i1 (p, p′′)
]
< 1 for any p∈ (p∗,p∗∗) (given sufficiently large n). As a result,
we have for all p < p∗∗ and for all p > p∗, respectively:
Ẽ1
[
ω−i |E−i0 (p∗, p)
]
−p > 0 (3.7.1)
p− Ẽ0
[
ω−i |E−i1 (p, p∗∗)
]
> 0 . (3.7.2)
Given the strategies above, signal-1 agents buy at any price p which is at most
Ẽ1
[
ω−i |E−i0 (p∗, p)
]
and signal-0 agents will sell at any price p which is at least Ẽ0
[
ω−i |E−i1 (p, p∗∗)
]
.
To see that these strategies constitute an equilibrium for sufficiently large n, we can take
the perspective of a buyer. It is completely analogous to show that there is no prof-
itable deviation for a seller. Consider an agent i who observes signal si = 1 and price
pi. Under the strategy described above, i never accepts to trade at a price for which
i expects a negative payoff and thus i’s expected payoff is strictly positive. Any devi-
ation in which i reports ei = 1 but buys at a price pi > Ẽ1
[
ω−i |E−i0 (p∗, pi)
]
is at best
non-harmful, if no seller sells at this price, or leads to a lower expected payoff. Suppose
then next that i deviates by reporting ei = 0. Afterwards, i cannot do better than sell-
ing at any price pi for which pi > Ẽ1
[
ω−i |E−i1 (pi, p∗∗)
]
. From Lemma 4, we know that
Ẽ1
[




ω−i |E−i0 (pi, p∗∗)
]
. Hence, all other signal 1-agents reject such
trades, and therefore, i’s payoff will be zero. Thus, there is no profitable deviation for i
and the strategies described above indeed constitute an equilibrium.
Proof of (ii) To prove the second part of Proposition 4, we need to find a group size
such that we are almost certain that at least one agent has a positive payoff, and all those
with positive payoffs have endorsed the actual state, and all those with negative payoffs
have endorsed the opposite state. Alternatively, we can show that, for a given group size
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and above, the probability of the following three events is negligible:
• Event 1: there exists an agent endorsing the actual state making a loss;
• Event 2: there exists an agent endorsing the other state making a profit;
• Event 3: no agent trades.
Let us first show that Event 2 implies Event 1. In state Y , an agent endorsing ei = 0 can
only make a profit if there is a buyer j with pj ≥ pi > vi. Since vi excludes ei = 0 and vj
excludes ej = 1, we have vj = vi− 1n−1 < vi. Then pj > vj , implying that agent j must be
making a loss. The same argument can be made for state N . Consequently, Event 2 is a
subevent of Event 1 and can be ignored.
We can establish P (“agents endorsing the actual state, and only them, will make
a profit”) > 1− ε for all n above a threshold by showing that P (Event 1) < ε/2 and
P (Event 3)< ε/2. Recall that statement (ii) posits that we are in a truth-telling equilib-
rium. We can therefore equate vi with ω−i.
Event 1: there exists an agent endorsing the actual state making a loss.
From Lemma 2, it follows that we can find n1 such that in the truth-telling equilibrium
with probability at most ε2 , we have vi ≤ ω̃1 in state Y or vi ≥ ω̃0 in state N . Furthermore,
from Lemma 4, we have that for any prices p′, p′′ and any n: Ẽ1
[





vi |E−i1 (p′ p′′)
]
> ω̃0. Thus, in the equilibrium described in part (i) of Proposition
4, there will never be trade for prices exceeding ω̃1 (because buyers will not accept such
prices) and for prices lower than ω̃0 (because sellers will not accept such prices). Combining
the two results, we know that there exists an n1 such that for all n≥ n1, the probability
that any trade occurs at a price larger than the asset value in state Y (implying that some
buyers – who endorse the correct state – make a loss) is at most ε2 , and analogously for
state N .
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Event 3: no agent trades. Let I =[p∗, p∗∗], let E+ be the event that there is at least
one buyer with pi ∈ I and E− be the event that there is at least one seller with pi ∈ I and









Hence, under any state of the world S ∈ {Y,N},
P (trade in I |S)




P (k buyers and n−k sellers |S)P
(










n−k [(∆p)k + (∆p)n−k]
=1− [∆pωS + (1−ωS)]n− [ωS + ∆p(1−ωS)]n .
Since the limit of the last expression is 1,
limn→∞P (no trade in [p∗, p∗∗])
= 1− limn→∞P (Y )P (trade in [p∗, p∗∗] |Y ) +P (N)P (trade in [p∗, p∗∗] |N)
= 0.
This implies that there exists an n2 ≥ nδ such that for all n ≥ n2, there is at most ε2
probability that no trade occurs in the interval (p∗, p∗∗).
P (trade in I |S)
≥P
(





P (k buyers and n−k sellers |S)P
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Final step. The probability that at least one agent has a positive payoff, and all
those with positive payoffs have endorsed the actual state, and all those with negative
payoffs have endorsed the opposite state, is at least 1−P (Event 1)−P (Event 3). For all
n≥ n1, the probability of Event 1 is at most ε2 and for all n≥ n2, that of Event 3 is also
at most ε2 . Let n
∗ = max{n1, n2}. Then for any n≥ n∗, the probability that some agents
endorsing the actual state, and only them, will make a profit and no agent endorsing the
actual state makes a loss is more than 1− ε, as desired.
3.7.3 Parameter values for each task
In our current experimental design, P (S = Y ) = P (S = N) = 12 , and group size n = 100.
Table 3.7.1 lists parameter values ωN and ωY of the 30 tasks in our experiment. They
contain all combinations where (ωN , ωY ) ∈ {0.05,0.1, ...,0.45,0.55, ...,0.95}, ωY − ωN ∈
{0.2,0.25,0.3}, and ω̄1− ω̄0 > 0.04.
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Table 3.7.1: Task parameter values
set task ωN ωY
1 1 0.05 0.25
2 2 0.05 0.3
1 3 0.05 0.35
2 4 0.1 0.3
1 5 0.1 0.35
2 6 0.1 0.4
1 7 0.15 0.35
2 8 0.15 0.4
1 9 0.15 0.45
2 10 0.2 0.4
1 11 0.2 0.45
2 12 0.25 0.45
2 13 0.75 0.95
1 14 0.7 0.95
2 15 0.65 0.95
1 16 0.7 0.9
2 17 0.65 0.9
1 18 0.6 0.9
2 19 0.65 0.85
1 20 0.6 0.85
2 21 0.55 0.85
1 22 0.6 0.8
2 23 0.55 0.8
1 24 0.55 0.75
1 25 0.3 0.6
2 26 0.35 0.6
1 27 0.35 0.65
2 28 0.4 0.6
1 29 0.4 0.65
2 30 0.4 0.7
3.7.4 Truth-telling at the individual level
Table 3.7.2 shows the proportion of participants with at least certain numbers of truth-
telling in both SPA and FTM treatments.
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Table 3.7.2: Proportion of participants with at least certain numbers of truth-telling
















3.8 Proof of the lemmas
3.8.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Using that P̃1 (ω−i = 0) = P̃1 (ω−i = 1) = 0, since P̃ conditions on the fact that










ω−i = kn−1 |si = 1
)
1−P (ω−i = 0 or ω−i = 1 |si = 1)
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n−1 |si = 1
)
= 11−P (ω−i = 0 or ω−i = 1 |si = 1)
[E(ω−i |si = 1)−P (ω−i = 1 |si = 1)]





n−1 −P (ω−i = 1 |si = 1)
]
.




n−1 and Equation (3.2.3).
Since r1,ωY ,ωN ∈ (0,1), as n→∞,
P (ω−i = 0 |si = 1)
=P (ω−i = 0 |Y )P (Y |si = 1) +P (ω−i = 0 |N)P (N |si = 1)
=r1(1−ωY )n−1 + (1− r1)(1−ωN )n−1→ 0,
and P (ω−i = 1 |si = 1) = r1ωn−1Y + (1− r1)ω
n−1
N → 0. We then have ω̃1→ ω̄1.
3.8.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. By the weak law of large numbers, we have that for any δ > 0 and ε > 0 there exists
n(δ,ε) such that for all n≥ n(δ,ε):
P (|E [ω−i |Y ]−ω−i|< δ |Y )> 1− ε. (3.8.1)
Then note that E [ω−i |Y ] = ωY . For any ε > 0, taking δ = ωY − ω̄1 > 0 in Equation
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(3.8.1), we have that for all n≥ n1 ≡ n(ωY − ω̄1, ε),
1− ε <P (|ωY −ω−i|< ωY − ω̄1 |Y )
≤P (ωY −ω−i < ωY − ω̄1 |Y ) = P (ω−i > ω̄1 |Y ).
Similarly, for all n≥ n2 ≡ n(ω̄0−ωN , ε), P (ω−i < ω̄0 |N)> 1− ε.
From Lemma 1, for any δ > 0, there existsm(δ) such that |ω̃1− ω̄1|<δ and |ω̃0− ω̄0|<δ
for all n ≥m(δ). Let us first pick δ = ωY −ω̄12 > 0 and also in Equation (3.8.1). Then for


















P (ω−i > ω̃1 |Y )≥ P (ω−i >
ωY + ω̄1
2 > ω̃1 |Y )
= P (ω−i >
ωY + ω̄1
2 |Y )















,m( ω̄0−ωN2 )}, P (ω−i < ω̃0 |N)> 1− ε.
Finally, taking n∗ = max{n1,n2,n3,n4} completes the proof.
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3.8.3 Proof of Lemma 3


















































































only depends on p′ and p′′ through the difference
∆p ≡ p′′−p′. Consider next the likelihood ratio, for n−1≥ k′ > k ≥ 2:
P̃s
(











) = 1− (1−∆p)n−k−1
1− (1−∆p)n−k
′−1










where the numerator can be simplified to
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Thus, consider a point (q′, q′′) with ∆q ≡ q′′− q′ >∆p. Then,
P̃s
(





















































for all n−1≥ k′ > k ≥ 2, whenever ∆q >∆p. Hence, a monotone likelihood ratio prop-

















if and only if ∆q > ∆p. As ∆p is increas-
ing in p′′ and decreasing in p′, the first part of the lemma follows. The second part of the
lemma can be obtained by replacing n−k−1 by k in the derivations above, changing the
signs of all derivatives.
3.8.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Recall that P̃1 (·)conditions on k ≤ n− 2 and thus P̃1 (∃j 6= i : sj = 0) = 1. Hence,
P̃1
(
E−i0 (0, 1) |ω−i = kn−1
)




















By the same reasoning, ω̃1 is also equal to Ẽ1
[
ω−i |E−i1 (0, 1)
]
. As from Lemma 3,
Ẽ1
[





















whenever p′′−p′ < 1, the Lemma follows.
3.8.5 Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. Consider Equation (3.8.2). Only the weights P̃1(E
−i
0 (p′,p′′) |ω−i= kn−1 )
P̃1(E−i0 (p′,p′′))
are functions
of p′ and p′′. Since the denominator is the weighted sum of the numerator for all k, it
is enough to show that P̃1
(
E−i0 (p′,p′′) |ω−i = kn−1
)
is continuous in p′ and p′′. This is
immediate from Equation (3.8.3).
3.8.6 Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. We start from Equation (3.8.2) and first show that the denominator of the fraction




















n−k−1 (1− r̃1) ,
(3.8.4)
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where the last equality is obtained from the binomial theorem. In the limit, for any prices









since p′, p′′, ωY , and ωN are all strictly between 0 and 1.
Next, we bound the expression in Equation (3.8.2) from above and below to show that
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) < Ẽ1 [ω−i |E−i0 (p′, p′′)]< ω̃1. (3.8.8)
Taking the limit and using Equation (3.8.6) and Lemma 1, we get that for any p′, p′′ in
(0,1), limn→∞ Ẽ1
[
ω−i |E−i0 (p′, p′′)
]
= limn→∞ ω̃1 = ω̄1.
3.8.7 Proof of Lemma 7

































ω−i |E−i1 (α, 1)
])
.
It immediately follows from Lemma 5 that g is continuous. Since we also have 0 < ω̄0 <
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Ẽ1
[





ω−i |E−i1 (0, α)
]
> 0.
By the intermediate value theorem, there must then exist a pair p∗, p∗∗with 0 < p∗ <
α < p∗∗ < 1 with the property:
Ẽ1
[





ω−i |E−i1 (p∗, p∗∗)
]
= 0 .
3.8.8 Proof of Lemma 8
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]
= ∑n−2k=1 kn−1 P̃1 (ω−i = kn−1) ∂∂p
[
P̃1(E−i0 (p′,p) |ω−i= kn−1)
P̃1(E−i0 (p′,p))
]
= ∑n−2k=1 n−1−kn−1 P̃1 (ω−i = n−1−kn−1 ) ∂∂p
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where the second step exchanges the order of summation. Consider next exclusively
the term ∂∂p
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) < 1 (3.8.11)




is increasing in n, this k∗ will have the same property for all n′ ≥ n. We can next split the
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+ ∑n−1k=k∗+1 n−1−kn−1 P̃1 (ω−i = n−1−kn−1 ) ∂∂p
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where εn > 0 since by construction, the second sum averages over values smaller than






converging to 0 as n→∞, there exists n∗ such that
for all n≥ n∗, the first part of the sum is smaller than εn, and thus the lemma follows.
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3.9 Experimental instructions and training rounds
All participants first watched the experimental instruction video (YouTube link) where
the experimental setting of urns and balls was explained.
Then they went through five rounds of training and got feedback about how the pay-
ment was calculated. Figure 3.9.1 shows an example from the SPA treatment, and Figure
3.9.2 shows an example from the FTM treatment where the bet went through.
Figure 3.9.1: An example of feedback in the training rounds in SPA.
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More than other social sciences, economics favors the hard data revealed by agents’ deci-
sions, as opposed to surveys of their opinions or tastes. Yet subjective reports are often
an irreplaceable source of information. Firms that want to know how consumers would
value a hypothetical new product, government agencies asking external experts to assess
the long-term impact of a policy, and economists working with self-reported panel-data
all rely on answers provided by individuals whose effort or honesty may be in doubt. We
propose a new class of incentive compatible mechanisms for this problem that we call
choice-matching. The idea is to link explicit opinions and judgments, with an auxiliary
task that reveals the respondents’ “types”, but only implicitly. In our canonical version,
respondents answer a multiple choice question (MCQ), and the auxiliary task asks respon-
dents to predict how often each answer was chosen by all other respondents.
A respondent’s score is then a weighted sum of a prediction accuracy score and the
average prediction accuracy score of all the respondents who endorse the same answer to
the MCQ. We state conditions under which this mechanism is truth-inducing, the major
1This chapter is based on an eponymous paper co-authored with Jakša Cvitanić, Dražen Prelec and
Blake Riley.
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one being that there is a one-to-one correspondence between predictions and answers to
the MCQ. However, the guiding idea behind choice-matching is more general, and the
prediction question can be replaced with other kinds of tasks or games.
We illustrate choice-matching with an example of consumer evaluations of a trial prod-
uct in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 presents the model and our results in the canonical version
of our mechanism. Section 4.4 explains how the choice-matching payment rules can be
used without asking for predictions of other respondents’ answers, and discusses possible
applications in marketing and experimental economics. Section 4.5 compares our method
to previous proposals. Section 4.6 concludes. Additional material is provided in Section
4.7
4.2 Example
Suppose that a firm intends to launch a new product and asks respondents to evaluate
a trial version on a scale from 1 to 5. A rating that best represents a respondent’s
true opinion is their type. The firm would like to know the actual percentage of each
type, but may be worried that some respondents may not answer honestly, for lack of
effort or because they feel obliged to endorse the product. The firm wants to provide
monetary incentives for honest answers. For these incentives to be strict, there must be
some additional input to the mechanism beyond the answers themselves (Radanovic and
Faltings, 2013; Cvitanić et al., 2020). In our canonical version of choice-matching, this
input is a respondent’s prediction of the relative frequency of each of the five ratings
submitted by other respondents in the sample.
Let xr = (xr1, ...,xr5) denote the reported rating of respondent r, where xrk = 1 if r’s
answer is “k” and xrk = 0 otherwise. yr = (yr1, ..,yr5), is then a vector of predictions, where
yrk is the prediction by respondent r of the frequency of others choosing k as their MCQ
answer.
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The “prediction score” that respondent r receives is a function S(x̄−r,yr) of her pre-
diction vector yr and the distribution x̄−r of the reported ratings’ frequencies, excluding
her own reported rating. The firm chooses S to be a proper scoring rule (Savage, 1971,
Gneiting and Raftery, 2007). It is then in the interest of each respondent to report their
expected value of the frequencies, which we call their best prediction. We denote by S̄−r
the average prediction score of respondents other than r who report the same rating as
r, if any. Respondent r receives a score of zero if among the others’ ratings there is any
missing ratings option, not reported by at least one respondent other than r. If there is
no missing option, she receives
λS+ (1−λ) S̄−r
with λ ∈ (0,1) an arbitrary weight chosen by the survey planner.
Why might we expect this payment formula to be truth-inducing? Observe, first, that
respondent r can safely assume that the payment formula is in effect, because the presence
or absence of a missing option does not hinge on her rating, and if the formula is not in
effect she receives zero no matter what she does. This triggering mechanism was first
employed by Baillon (2017), for the binary case.
The term λS provides incentives for giving best predictions because S is a strictly
proper scoring rule. If a respondent believes that those who share her type also have
(roughly) the same expectations of type frequencies, she will anticipate that they will
also give (roughly) the same predictions. Then, if all respondents other than her provide
honest ratings, the average of the prediction scores of all those with the same rating is
(roughly) equal to the score corresponding to their best prediction. By providing her
honest rating, a respondent is scored according to a prediction (roughly) identical to the
one she made himself, ensuring that the second term provides the incentives to answer the
MCQ honestly. These incentives apply even if some respondents do not provide a personal
prediction. Thus, in a large survey most respondents could be asked just for their ratings
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(letting λ= 0 in their scoring formula).
For the above arguments, it is not crucial that respondents use what we call best predic-
tions. What is important is that respondents of the same type believe that approximately
the same predictions are optimal, and respondents of different types believe that different
predictions are optimal, as we discuss below. Previous mechanisms have also invoked this
assumption in some form, but with additional requirements or limitations (Prelec, 2004;
Witkowski and Parkes, 2012b; Radanovic and Faltings, 2013; 2014; Zhang and Cheng,
2014; Baillon, 2017). We will compare choice-matching to these proposals at the end of
the chapter.
4.3 Model and Results
4.3.1 Setup
Generalizing the previous example, let A= {1, . . . , M} denote the set of possible answers
to an MCQ, and let N be the number of respondents. The respondent’s type is denoted
by random vector T r, where T r = i if i ∈A would be respondent r’s honest answer to the
question, and T ri = 0 otherwise.2 Xr = (Xr1 , ...,XrM ) denotes the chosen answer or reported
type of respondent r, where Xrk = 1 if r’s answer is “k” and Xrk = 0 otherwise. The answer





i is the frequency of types i in the




i is the frequency
of reported types i. Y ri is respondent r’s prediction of X̄−ri . The realizations of Xri and
Y ri are denoted xri , yri , the realization of T ri is tri , and so on.
A respondent’s score will depend on the reported types and predictions of all respon-
dents, and the following choice-matching trigger:
Definition 18. The choice-matching trigger Mr of respondent r is the event such that
2We will say in this case that r has type i.
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each answer i ∈ A is reported at least once by respondents other than r. That is, Mr
occurs if and only if there is no i ∈ A with x̄−ri = 0. The type-matching trigger Er of
respondent r is the event such that each type i ∈ A is represented at least once among
respondents other than r.
Note that when all respondents other than r respond honestly, the choice-matching
trigger becomes identical to the type-matching trigger. Assumptions A4-A7 below are
sufficient, but not necessary, for choice-matching to be honesty-inducing. In Subsection
4.3.2 we explain how they can be relaxed.
Assumption 4. Common prior. There exists a common prior on the distribution of
T r in the population.
Importantly, we do not assume that the survey planner knows the prior, only that it
is known to the respondents.
Assumption 5. Non-degeneracy. For any respondent r and any realization tr:
P (Er | T r = tr)> 0
Each respondent considers it possible that all distinct types are represented in the
rest of the sample. Although a technical assumption, non-degeneracy cannot be relaxed
without changing our approach substantially. The method thus puts some constraints
on the survey design: the number of answer options must be less than the number of
respondents (continuous scales are not allowed), and all options must have a chance of
receiving an honest endorsement.




T̄−r | T rk = 1, Er
]
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Assumption 6. Stochastic relevance. For any two respondents r, s and any answer
options, k, i ∈ A:
pr,k 6= ps,i if k 6= i
Assumption 7. Impersonal updating. For any two respondents r, s and any answer
option, k ∈ A:
pr,k = ps,k
Our version of stochastic relevance differs slightly from the standard one (Miller et al.,
2005), because expectations are also conditioned on the type-matching trigger Er (this
further implies N ≥M + 2, since N = M + 1 and Er yield pr,k = (1/M,..,1/M), for all
r,k).
Stochastic relevance is a mild requirement, with substantial support in the experimen-
tal psychology literature (Marks and Miller, 1987). The finding there that respondents’
answers about their personal characteristics are strongly correlated with their predictions
about the distribution of answers in the sample was labeled the “false consensus effect”
(Ross et al., 1977), although, as noted by Dawes (1989), it can be consistent with Bayesian
updating.
Stochastic relevance may be violated if the distribution of a particular characteristic
– for instance gender – is common knowledge. However, such a characteristic can be
made stochastically relevant if combined with characteristics whose distribution is not
common knowledge. For example, a respondent could be asked to indicate both gender
and beverage preference, and to predict their joint distribution in the sample. If the
correlation between beverage preference and gender is not known a priori, then one’s own
gender will be informative of the joint gender-preference distribution.
Impersonal updating is a more demanding assumption, stating that all respondents of
the same type have identical expectations about type frequencies. It will not hold exactly
in practice, as respondents with identical answers to an MCQ are likely to report differing
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predictions. As we discuss below, the main result of this section continues to hold when
impersonal updating is only approximately true.
Assumptions A4-A7 generically hold in a setting in which respondents’ types are inde-
pendently and identically distributed conditional on a certain state of the world.3 In our
example in 4.2 for instance, we could imagine that different states of the world correspond
to the true quality of the trial product and that the better the quality, the higher the
probability for each respondent to have a high honest rating.4
4.3.2 Inducing Honesty via Choice-Matching
We now assume A4-A7 and model the strategic setting induced by our payment rule as
a Bayesian game. A pure strategy for respondent r is a function σ(tr) = (σx(tr),σy(tr))
that maps her type to a response (xr,yr). The profile of all respondents’ pure strategies is
denoted σ(t), with entries σr(tr), and the profile excluding player r is denoted σ−r(t−r).
Given a real-valued payment rule R(σr(tr),σ−r(t−r)), a set of response strategies is a











| T r = tr
]
≥ 0 (4.3.1)
That is, by deviating in responses (x,y), player r would be worse off (in expectation) than
by not deviating. If the inequality is strict we speak of a strict Nash equilibrium. A Nash
equilibrium is strict in x if the inequality is strict whenever x 6= σrx(tr) and, analogously,
it is strict in y if the inequality is strict whenever y 6= σry(tr).
3An exact statement on the relation of the conditional i.i.d. assumption and our assumptions is given
in Section 4.7. One sufficient condition for our assumptions to hold then is that N > M +1 and that the
state of the world has a continuous distribution.
4Furthermore, our assumptions can hold even if the exact distribution of types is common knowledge.
For example, with N = 4, M = 2 and common knowledge that there are two respondents of each type,
each type knows that among the remaining three respondents there is one that matches her type and two
who do not. A pair of respondents will therefore have the same expectations if and only if the pair are of
the same type, satisfying assumptions A6 and A7.
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A strategy profile is honest if every respondent r reports xr = tr. A payment rule which
has a Nash equilibrium that is strict in x and y and honest is called strictly incentive
compatible. To make choice-matching incentive compatible, we use strictly proper scoring
rules:
Definition 19. Let Z be a random vector of positive frequencies with dimension M > 1
which satisfies ∑Mk=1Zk = 1. Let y be a prediction of Z. We say that the scoring rule S is
strictly proper if E [S (y,Z)] is uniquely maximized for y = E [Z].
Well-known strictly proper scoring rules are the quadratic S (y,Z) =−∑Mk=1 (yk−Zk)2,
and the logarithmic S (y,Z) =∑Mk=1 Zk log (yk).
Definition 20. Consider a respondent r who reports k as her type, and let S be strictly
proper. We say that a collection of payment rules RrS,λ induces choice-matching if
(a) In the eventMr:
RrS,λ(xr,yr,x−r,y−r) = λS(yr, x̄−r) + (1−λ) S̄−r(xr,x−r,y−r)
where λ ∈ (0,1) and S̄−r(xr,x−r,y−r) is the average prediction score achieved by the






(b) and RrS,λ(xr,yr) = 0 otherwise.
In words, if all M possible answers are chosen by at least one respondent other than r,
choice-matching assigns her a score that is a weighted average of her own prediction score
(that is, S(yr, x̄−r)) and the prediction score of those respondents who report the same
type. Otherwise, she receives zero.
We now come to the main result of this section.
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Proposition 5. Under Assumptions A4-A7 any collection of payment rules RrS,λ that
induces choice-matching is strictly incentive compatible.
Proof. We show that providing honest responses and best predictions is a Nash equilibrium
that is honest and strict in x and y, hence strictly incentive compatible. Fix a respondent
r with type k and suppose that all respondents other than r provide honest responses
and best predictions. Because respondent r cannot influence the choice-matching trigger
and receives zero if she is not matched, she will condition her payoffs on being choice-
matched. Given that other respondents answer honestly, this means conditioning on the
type-matching event Er. With her prediction yr, r thus maximizes
E
[
S(yr, T̄−r) |Er, T rk = 1
]
Since S is strictly proper, r maximizes her expected payoff with yr = pr,k, i.e., what we
call r’s “best prediction” is the optimal prediction from r’s perspective.5 To see that choice-
matching is strictly incentive compatible in x, consider the difference in the expected score
for respondent r between reporting tr honestly and deviating by making some dishonest
report xr with xri = 1:
Pr(Er | T r)× (1−λ)E
[
S̄−r(tr, t−r,y−r)− S̄−r(xr, t−r,y−r) | T r = tr,Er
]
From non-degeneracy, Pr(Er | T r)× (1−λ)> 0. Furthermore, by impersonal updating all
respondents of the same type have the same best prediction, so that the average S̄−r is
equal to the corresponding score S, and we have
E
[




S(pr,k, x̄−r)−S(pr,i, x̄−r) | T r = tr,Er
]
5Due to non-degeneracy, Ẽ [·] := E
[
· |Er, T rk = 1
]
is also an expectation operator, so that when S is
strictly proper, for any random vector of frequencies Z, Ẽ [S (r,Z)] is maximized by r = Ẽ [Z].
103
CHAPTER 4. HONESTY VIA CHOICE-MATCHING
By definition of pr,k and since S is strictly proper, we have
E
[
S(pr,k, x̄−r)−S(pr,i, x̄−r) | T r = tr,Er
]
> 0
for any i 6= k. Thus, RS,λ is strictly incentive compatible.
4.3.3 Robustness of the Result
In the following, we discuss extensions of Proposition 5. First, there may be equilibria
other than the honest one. However, if respondents cannot communicate with each other,
it is plausible that respondents of the same type will adopt the same strategies (perhaps
mixed). Under this symmetry assumption, we can show that all strict equilibria are either
honest, or honest up to permutation of responses, that is, all respondents of type k report
type i, all respondents of type i report type j, and so on. Second, we discuss in which way
assumptions A4-A7 can be relaxed, while still allowing for a strict Nash equilibrium in
honest strategies. Third, we point out that it is not necessary that all respondents report
both an answer to the MCQ and a prediction, and that proper scoring can be replaced
with other belief elicitation mechanisms.
A strategy profile σ is symmetric if respondents of the same type have identical strate-
gies, i.e., if for all respondents r and s and all types tr, ts we have σr (tr) = σs (ts) whenever





= σk (tr), where π is a permutation of the answers to the MCQ.
Corollary 1. Any permutation profile of honest responses is a strict Nash equilibrium.
Moreover, when σ is a symmetric strict Nash equilibrium, then σ is a permutation profile
of honest responses.
Proof. The first part of Corollary 1 follows directly from the proof of Proposition 5, re-
placing k by π (k). The second part rules out pooling equilibria as follows. Since σ
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is symmetric, respondents of the same type always provide the same answers. First, if
respondents of different types report different answers, the reported types σx (t) are a per-
mutation of the (actual) type profile. As in the proof of Proposition 5, any respondent r of
type k then maximizes her expected prediction score by setting yr` = p
r,k
σ−1x (`)
for all ` ∈ A.
Taken together, σ (t) is a permutation profile of honest responses. Second, if respondents
of two different types report the same type, there must be a missing answer option and
thus all respondents receive zero. Since respondents could also receive zero by endorsing
the missing answer option, the equilibrium cannot be strict.
Permutation profiles are a relabeling of the answers to the MCQ, and provide no ben-
efit in score relative to the focal honest equilibrium. It is hard to see how such relabeling
might be individually or collectively advantageous. Pooling equilibria may be attractive
to respondents who would like to conceal their type. However, as the above proof shows,
they are either not strict or not symmetric (or both).
Proposition 5 and Corollary 1 still hold when we weaken the impersonal updating as-
sumption A7. Note first that A7 does not affect incentives for the predictions. If all
respondents other than r are honest, r should report her best prediction pr,k when her
type is k. It is intuitive that r will have strict incentives to truthfully report her type if
the best prediction of all individuals of her type is “closer” to her best prediction than the
best prediction of individuals of some other type. The precise definition of “closer” in the
proof of such a result will depend on the scoring rule S. For instance, with the logarithmic
scoring rule, assumption A7 can be replaced by the assumption that the relative entropy
between the best predictions of two individuals with the same type is smaller than the
relative entropy between the best predictions of two individuals with different types. As
long as the expectations of respondents are clustered in this sense, truth-telling will remain
strictly incentive-compatible. In Subsection 4.7.3, we formalize this point.
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Our method further allows that only a subsample of the respondents answer both
the MCQ and the prediction question, while the remaining respondents answer the MCQ
only. To accommodate this option theoretically, we redefine the matching trigger such
that for each answer choice i ∈ A there is a respondent s 6= r who answers i and submits
a prediction. Respondents who only answer the MCQ will receive the score S̄, provided
that the (redefined) eventMr occurs. This simplifies the mechanism for those respondents
without losing incentive compatibility.
Finally, by using other types of scoring rules one can adjust choice-matching to re-
spondents who are not risk-neutral or do not even maximize expected utility (Offerman et
al., 2009). Whichever method is chosen, choice-matching adds minimal difficulty to these
procedures, since it relies on the same scoring principle for rewarding answers to the MCQ
as for rewarding predictions. A respondent who understands the elicitation method will
thus easily understand choice-matching incentives as well.
4.4 Choice-Matching Generalized
Making predictions about other respondents’ answers is an attractive default for our aux-
iliary task. However, there are situations in which its use cannot be recommended. First,
it may be that the stochastic relevance of individual answer types is weak since the distri-
bution of types in a population is well known, and the planner does not want to include
another question in the survey to reinstate stochastic relevance. Second, some respon-
dents may have trouble understanding the payments made according to proper scoring
rules. Finally, in some situations respondents could expect that predictions of some other
respondent type might be more accurate. For example, if a survey asks about occupa-
tion, a respondent could have an incentive to claim to be someone that has specialized
knowledge of the empirical distribution, for instance a labor economist.
In this section, we show that there is a general principle behind choice-matching which
106
BENJAMIN TEREICK: MAKING CROWDS WISER
can be employed by methods that do not rely on predictions.
4.4.1 General Mechanism
To formalize the underlying principle of choice-matching, we first introduce real-valued
utility-functions uk(yr,x−r,y−r) for k ∈ A that depend on all variables except a respon-
dent’s reported type xr. Since respondents do not necessarily report a prediction, we refer
to yr in the following as r’s y-response, which may take values in some general response
set Ω. In the prediction-based model of Section 4.3, the utility functions correspond to











in the case ofMr
0 otherwise.
Note that in Section 4.3 we implicitly assumed that the planner knows the respondents
are risk-neutral. However, in general, choice-matching does not require such knowledge.
What is needed is that the reward system used by the planner induces a game in which
different strategies are optimal for different types.
Definition 21. Let G be a (Bayesian) game given by the collection of N respondents,
a set of types A, a set of potential y-responses Ω, a prior P and utilities {uk}k∈A. The
game G is type-separating if there is a profile σ such that for every respondent r and every
k ∈ A:
(i) σrx (tr) = tr



















| trk = 1,Er
]
for
any k ∈ A, y ∈ Ω, y 6= y∗k.
In words, in a type-separating game there is a profile σ in which respondents declare
their types honestly (condition (i)), and in which respondents of identical types give the
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same y-response and respondents of different types give different y-responses (condition
(ii)). Furthermore, this profile is a Nash equilibrium (condition (iii)). Importantly, this




does not depend on xr, so that the
game G alone is not sufficient to reveal types. For instance, in the setting discussed in
Section 4.3, it would not be sufficient to only score respondents on their own predictions,
since then they would have no incentive to report their honest answer to the MCQ.
In Section 4.3, conditions (i)− (iii) correspond to separation in the prediction task,
which – under assumptions A4-A7 – can be achieved by choosing a strictly proper scoring
rule. The idea of the next proposition is that prediction scoring can be replaced by any
game that satisfies conditions (i)− (iii).




be a type-separating game. Under as-
sumptions A4-A5, any payment rule is strictly incentive compatible if it induces a game〈
N,A,Ω,{Vk}k∈A , P
〉









where λ ∈ (0,1) and ū is the average utility value achieved by the respondents other















and, on the complement ofMr:
Vk(xr,yr,x−r,y−r) = 0.
Proof. The proof is given in Section 4.7. It is almost identical to the special case in Section
4.3.
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4.4.2 Example and Applications
To see how choice-matching can be applied when the second question is not a prediction,
consider again the example from Section 4.2 in which each respondent gives a rating for a
trial product. As an alternative to scoring respondents on predictions, the company could
use the following procedure: first, the company presents a list of existing products to each
respondent and each respondent chooses the product on the list she likes most. Again,
we use the matching trigger: if there is a product that is not chosen by anyone, then r
receives nothing, or some pre-defined, fixed participation fee. Otherwise, r participates
in a “product lottery”: she receives the product she chose with probability λ, or else she
receives the product chosen by a respondent randomly selected among those who give the
same rating.
Intuitively, these incentives work if respondents expect that those who have the same
assessment of the trial product will have (approximately) the same preference with re-
gard to the products on the list, which is also what the type-separation assumption in
proposition 6 entails.6
Experimental economics is another promising application domain for generalized choice-
matching. Suppose that an experimenter is interested in the willingness-to-pay for a good
that cannot be offered for sale, perhaps because its price exceeds the research budget or
because it is hypothetical in nature. As the auxiliary task, the experimenter can then ask
for the willingness-to-pay for a good which can be incentivized, and link the hypotheti-
cal willingness-to-pay to the stated willingness-to-pay demonstrated in the lab. Choice-
matching also makes it possible to incentivize survey responses about behavior outside the
lab, by linking the respondent’s reward to the one obtained by respondents who give the
same answers to the survey questions. For instance, in an experiment on decision-making
under risk, respondents often choose among a number of gambles, with one of the gambles
6 The type-separation assumption can be relaxed in a similar fashion as the impersonal updating
assumption in Subsection 4.3.1.
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randomly chosen to be played out. Using choice-matching, the experimenter could ask a
survey question related to risk attitude, e.g., which insurance a respondent has bought.
She could then provide incentives for this survey question by paying respondents with
some probablility according to the gambles chosen by respondents with the same survey
answer.
4.5 Comparison with Existing Methods
Incentives for non-verifiable MCQs based on predictions of the answer distribution were
introduced by Prelec (2004), through the Bayesian Truth Serum (BTS) mechanism. Under
BTS, a reported answer receives a high score if its actual frequency exceeds predicted
frequency (and predictions are scored with the logarithmic version of S). The intuition
here is that a respondent of, say, type k expects that other types will underestimate the
frequency of k-types in the population, making an honest k-report optimal ex-ante. The
exact BTS scoring formula is quite opaque and its theoretical guarantee holds only in
the large sample limit (Prelec 2004, Cvitanić et al., 2020). However, the scores deliver a
bonus property, in that they also reflect respondent expertise. Precisely, if types are i.i.d
conditional on an underlying state of the world, then equilibrium BTS scores rank types
according to their posteriors on the actual world state. In principle, one can back out
the true world state by focusing on the highest-scoring respondents, and thus improve on
majority voting and other crowd-wisdom algorithms (Prelec et al., 2017).
Finite sample incentive-compatibility is obtained by several recent mechanisms, typi-
cally under weaker assumptions than needed for BTS. For binary questions, these include
the Robust Bayesian Truth Serum (RBTS) (Witkowski and Parkes, 2012b) and Baillon’s
(2017) “Bayesian Market.” The latter translates reported types and predictions into the
buying and selling of securities whose value is defined by the distribution of reported an-
swers. Some respondents may find the competitive market trading setting more engaging
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than scoring rules. For general MCQs, Radanovic and Faltings (2013) is mathematically
simpler than both BTS and RBTS, but requires that the highest expected frequency of
each type is held by the type itself, i.e, pr,kk > p
r,`
k , for each k,` ∈ A with k 6= `.7 The
mechanism of Zhang and Chen (2014) involves a two-stage game where respondents revise
their predictions after receiving the answer of another respondent. Survey implementation
would therefore require contacting respondents more than once.
The (non-parametric) Divergence-based Bayesian Truth Serum (DIV) of Radanovic
and Faltings (2014) is closest to (prediction-based) choice-matching. The basic idea is
to penalize disagreement in predictions among respondents reporting the same type. A
theoretical disadvantage of DIV relative to choice-matching, is that it allows non-honest
symmetric strict equilibria that also payoff dominate honest ones. A practical disadvantage
is that with DIV each respondent must provide a prediction.
Several mechanisms get by without asking for predictions,. The “peer prediction”
method of Miller et al. (2005) assumes that the planner knows the common prior, and
is in effect able to compute the posteriors that ideal respondents would supply. More
recently, data-intensive methods have attempted to estimate the prior from distributional
assumptions or by machine learning (Radanovic and Faltings, 2015, Radanovic et al.,
2016, Shnayder et al., 2016, Liu and Chen, 2017, Agarwal et al., 2020). These methods
are suitable for settings where large quantities of data are collected on similar questions
(e.g., different product ratings).
4.6 Conclusion
We have proposed a new way to elicit honest answers to a multiple choice question when
honesty cannot be verified, and the planner functions as an outsider, agnostic about the
distribution of answers in the population. The method asks respondents to engage in
7This assumption for instance rules out the common knowledge case of stochastic relevance mentioned
in footnote 3.
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a scored auxiliary task, which in our canonical version is to predict the distribution of
answers in the sample. By answering the MCQ, respondents pool with other respondents
endorsing that same answer, and share in their success or failure in the auxiliary task. It
is not necessary for everyone to participate in the auxiliary task; the minimal number is
just two plus the number of possible answers in the MCQ.
Compared to alternatives in the literature, our mechanism may be easier to explain.
Previous empirical tests of the BTS (John et al., 2012 and Weaver and Prelec, 2013)
used the so-called “intimidation method” (Frank et al. 2017), where respondents are told
that they do not need to understand how the payment formula works, only that it is in
their interest to be truthful. Although such black-box instructions do affect the aggregate
answer distribution, it is not clear what fraction of respondents find the claim credible.
The specific prediction-based method may not be effective when there is strong pub-
lic information about the distribution of types, or when respondents of the same type,
as defined by the MCQ, have very different information about this distribution. The
choice-matching principle can still be applied provided there is some task that induces
separation among the honest answers. The planner only needs to find a task for which
a separating equilibrium exists, she does not need to know the strategies that constitute
this equilibrium.
While surveys have played a major role as a research tool in other social sciences,
economists have traditionally been suspicious of stated preferences and beliefs, since there
are no consequences for responding carelessly or dishonestly. These unverifiable variables
may often be the key variables of social science interest. By linking stated and revealed
preferences our method erases, in principle, the methodological boundary between those
two types of data.
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4.7 Additional Material
4.7.1 Proof of Proposition 6
Recall the statement of Proposition 6:




be a type-separating game. Und+er as-
sumptions A4-A5, any payment rule is strictly incentive compatible if it induces a game〈
N,A,Ω,{Vk}k∈A , P
〉









where λ ∈ (0,1) and ū is the average utility value achieved by the respondents other















and, on the complement ofMr:
Vk(xr,yr,x−r,y−r) = 0.
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 5, observe that r cannot influence the choice-
matching trigger and should thus condition her expected payoffs on being choice-matched.
Since G is type separating, condition (iii) from definition 4 guarantees that the payment
rule is strictly incentive compatible in y. Consider then the difference in the expected score
for respondent r between reporting tr honestly and deviating by making some dishonest
report xr with xri = 1:










| T r = k,Er
]
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for i 6= k. Again, using condition (iii) from definition 4, we have that for r’s conditional











| T r = k,Er
]
> 0
which gives the required result.
4.7.2 Stochastic Relevance Under Conditional Independence and
Identical Distribution
Here we show that our stochastic relevance assumption A6 is satisfied in the common
setup in which there is an unknown state of the world conditioning on which respondent
types are independently and identically distributed.8
We first derive conditions which guarantee stochastic relevance without a matching
trigger. These conditions are always satisfied when the state of the world has a continuous
distribution, and is generically satisfied when it has a discrete distribution. In the second
step, we show that our matching trigger adds only minor additional requirements.
Stochastic relevance with respect to the state of the world As before, let M > 1
be an integer and A = {1, ...,M}. We further write ∆M for the M -dimensional simplex.
We start by considering a single respondent, whose type we denote T . Suppose that Ω is
a random vector taking values in ∆M , representing the state of the world, and write
8Note that assumption A7 is then also satisfied.
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P (T = k |Ω = ω) = ωk (4.7.1)
for all k ∈ A. In the following, we assume that Ω is a continuous random variable or a
discrete random variable, and we denote by P (ω) its probability density/mass function.
In this Section, we slightly abuse notation by writing T = k instead of T rk = 1 to mean
that respondent r’s type is k.
Definition 22. Stochastic relevance w.r.t. to Ω holds if for all different k,j ∈ A:
E (Ω|T = k) 6= E (Ω|T = j) (4.7.2)
Our first result states:
Proposition 7. Stochastic relevance w.r.t. to Ω holds if and only if for all different
k,j ∈ A and any constant λ ∈ R:
P (Ωk = λΩj)< 1 (4.7.3)
In words, stochastic relevance w.r.t. Ω holds if the ratio of any two state components
Ωk, Ωj is not known with certainty ax ante. This condition is satisfied if Ω follows a
continuous distribution on ∆M because the subset of ∆M on which Ωk = λΩj has zero
measure. If the distribution of Ω is discrete, then (4.7.3) is violated only if for all ω s.t.
P (ω)> 0, ωk = λωj .
Proof. We first rewrite (4.7.2). W.l.o.g. take k = 1, j = 2. For any i ∈ A:
E (Ωi |T = 1) =
ˆ
∆M




P (T = 1 |ω)
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And analogously, E (Ωi |T = 2) = E(ΩiΩ2)E(Ω2) . Thus, stochastic relevance w.r.t. Ω holds if






We next show that (4.7.3) implies (4.7.5) by contradiction. Suppose that (4.7.3) holds






































Note that (4.7.8) is an instance of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality which holds with equality
if and only if there is λ ∈ R such that
P (Ω1 = λΩ2) = 1 (4.7.9)
Thus, we have a contradiction and (4.7.3) indeed implies (4.7.5).
Finally, it is easy to see that (4.7.5) implies (4.7.3). Note that P (Ωk = λΩj) = 1 implies
λ= E(Ω2)E(Ω1) . This immediately yields equation (4.7.6), in violation to (4.7.5).
Corollary 2. Stochastic relevance w.r.t. to Ω holds if and only if for all different k,j ∈A
there is a set S ⊂∆M of possible values of Ω with
P (Ω ∈ S |T = k) 6= P (Ω ∈ S |T = j) (4.7.10)
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In words, stochastic relevance w.r.t. to Ω holds if and only if every type disagrees with
all other types about the probabilities of some states of the world.

















and recall that P (ω |T = k) = ωkE[ωk] P (ω). Thus, for i= 1,2 we have






and hence P (Ω ∈ Si |T = k) =P (Ω ∈ Si |T = j) only if P (Ω ∈ Si) = 0. From Proposition 7,
we know that stochastic relevance holds if and only if for all different k,j ∈A and any con-
stant λ∈R, (4.7.3) holds. It is straightforward to verify that (4.7.3) is equivalent to either
P (Ω ∈ S1)> 0 or P (Ω ∈ S2)> 0 (or both). It follows that stochastic relevance holds if and
only if P (Ω ∈ S1 |T = k) 6=P (Ω ∈ S1 |T = j) or P (Ω ∈ S2 |T = k) 6=P (Ω ∈ S2 |T = j).
Stochastic Relevance in a Finite Sample Distribution Consider a finite sample of
N respondents with types T 1, ...TN which satisfy conditional independence w.r.t. Ω, that
is, for all s 6= r and i,k ∈ A:
P (T s = i |Ω = ω, T r = k) = P (T s = i |Ω = ω) (4.7.11)
and are identically distributed, so that for all s,r ≤N :9
P (T s = i |Ω = ω) = P (T r = i |Ω = ω) = ωi (4.7.12)
9Note that it is not restrictive that we identify the state ω with the probability ωi. Suppose for instance
that in the trial product example from Section 4.2, honest ratings are distributed conditionally i.i.d on
the quality of the product, represented by Ω. We can then simply define a new random vector ω̃, s.t.
P (T r = i |Ω = ω) = ω̃i.
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Next, recall that we defined T̄−ri as the frequency of respondents whose type is i in the
sample excluding r.
Proposition 8. Under conditional i.i.d, stochastic relevance w.r.t. Ω implies stochastic
relevance w.r.t. T̄−r.
































Ωi |T 1 = k
]
(4.7.14)
Thus, for given j,k ∈A, we get that E
[













Ω |T 1 = j
]
.
Sufficient Conditions For Assumption A6 We will next state a result which adapts
propositions 7 and 8 to our matching trigger. As before, we write:
pr,k := E
[
T̄−r |Er, T r = k
]
(4.7.15)
Recall that our assumption A6 states that if j 6= k, then:
pr,k 6= pr,j . (4.7.16)
It will further prove useful to use the following identities, where Ω > 0 means that
Ωk > 0 for all k ∈ A.
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Lemma 2. If the types T 1, ...,TN are conditionally i.i.d w.r.t. Ω and P (Ω> 0)> 0, then
for s 6= r and any i ∈ A:










The first identity allows us to conclude that if T 1, ...,TN are conditionally i.i.d w.r.t.
Ω, then T 1, ...,TN are also conditionally i.i.d w.r.t. to both Ω and the matching trigger.
The second identity allows us to relate stochastic relevance w.r.t. Ω to stochastic relevance
w.r.t. T̄−r.
Proof. In the following, w.l.o.g fix r = k = 1. We first prove identity (i). For s 6= 1:
P (T s = i|Ω = ω,T 1 = 1,E1) = P (T
s = i, E1|Ω = ω,T 1 = 1)
P (E1|Ω = ω,T 1 = 1) (4.7.17)
Let θ−1 be the set of all possible t−1 = (t2, ..., tN ) and let θ−1E be the set of all t−1 such
that 1’s matching trigger is in effect. We then get for the numerator:
P (T s = i, E1|Ω = ω,T 1 = 1) =
∑
t−1∈θ−1E
P (T s = i, T−1 = t−1|Ω = ω,T 1 = 1) (4.7.18)
=
∑
t−1 ∈ θ−1E ,
s.t. ts = i
P ( T−1 = t−1|Ω = ω,T 1 = k) =
∑
t−1 ∈ θ−1E ,
s.t. ts = i
P (T−1 = t−1|Ω = ω) (4.7.19)
where the first step uses that each part of the sum is zero when ts 6= k and the
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second step uses conditional independence. Similarly, we get P
(







for the denominator. Thus:
P (T s = i|Ω = ω,T 1 = 1,E1) = P (T
s = k, E1|Ω = ω)
P (E1|Ω = ω) = P (T
s = i|Ω = ω,E1)
which is the first part of identity (i). To get the second part, note that due to condi-
tional i.i.d. w.r.t. Ω we can rewrite




so that (4.7.19) yields the same expression for all s 6= 1. Thus, we are allowed to write






= i|Ω = ω,E1)
= E(T̄−1i |Ω = ω,E1) =
1
N −1E((N −1) T̄
−1
i |Ω = ω,E1)
Let Z = (N −1) T̄−1−1M , where 1M denotes anM -dimensional vector of 1s. Note that
conditioning on Ω = ω and E1, Z is distributed according to a multinomial distribution,
with N −M −1 draws and parameters ω1, ...,ωM , such that:
(N −1) E(T̄−1i |Ω = ω,E1) = 1 +E(Zi |Ω = ω, Z ≥ 0)
= 1 + (N −M −1)ωi
which also shows the second part of identity (i).
To get to identity (ii), observe that for all i ∈ A
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E(T̄−1i |T 1 = k,E1) =
ˆ
∆M

























1 = k,E1) (4.7.23)
where in (4.7.22) we used identity (i). This proves identity (ii) as well.
We will now come to the key result:
Proposition 9. Let N −1>M and suppose that
(i) The types T 1, ...,TN are conditionally i.i.d w.r.t. Ω,
(ii) P (Ω> 0)> 0
(iii) and for all different k,j ∈ A and any constant λ ∈ R :
P (Ωk = λΩj |Ω> 0)< 1 (4.7.24)
Then, assumption A6 holds.
Proof. Again fix r = 1. Invoking Lemma 2, we have






Thus, under assumptions (i) and (ii), A6 holds if and only if E(Ω|T 1 = k,E1) 6=
E(Ω|T 1 = j,E1) for different j,k.
121
CHAPTER 4. HONESTY VIA CHOICE-MATCHING
Note that P (Ω> 0)> 0 implies P (Ω> 0 |T r = i)> 0 for all i∈A. Under conditional i.i.d.,
this implies that for any i ∈ A:
P
(












ω |T 1 = i
) M∏
k=1
ωk > 0 (4.7.26)








. Lemma 1 ensures that if
T 1, ...,TN are independent conditional on Ω, they are independent conditional on Ω when
replacing P and E by P̃ and Ẽ. We can thus apply proposition 7 to P̃ (·) and Ẽ (·), which
yields that assumption A6 holds if and only if for all λ ∈ R
P̃ (Ωk = λΩj) = P
(
















P (Ωk = λΩj |Ω> 0) = 1−
ˆ
∆M















P (ω |Ω> 0)
P (E1 |Ω> 0) (4.7.30)




> 0, so that (4.7.30) is strictly larger than 0 if
and only if P (ω |Ω> 0)> 0. Therefore, when (4.7.29) does not equal 1, (4.7.28) does not
equal 1 either. Thus, assumption (iii) implies (4.7.27) and under (i) and (ii), assumption
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(iii) is sufficient to guarantee A6.
Note that in addition to the requirements of propositions 7 and 8, proposition 9 adds
only the additional requirements that the sample is sufficiently large (N − 1 > M) and
that the linear independence needed for proposition 7 holds also when restricted to Ω> 0.
Again, given that N −1>M , it is sufficient that Ω has a continuous distribution on ∆M .
Thus, the only cases that are excluded by our matching trigger are knife edge cases in
which Ω’s distribution on ∆M is discrete, and in which, given that all types have a strictly
positive (conditional) probability, the ratio of at least two types is known. Since this
peculiar situation is unlikely to occur in practice, the additional restriction implied by our
trigger is a very minor one.
4.7.3 Robustness: No common prior
Our main result holds in a model without a common prior P . Instead, we assume that
each respondent r has probabilisitic beliefs represented by probability measure P r, with
the corresponding expectation operator given by Er. Since a Bayesian game requires a
common prior, we need to adjust our definition of incentive compatibility which we do in
a similar manner as Witkowski and Parkes (2012a), Radanovic and Faltings (2014) and











| trk = 1
]
> 0





and each respondent r. We continue to assume non-
degeneracy and stochastic relevance for each probability measure P r. In contrast to Sub-
section 4.3.1 however, it is now possible that yr,k 6= ys,k for two respondents r, s (violating
impersonal updating). In order to measure the divergence between these posterior ex-
pectations, we use a divergence function d(x, y) : ∆m×∆m → R+ ∪{∞} mapping two
probability vectors into the extended positive real line. We require that d(x, y) = 0 if and
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only if x= y, and define:
Definition 23. Posterior expectations yr,k of respondents satisfy closeness with respect










for any respondents r, s and s′, and for all k, k′ ∈ A with k 6= k′.
That is, under closeness the posteriors of two respondents with the same type can
differ due to different prior assumptions, but they still agree more (as measured by d)
than two individuals with different types. Put differently, respondents may bring different
information about the distribution of types to the survey, but the information about their
own honest response dominates differences with regard to the remaining information. We
can exploit such a structure via an extension of a relationship between scoring rules and
divergence measures studied by Friedman (1983) and Nau (1985):
Definition 24. An SPSR f(q;j) is effective with respect to divergence function d if for
















That is, when p1 is “closer” according to d to the true probability q than p2 is, then
the expectation of scoring rule f (p, i) using true probability q is higher for p= p1 than for
p= p2.
Proposition 10. Suppose that closeness holds with respect to divergence d and that SPSR
f (q, j) is effective with respect to d. Then, choice-matching is strictly incentive compatible.
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Proof. To simplify the exposition of this proof, we write Ẽr = Er [. | Er,T r] for player r’s
expectation operator conditional on her type and conditional on r’s matching trigger under
honesty. Compared to proposition 5, incentive compatibility for predictions is unchanged.
For answers to the MCQ, consider an individual respondent r of type k and suppose
that all other respondents respond truthfully. Then, the difference of the expected payoff
between reporting tr and deviating to xr with xrk′ = 1 for some k′ 6= k is:
Ẽr
[






















































where the last inequality follows since by definition of closeness and the effectiveness
relation between d and f , the bracketed term must be strictly positive for all respondents
r, s, s′.
Friedman (1983) and Nau (1985) characterize scoring rules which are effective with
respect to a metric d, including the well-known quadratic scoring and spherical scoring
rules. In addition to their contribution, it is easy to verify that the logarithmic scoring rule
is effective with respect to d when d is defined as relative entropy (which is not symmetric
and hence not a metric). Thus, for two plausible divergence measures of posteriors, relative
entropy and quadratic distance, the two most commonly used scoring rules can be used







Just as the industrial revolution saw division of labor in manufacturing of a previously
unknown scale, the ongoing digital revolution has brought about an unprecedented level
of division of labor in decision-making. For an ever-increasing number of decisions, we
have access to the recommendations of many, sometimes millions, of distant strangers.
However, the abundance of such data is mirrored by an abundance of ways how to make
use of them: the question of how best to combine the judgments of individual members
of a group into one decision has been studied in decision theory already by Savage (1954)
and has since been continuously topical in different fields, ranging from statistical decision
theory (e.g. Stone, 1961, Genest and Zidek, 1986, and more recently Baron et al., 2014,
Satopää et al., 2014), psychology (e.g. Hertwig, 2012, Budecsu and Chen, 2014) and game
theory (e.g. Feddersen and Pedersdorfer, 1998) to experimental economics (e.g. Anderson
and Holt, 1997, Gillen et al. 2017).
In this chapter, I put methods under the microscope which have, despite the wide-
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spanning existing literature, received relatively little attention. These are methods which
try to solve the problem of aggregation by making use of metabeliefs (i.e., beliefs about
beliefs) and specifically beliefs about the beliefs of others. A recently developed method in
this spirit is the “Surpringly Popular Algorithm” (SPA) proposed by Prelec et al. (2017).
The SPA asks respondents to predict the share of all possible answer options and chooses
an option if it is more commonly chosen (i.e. more “popular”) than on average predicted.
The idea is to penalize answer options that can be expected to be frequent regardless of
their correctness.
While this algorithm was successfully tested empirically, it is an open question whether
it constitutes the best way to make use of metabeliefs. Prelec et al. (2017) offer a
theoretical justification of their algorithm in terms of a model with infinite respondents, but
I show that when we consider finitely many respondents, this justification ceases to hold.
Instead, I propose a new method that under the assumption of Bayesian responses would
be optimal even with finitely many respondents. Specifically, I propose “self-aggregation”
(SELF), which lets the crowd choose how to aggregate the judgments of its members. If
the crowd members are capable of making full use of their metabeliefs, these aggregation
rules will be better than one chosen by an outsider. The idea is thus to apply the “wisdom
of crowds” (Surowiecki, 2005) to the aggregation problem itself.
In addition to the SPA, I contrast SELF – theoretically and in an online experiment
– with majority voting and with aggregation methods based on judgments of confidence.
The latter have served as the traditional inputs for aggregation approaches in decision
theory and are therefore a natural benchmark. SELF, SPA and confidence-based methods
further share as a common feature that they can be applied “on the spot”. That is, they
take as inputs only the information provided by respondents. This stands in contrast
to methods which make use of large amounts of data on the track-record or individual
characteristics of different experts (e.g. Budescu and Chen, 2014). The advantage of on-
the-spot methods is that they can be applied even if such data is not available. Moreover,
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methods that give differing weights to different opinions according to a complex learning
process lack transparency and as a result may not be accepted by the experts that are
consulted or by the decision-maker who wants to employ them.
In my theoretical analysis, I consider a binary-choice model in which an aggregator asks two
questions to respondents about their choice among two different options. To analyze the
performance of the different methods, I build on the model by Prelec et al. (2017). While
simplifying their model on one dimension – by limiting the number of available options
to two – I generalize the setting by adding additional uncertainty about the distribution
of judgments. I show that in this extended setting, the SPA is not always the optimal
rule but that under the Bayesian assumption made by Prelec et al. (2017), the optimal
decision-rule is available to respondents and can be communicated efficiently.
A special case of this model allows me to make a more detailed comparison: The SPA
is theoretically the best out of the methods considered in Prelec et al.’s (2017) experiment
when the two choice-options are about equally likely to be the correct choice. When the
prior is not equal however, the SPA can be almost arbitrarily worse than alternatives when
the crowd size is small. Moving on from the assumption of Bayesian responses, I study an
anchoring and adjustment model in the spirit of Tversky and Kahneman (1974). I show
that the theoretical advantage of SELF over the SPA prevails under anchoring. However,
if methods differ in terms of the difficulty they pose to respondents and anchoring is more
pronounced for the types of judgments required by SELF, the theoretical performance
ranking may reverse.
In the online experiment, I test the empirical accuracy of the model by implementing
an environment with the statistical properties of my model. This allows me to compare
responses directly to the Bayesian prescription, which leads to a more powerful design
for comparing methods than has been used in previous work. I find that the SPA shows
the highest performance, followed by SELF. Estimating anchoring parameters, I find that
most of the deviation from the Bayesian model can be explained by a stronger tendency to
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report values in the mid-range of the answer scale for some methods, as predicted by an-
choring. These results show that the meta-cognitive abilities of individuals are challenged
by complex methods such as SELF and the SPA. However, despite anchoring effects, re-
sponses contain sufficient information to outperform methods based on less challenging
questions.
5.1.1 Related Literature
A statistical argument for using a large sample of respondents rather than asking a single
individual was first formulated by Condorcet (1785) in what is now called the Condorcet
Jury Theorem (CJT). Condorcet’s work was re-discovered in the social choice literature
by Black (1948) and his classical jury result has led to the development of new conditions
under which majority voting (and plurality voting for more than two options), still out-
performs individual metrics (List and Goodin, 2001, Dryzek and List, 2003). In a broader
context, this is part of a “wisdom of crowd” literature which can be traced back to Galton
(1907). In this literature, relatively simple statistics (e.g. the mode, median or mean) of a
pool of judgments are demonstrated to outperform the best, or average individual member
of the group (e.g. Richardson and Stone, 1971, Treynor, 1987, Herzog and Hertwig, 2011).
In settings in which such simple wisdom of crowds techniques do not perform well, a
large body of work exists attempting to correct individual judgments before aggregating
them, e.g. Herzog and Hertwig (2009), Hertwig (2012), Fan et al. (2019). This literature
is heavily influenced by the study of the calibration properties of confidence judgments and
probabilistic reasoning capabilities of humans in the tradition of Kahneman and Tversky
(1973; 1982).
In contrast to these specific practical applications, Gneiting et al. (2013), Baron et
al. (2014) and Raftery et al. (2005), prove the optimality of specific aggregation methods
in a given statistical environment. The setting considered in this chapter is considerably
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simpler but makes use of a new type of input which does not rely on individual confidences.
Instead, individuals are asked directly for judgments which take into account that there
are other individuals who provide judgments as well. Such methods are still quite rare
(Steyvers and Miller, 2015). Prelec et al. (2017) suggest a method in which respondents
are asked for their predictions of the responses of other individuals. The empirical ade-
quacy of their method has been replicated by Lee et al. (2018).1 A more general version
of the SPA based on Bayesian hierarchical modeling is proposed by McCoy and Prelec
(2017).
The next section gives an illustration of the main theoretical idea. Section 5.3 is the
formal model, starting with the assumption that respondents give answers in a Bayesian
fashion and extending from there to an anchoring and adjustment model. Section 5.4
describes the experimental design and Section 5.5 provides the findings of this experiment.
I discuss the relation of these findings to the theoretical model in Section 5.6. Section 5.7
concludes and Sections 5.8 and 5.9 provide additional material.
5.2 Illustration: A Jury Decision
The focus in this chapter will be on the simplest possible choice problem, a binary decision.
Such a problem was also studied by Condorcet (1785) who considered a jury trying to
determine whether a delinquent was guilty or not. In his model, all individual judgments
are identically distributed and the correctness of their judgments are independent from
each other. Condorcet’s observation was that if each jury member has a probability larger
than 50% to make the right decision, the majority of the members will reach the correct
decision with near certainty as the jury size increases. Clearly, this model lacks some
essential features of real-life decision making, or otherwise large majorities would almost
never make mistakes.
1A correction of this article was posted online which showed that the SPA slightly underperformed the
modal prediction of media experts and self-declared highly-knowledgeable respondents.
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A natural point of departure from Condorcet’s classic model is to relax the idea that
the individual judgments of the jury members are independent from each other. For in-
stance, we can imagine a delinquent who is very well-spoken and who is able to afford
highly-paid attorneys. Such a delinquent, whether guilty or not, will tend to convince
more jury members. Suppose then that when the delinquent is not guilty, each judge has
a probability of 80% to come to the conclusion that the delinquent is in fact not guilty.
However, even if he is guilty, it may be that each member will vote to acquit with a large,
65% say, probability. If we suppose further that a priori (that is, before the jury members
have heard the testimony), it is equally probable that the defendant is guilty or not, we
see that each jury member has an (unconditional) probability larger than 50% to make the
correct decision in line with Condorcet’s requirement. However, the accuracy of the judg-
ments are not independent from each other: If one of the jury members makes an incorrect
judgment, it becomes more probable that another judge also reaches the wrong conclusion.
In technical terms, the judgments of the jury member are independent only conditionally
on the correct verdict. This (seemingly) small difference in assumptions has a stark effect
on the accuracy of the jury: under the assumption of conditional independence, at least
65% (approximately) of the jury members will vote in favor of the defendant. If the jury
votes according to the majority rule, it will thus always acquit the defendant, even if she
is guilty. Thus, since we assumed unconditional probability of guilt to be 50%, the jury
will reach the wrong verdict about 50% of the time. In a reversal of Condorcet’s initial
result, a large crowd can have a lower “expected accuracy” than each of the individual
jury members.
As a way out of such situations, one could try to find out which jury members have par-
ticularly high accuracy. In the case of the well-spoken defendant, one could for instance
try to identify those members which are less easily fooled by appearance. It is however
not easy to measure accuracy in the jury case since the actual “ground truth” of guilt
or innocence is, in the overwhelming majority of cases, not known (Sunstein, 2006). As
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a replacement, we could try to ask the jury members for their own assessment of their
expertise. However, as has long been documented, confidence reports are often not well
calibrated (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982, Lichtenstein et al., 1982, Keren, 1991, Johnson
and Fowler, 2011). Moreover, as pointed out by Prelec et al. (2017), even if individual
confidences were fully Bayesian probabilities, they might not be a suitable input for judg-
ment aggregation. In the case of our jury, those members who vote guilty will always be
more confident.2 What is informative about them, rather than their relative confidence,
is that there are surprisingly many of them in case the defendant is indeed guilty.
As an alternative to confidence-weighted measures, the Surprisingly Popular Algorithm
of Prelec et al. (2017) therefore asks for a prediction of the overall response. The jury
members, for instance would predict the responses by their fellow jury members. If more
jury members voted guilty than on average predicted, “guilty” should be the verdict of
the jury (and “not guilty” otherwise). The underlying intuition is simple: jury members
should expect a share of 65%-80% to vote to acquit. When the jury is large, and the
defendant is not guilty, about 80% of the jury – a larger share than on average expected
– will vote to acquit, whereas when the defendant is guilty only 65% will do so, which is
less than predicted on average. Thus, with a large enough jury, the SPA will always make
the right verdict.
The first question asked by the model in my chapter is how important the assumption
of a large crowd is for the argument just outlined. In the next section, I show that it is
indeed a crucial assumption. For a smaller crowd, there can be larger sampling variance,
so that for instance in our example a share quite different from 65% could vote to acquit if
the defendant is in fact guilty and a share different from 80% could vote to convict if the
defendant is innocent, even if all the other simplifying assumptions are true. As a result,
2This is for pure mechanical, statistical reasons: bayesian updating gives a confidence of 80%80+65% ≈
55.2% for jury members who vote to acquit and a confidence of (100−65)%(100−65)%+(100−80)% ≈ 63.5% for jury
members who vote to convict.
133
CHAPTER 5. AGGREGATION THROUGH META-COGNITION
the optimal Bayesian voting rule can be quite different to the SPA (I do show however,
that if the unconditional probability of guilt is 50%, the SPA will be “close” to the optimal
rule). This observation is not restricted to a “small crowd”, but rather concerns a general
class of situations with which the SPA may not deal well, namely situations in which the
innocence or guilt of the defendant does not fully determine the composition of judgments.
For instance, there could be idiosyncratic shocks which determine the votes, other than
the evidence laid out in court, or the asusumption of conditional independence could be
violated due to group deliberation.
Pushing the idea to make use of the Bayesian expectations and the domain-knowledge
of the jury involved to the limit, I therefore propose a new method, “self-aggregation”,
which asks the jury members a rather demanding question: What is the optimal number of
guilty votes that we should use as a threshold to convict the defendant? We will see that
under mild assumptions, this method can be communicated as efficiently as the inputs
required for the SPA. Of course, it could be that this question is over-demanding to the
jury members. The truism under the Bayesian case then becomes an empirical question,
which I address in the experiment reported in Sections 5.4-5.5. Before this however, I will
make the discussion of the jury example rigorous in the next section.
5.3 Model
5.3.1 Setup and Notation
To formalize the preceding discussion, suppose there are two answer options, denoted 1 and
0 (like “guilty” and “not guilty” in the jury example) and a set I = {1, ...,n} of individuals.
Each individual i ∈ I makes a judgment on which of the two options is the correct one
and potentially makes a meta-judgment (defined in 5.3.2). The individuals’ judgment is
based on a piece of information si, a signal, which is the realization of a random variable
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Si. The true (or correct) option is a random variable T equal to either 0 or 1 and the joint
distribution of signals and truth is determined by a probability measure P .
An aggregator makes a choice from {0,1} upon receiving the individual judgments and
meta-judgments. As will be made precise below, her aim is to maximize the probability
that her choice is correct. The crucial idea is that the aggregator does not know the
probability measure P , whereas it is, at least tacitly, known to the individuals. However,
the aggregator may make assumptions about the set of ”admissable” priors, denoted P .
The prior probability P (T = 1) is denoted π. Moreover I write for the individual signals:
P
(





Si = 1 | T = 0
)
= qi (2)
where pi > qi for all i ∈ I. (1)-(2) are in the form of a signal detection model (Macmillan,
2002) in which individuals try to detect the truth and the parameter pi gives the hit rate
(the rate of positive signals when the underlying state is true) and the parameter qi the
individuals’ false alarm rate (the rate of positive signals when the underlying state is
false). I denote random variables such as T and the signals S1, ...,Sn with capital letters.
S = (S1, ...,Sn) denotes the random vector of signals and the average signal 1nSi is written
S̄. The realizations of these random variables are written t, si, s and s̄, respectively. In
the next subsection, I define properties of the signal distribution which will play a central
role throughout the chapter. After that, the relation of the individuals’ responses and the
signaling structure is defined.
5.3.2 Individual responses and the Aggregator’s Objective
All four properties discussed in this subsection are commonly made in the judgment ag-
gregation literature. The first property, which is assumed throughout the chapter, relates
the individuals’ signal and their posterior belief about T :
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(Signal Property 1) P satisfies Signal Decisiveness if for each i∈ I and si ∈ {0, 1}:
P (T = si |Si = si)> 12
I will also refer to an individual with a signal si such that P (T = 1 |Si = si)> 12 as “indi-
vidual i believes that T = 1”. With this convention, Signal Decisiveness means that upon
receiving a signal of 0 or 1, each individual believes that T = 0 or T = 1, respectively.
(Signal Property 2) P satisfies Exchangeability if for any permutation φ(1) , ..., φ(n)
of 1, ...,n:
P (S1 = s1, ...,Sn = sn, T = k) = P
(
Sφ(1) = s1, ...,Sφ(n) = sφ(n), T = k
)
for all realizations s1, ..., sn and k ∈ {0,1}.
In words, exchangeability states that permuting the judgments of individuals should
not change the probability of the event. That is, it should not matter which expert holds
which opinion. This is surely a fairly demanding property and to some extent it limits the
possibility of methods which are based on ‘expert selection, since the individuals’ compe-
tences are not differentiated with respect to information they are receiving. However, it is
still possible to include an imperfect response as a substitute for individual differences in
informativeness. I.e., one could include in the model that individuals differ with respect
to how accurately they can report aspects of P .
Under exchangeability, what matters for the aggregator is the share of respondents
who believe that T = 1, i.e. the average signal S̄. The realization of this variable, the
empirical average s̄ of the realizations s1, ..., sn is then a sufficient statistic for the truth
parameter T . This means that conditioning on the random vector (S1, ...,Sn) does not
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P (T |S1, ...,Sn) are identical. The next property refers to this sufficient statistic:
(Signal Property 3) P satisfies the The Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP)
if for any vector of realizations s′ and s, for which the average satisfies s̄′ ≥ s̄ (that is,
there is a larger share of 1-signals in s′):
P (S = s′, T = 1)
P (S = s′, T = 0) ≥
P (S = s, T = 1)
P (S = s, T = 0)
Under MLRP, when a larger number of respondents receives a signal Si = 1, then T = 1
becomes relatively more likely compared to T = 0. It implies that shifting any individuals’
signal from 0 to 1 should not make it less probable that T = 1 is true. Crucially, MLRP
does not exclude the possibility that even for large values of s̄, the conditional probability
P
(
T | S̄ = s̄
)
can be very low. In particular, if a majority of respondents receives the signal
Si = 1, it is still possible that T = 0 is more probable than T = 1.
Definition 25. SP1-SP3 together define the main model.
Remark 2. Under exchangeability, pi = p and qi = q for all i ∈ I. Then, SP1 and SP3







and 1− q1−p >
π
1−π (5.3.2)
That is, when Si = 1, the ratio of hit- and false-alarm rate pq outweighs the prior odds
ratio 1−ππ (and analogously when Si = 0). The next property gives rise to a sub-case of
the model, the “binomial model”:
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(Signal Property 4) P satisfies conditional independence of the signals S1, ...,Sn with
respect to T if
P
(






for all i, j ∈ I with i 6= j.
Definition 26. In the binomial model, (SP1-SP4) hold.3
I coin this subcase the binomial model because under SP1-4, in each state, individual
signals follow a binomial distribution. In my notation, the distribution of signals under T =
1, denoted P (S|T = 1), is a binomial (n,p)-distribution, and P (S|T = 0), the distribution
of signals under T = 0, is a binomial (n,q)-distribution. The binomial model generalizes
the case of binary signals considered in Prelec et al. (2017) and it is the setting of the
experiment reported in Sections 5.4-5.5.
5.3.3 Individual responses and the Aggregator’s Objective
Moving from individual signals to responses, I next define what it means for respondents
to be truthful. I denote i’s judgment by Xi. The vector X = X1, ...,Xn, the average X̄
and the realizations xi, x and x̄ are defined analoguously to their signal-equivalents.




1 ifP (T = 1 |Si = si)≥ 12
0 else.
Note that with signal decisiveness, truthful answers entail that xi = si. Assuming (JP1),
one can identify judgments and signals and can use notation withX and S interchangeably.
3SP3 follows by assuming SP1, SP2 and SP4, so that it is in fact only necessary to assume these 3
conditions.
138
BENJAMIN TEREICK: MAKING CROWDS WISER
Besides asking for the individual judgments about T , the aggregator also poses a meta-
question to the individuals, to which the individuals provide a response yi, called a meta-
judgment. The meta-question asks for some information about P . I express the meta-
question as a function m representing the “correct” Bayesian answer to the question.
For instance, it could ask “what is the probability that more than 5 respondents will
report a judgment of 1?” which would then be captured by P
(
X̄ ≥ 5n |Si
)
. Formally, a
meta-question is a function m mapping the conditional probability measures P (. |Si = 1),
P (. |Si = 0) into the [0, 1] interval. This captures two restrictions often implicit in the
literature: First, the respondent cannot be asked about information that is conditional
on a different signal than the actual realized one, or about unconditional information
in which the realization of the signal would still be unknown. For instance, in the jury
example a question that would not be allowed would be “Would you think the defendant
was guilty, if you would not find the defendant convincing”? Second, I assume that it is
impossible for respondents to communicate the entire posterior distribution. In the spirit
of Compte and Postlewaite (2018), I model that individuals are limited in their ability
to communicate their knowledge about the statistical setting by restricting the answer
space for the y-answer to [0,1]. This can still encorporate confidence judgments, SPA-like
predictions and even decision-rules. Aside from these assumptions, m can be any function
which maps the conditional distribution P (.|si) into a response in [0,1]. We will see below
that under assumptions SP1-SP3, this is sufficiently unrestrictive to allow the aggregator
to make full use of the individuals’ information if they are giving Bayesian responses, as
defined next:
(Judgment Property 2) Individuals are truthful Bayesians w.r.t. to y if for every
individual i:
yi =m(P ( . |Si = si))
If individuals are truthful Bayesians w.r.t. x and y, I will simply say that they are
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truthful Bayesians. Alternatives to the assumptions of truthful Bayesians are considered
in Subsection 5.3.7.
The Aggregators’s aim The aggregator’s task is to define an aggregation method. An
aggregation method A is a pair (m, C) where m is a meta-question and C : {0,1}N ×
[0,1]N → {0,1} is a choice-rule which aggregates the vector of individual judgments and
meta-judgments into a single judgment (either 0 or 1). The aggregator’s aim is to find an
aggregation method that is optimal, given the set P of possible probability measures. To
compare different aggregation methods, I use the following terminology.
Definition 27. An aggregation method A= (m, C) is better w.r.t. to P than A′= (m′, C ′),
written A%P A′, if
P (C (X, Ym) = T )≥ P
(
C ′ (X,Ym′) = T
)
(5.3.3)
where Ym is the vector of answers to the meta-question m.
When responses are truthfully Bayesian, Ym is the vector of truthful Bayesian meta-
judgments:
Ym = (m(P ( . |S1), ..., m(P ( . |Sn))
Following standard convention, I write AP A′ if (5.3.3) holds strictly and A∼P A′
if it holds with equality. Aggregation method A = (m,C) is thus (strictly) better under
P than A′ = (m′,C ′) if asking meta-question m and using choice-rule C will lead to the
correct decision with (strictly) higher probability than asking meta-question m′ and using
choice-rule C ′. Ideally, the aggregator would like to find a rule which is optimal in the
following sense:
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Figure 5.3.1: Optimal threshold values for three different levels of the prior π. The
distribution indicated by the unfilled red dots depict the probability of different numbers
of individuals to receive a 1-signal if T = 0, whereas the filled blue dots graph shows the
distribution conditional on T = 1.
for any alternative aggregation method A′.
As a first observation in the main model, any optimal aggregation method must have
a choice-rule of a specific form under Bayesian responses:
Proposition 11. If A = (m, C) is optimal with respect to each P ∈ P, there exists a
function t : P → [0, 1] such that:
C (x,y) =

1 if x̄≥ t(P )
0 if x̄ < t(P )
(5.3.5)
Proof. See Section 5.8.
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The basic observation of this proposition is that in the main model, every optimal
aggregation method, must partition the [0, 1] interval into two regions, in one of which the
aggregation methods concludes that T = 0 and in one of which it concludes that T = 1.
Figure 5.3.1 gives a graphical intuition of this observation. There, the signaling structure
satisfies SP1-SP4 with n= 15, hit rate p= 0.8 and false-alarm rate q= 0.65, the parameters
from the jury example in Section 2. The picture depicts the optimal threshold-rule for
different values of π (the prior probability that T = 1). Consistent with MLRP, the ratio of
probabilities under T = 1 and T = 0 increases with the number of individuals who receive
a signal of 1. Moving from the left to the right, the optimal threshold is at the first point
at which the probability ratio exceeds the ratio π1−π of the prior probabilities. At this
point, the number of 1-signals is sufficient evidence such that P (T = 1|S) > 12 . Due to
MLRP, all outcomes to the right of this point have an even larger ratio, and are thus
even stronger evidence for T = 1. When π = 12 , the optimal threshold-level (depicted in
yellow), is precisely at the point at which the outcome is assigned a higher probability
under the distribution conditional on T = 1. When the prior is lower, the optimal choice
rule requires stronger evidence in favor of T = 1 and the optimal threshold (depicted for
π = 0.3 in green) moves to the right. For a larger prior probability of T = 1, the optimal
required threshold (depicted in unfilled red for π = 0.7) is lower. We can see however
that although the optimal value differs for different values of π, all of the three optimal
thresholds are to the right of the majority threshold. Following the majority rule would
thus often lead to the incorrect decision.
5.3.4 Self-Aggregation, the Surprisingly Popular Algorithm and
Confidence-Based Aggregation
Self-Aggregation I will next define the different methods in terms of the meta-judgment.
The method I propose, SELF-aggregation, asks respondents for which number of 1-judgments,
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T = 1 becomes more likely than T = 0. It has the Bayesian answer:4









Under Bayesian responses, the meta-judgments of SELF thus provide the optimal cut-
off point t(P ) for the true probability measure P . The choice-rule of SELF is based on
the average ȳ of the responses yi:
CSELF (x,y) =

1 if x̄≥ ȳ
0 if x̄ < ȳ
(5.3.6)
Since each of the meta-judgments yi is equal to the optimal cut-off point t(P ), SELF
is thus an optimal aggregation rule under truthful Bayesian responses. Note however
that optimality does not uniquely determine a question and choice-rule. For instance,
an aggregation method could ask for an arbitrary transformation of the SELF-question,
say the question m̃=mSELF −1, and correct for this transformation in the choice-rule by
concluding that T = 1 if x̄≥ ȳ+1. Or, more sensibly, a different aggregation method could
use the geometric mean of the yi-judgments, rather than the arithmetic one. However, it
seems most natural to state the question as it is done by SELF.
Surprisingly Popular Algorithm As was mentioned in Section 5.2, the meta-question
in the Surprisingly Popular Algorithm (SPA) proposed by Prelec et al. (2017) asks each
individual for their expectation of the average response, i.e.:
mSPA = E
(
X̄ |Si = si
)
where E is the expectation operator associated with the measure P . The choice-rule
4The practical implementation of this question is discussed in Section 5.4.
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of the SPA is of the same form as SELF:
CSPA (x,y) =

1 if x̄≥ ȳ
0 if x̄ < ȳ
(5.3.7)
Average Confidence For the average confidence method (AVGCONF), the meta-question
asks about the probability that i assigns to T = 1, that is:
mAV G = P (T = 1 |Si = si)
and the choice-rule defined by AVGCONF is:
CAV GCONF (x,y) =

1 if ȳ ≥ 12
0 else
(5.3.8)
That is, AVG chooses an option if the average respondents believes it to be true with
at least 50% probability.
(Confidence-Weighted) Majority Voting Confidence-weighted majority voting (CONF-




1 if∑ixiyi ≥∑i (1−xi)(1−yi)
0 else
(5.3.9)
That is, CONFMAJ weighs each individual i with the probability i reports that their
judgment is correct (since yi is the probability i assigns to T = 1, the value 1− yi is the
probability an individual i with xi = 0 assigns to this judgment being correct). If the
number of individuals who report xi = 1, weighted by their reported probability, exceeds
the weighted number of individuals who report xi = 0, CONFMAJ chooses option 1.
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Finally, Majority Voting (MAJ) does not need yi altogether and instead uses:
CMAJ (x,y) =

1 if x̄≥ 12
0 else
(5.3.10)
5.3.5 Comparisons of Methods with Bayesian Responses
I next compare the performance of different aggregation methods based on the better-
ness relation defined in Subsection 5.3.3 and under the assumption of truthful Bayesian
responses. We can restate a result from Prelec et al. (2017) in the notation that has been
introduced thus far.
Proposition 12. [adapted from Theorem 2 in Prelec et al. (2017)] In the binomial model,
as n→∞, if individuals are truthful Bayesians we have
P (CSPA (x,y) = T )→ 1
Proof. [sketch] First note that
lim












P (T = 0|Si)
= pP (T |Si) + qP (T = 0|Si)
So that for each i ∈ I, yi is a strict convex mixture of p and q. In the binary
case we consider here, the optimality of the SPA then becomes a simple geometric ar-
gument.5 Since q < yi < p for each yi, we have that limn→∞P
[





X̄ < ȳ |T = 0
]
= 1, which ensures that the SPA always chooses the correct op-
tion.
5This observation is less obvious when there are more than two choice options (the case treated by
Theorem 3 in Prelec et al. (2017), which we do not consider here.
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The intuition is the same as in the jury example where it was loosely argued that with
a large crowd, the share of jury members who vote to acquit will be close to the expected
value conditioning on the defendant being truly guilty or innocent.
As argued in Section 5.2, and shown in Figure 5.3.1, the limit result does not hold for





= 1 and the simple majority voting will always choose T = 1 (since respon-
dents whose judgment is 1 will always be in the majority). This will turn out to be the
wrong choice whenever T = 0. A similar point holds for CONFMAJ.6
I next show that for a prior π of 12 , we can make a similar claim to Proposition 12,
without relying on limit results.
Proposition 13. In the binomial model given by (SP1-SP4), whenever individuals are
truthful Bayesians and π = 12 :
ASELF %P ASPA ∼P AAV GCON %P ACONMAJ %P AMAJ
for all P ∈ P and for some P ∈ P , each %P is strict.
Proof. For the full proof, see Subsection 5.8.2.
The idea of the proof is as follows: I show first that when respondents are truthful
Bayesians, the choice-rules of each of the aggregation methods can be written in the
form of (5.3.5). The corresponding values of t(P ) for each of the aggregation methods
6Note that yi has to be at least 0.5 when xi = 1 and that (1−yi) can be at most equal to 1. Thus, the





which can be rewritten as x̄ = 23 . Thus, CONFMAJ will always choose option 1 when x̄ exceeds
2
3 , no
matter the exact confidence levels reported.
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are:7































which are derived from the definitions in (5.3.6)-(5.3.10). We can see that for π = 12 ,
we have tAvgConf = tSPA, so the performance of AVGCONF and SPA must be identical.
Note further that all the thresholds above – in particular, the optimal one – do not depend
on the number of individuals. Intuitively, this is because only the relative evidence in the
sample matters, whereas the sample size n represents the “strength” of the evidence. The
latter is only relevant when there is additional, previous information captured by the
parameter π.
In the proof, I show that if p > 1− q, we have
tSELF > tSPA > tCONMAJ > tMAJ (5.3.16)
and the reverse holds for p < 1− q. An example of such an ordering is depicted in
Figure 5.3.2.
Due to MLRP, this ordering of the thresholds relates to an ordering in terms of expected
accuracy as follow: The closer the threshold value of a method is to the optimal one (i.e.
7Here and in the proof in Subsection 5.8.2, I surpress the dependence on P for simplicity. Since P is
fixed, there should be no ambiguity.
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ex
Figure 5.3.2: For n= 15, p= 0.9 and q = 0.4 (under an equal prior, π = 0.5), SELF, SPA,
CONFMAJ and MAJ correspond to threshold-rules with thresholds tSELF = 11, tSPA =
tAV G = 10, tCONFMAJ = 9 and tMAJ = 8, respectively. The ordering of the thresholds
from left to right corresponds to an increasing expected performance.
tSELF ), the higher the accuracy. A strict relationship in t however, does not translate to a





n), so that if for instance
8
n < tm < tm′ <
9
n methods m and m
′ have identical
expected accuracy.
Therefore, while the relationships among the threshold values is strict, the performance
comparision % in Proposition 13 is not necessarily. However, the example in Figure 5.3.2
shows that all of the relations can be strict at the same time.
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5.3.6 Shared Information and Asymmetric Prior
In the previous section, the performance of the different methods depended on the fact
that π = 12 . I next consider how these considerations change when π 6=
1
2 . For instance, in
the jury example, it could be that there is a commonly assumed base-rate for innocence
and guilt in comparable trials. More generally, the prior π can capture the shared infor-
mation of individuals apart from the private information captured by the signals Si. For
instance, before a general election respondents in an opinion poll may know the results
of previous opinion polls. Or if economists predict the outcome of a replication trial, the
shared information could be the outcomes of previous replications. Formally, this shared
information can be analyzed via the value of π if the shared information is conditionally
independent (w.r.t T ) of the signal vector S.
Thus, we can consider the case of differing base rates and shared information by consid-
ering how the performance ranking from Proposition 13 changes as the value of π deviates
from 0.5. Suppose for instance that π > 0.5. The proof of Proposition 13 in Subsection
5.8.2 also derives the exact values of the thresholds tSELF , tSPA, tAV GCON , tCONMAJ and

































tSPA = P (Si = 1). (5.3.18)
tAV GCONF =
P (T = 0 |Si = 0)−0.5
P (T = 1 |Si = 1) +P (T = 0 |Si = 0)−1
(5.3.19)
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tCONFMAJ =
P (T = 0 |Si = 0)
P (T = 1 |Si = 1) +P (T = 0 |Si = 0)
(5.3.20)
tMAJ = 0.5
Rewritten like this, we see that compared to 5.3.15, when π 6= 12 , tSELF has an ex-














)] . Since p > q, the denominator of this term is
always positive and it is furthermore invariant in π, whereas the numerator is strictly
decreasing in π. Thus, the optimal threshold (equal to tSELF when responses are truth-
fully Bayesian) is lower the less prior evidence there is since there is less “social” evidence
(stemming from the individuals’ signals) needed to conclude that T = 1. Moreover, since
both P (T = 0 |Si = 0) and P (T = 1 |Si = 1) move closer to the prior, the thresholds for
AVGCONF and CONFMAJ similarly decrease.
The threshold tSPA in turn is increasing in π. For small changes in π around 12 , this
is beneficial because the threshold moves towards the Bayes-optimal one, but it can be
harmful to the SPA’s performance for larger changes in π. This dynamic is depicted in
Figure 5.3.3, where (for n= 100) for most parameters, the SPA is expected to outperform
AVGCONF when π = 0.6, but AVGCONF is expected to dominate the SPA when π = 0.9.
Since with more extreme priors, less parameters satisfy the parametric restrictions 5.3.1-
5.3.2 (or in other words, with extreme priors, the information contained in the prior often
dominates the information contained in the individual signals), this dynamic works in
favor of the SPA.
Together with Proposition 13, this observation gives a new theoretical explanation for
the success of the SPA in a finite sample observed in Prelec et al. (2017) and Lee et al.
(2018). On the other hand, the poor accuracy of the SPA in a finite sample for extreme
priors, further illustrates that the SPA is not optimal under Bayesian responses. This
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(a) (b)
r
Figure 5.3.3: Theoretically expected performance differences for AVGCONF and SPA for
different combinations of the parameters p and q.
leaves room for the possibility that other methods may perform better in practice.
5.3.7 Comparisons of Methods under Non-Bayesian Judgments
Anchoring and Adjustment I will now drop the assumption of Bayesian judgments
and consider an anchoring and adjustment model in the spirit of Tversky and Kahneman
(1974). Individuals start with an anchor of 12 and adjust their response towards the
Bayesian answer. Individual responses can then be written as:
yi =
α
2 + (1−α)m(P |Si = si) (5.3.21)
for some α ∈ [0,1). The larger α, the more biased are the meta-judgments towards
the anchor of 12 and obviously, when α = 0, we have no anchoring and meta-judgments
are Bayesian again. I exclude the case that α = 1 when meta-judgments are completely
uninformative.
The specification in (5.3.21) is deterministic. Therefore, as in Subsection 5.3.4, the
meta-judgments of respondents – given their signal – are fixed. Thus, for the comparison
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of performances, similar arguments can be used. I write tα,m for the connected threshold-
values of the different methods when meta-judgments are of the form (5.3.21). As a first
observation, note that the condition for AVGCONF (given by (5.3.8)) holds with equality
if
x̄= 0.5− [αP (T = 1 |Si = 0) + (1−α)0.5][αP (T = 1 |Si = 1) + (1−α)0.5]−αP (T = 1 |Si = 0) + (1−α)0.5
= 0.5−P (T = 1 |Si = 0)
P (T = 1 |Si = 1)−P (T = 1 |Si = 0)
≡ tAV GCONF
and therefore, for any α < 1, tα,AV GCONF = tAV GCONF . That is, AVGCONF is ro-
bust to a distortion in responses of the form (5.3.21), and its expected performance is
the same as under Bayesian responses. In contrast, the thresholds of all other methods
considered here, move towards the anchor-point of 0.5, and thus reduce their expected
accuracy. Taken together, this implies that for larger values of α, AVGCONF gains in
strength relative to other methods. Computations show that for an α-value of 0.1, SELF
and AVGCONF each outperform each other on about half the parameter space. For larger
values of α, AVGCONF starts to dominate SELF for most of the parameter space (see
Figure 5.3.4 for an illustration).
Aside from the robustness of AVGCONF, we can prove that also under (5.3.21), SELF is
expected to outperform the SPA:
Proposition 14. In the anchoring and adjustment model, if the meta-judgment is as in
(5.3.21), then for all P ∈ P and for any α ∈ [0,1) :
ASELF %P ASPA
and for some P ∈ P, the relation is strict.
Proof. See 5.8.2.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.3.4: Theoretically Expected Performance for AVGCONF and SELF under a
low (10%, left figure) and middle-sized (40%) anchoring parameter. For low values, the
expected performance of AVGCONF and SELF is expected to be fairly balanced on the
parameter space, whereas for increasing anchoring, AVGCONF starts to dominate.
Instead of assuming a deterministic and homogenous bias, we could further assume
that in the specification (5.3.21), the anchoring parameter depends on the meta-question,
i.e. that we have:
yi =
αm
2 + (1−αm)m(P |Si = si) (5.3.22)
In this case, the theoretical performance ordering can change because for some meth-
ods, the meta-judgments are closer to the Bayesian prescription. The differences in αm
could be due to the difficulty connected with giving a particular meta-judgment. For
instance, one can suspect that the meta-question posed by SELF is more difficult than
the one posed by other methods and that thus the connected anchoring parameter will be
higher.
Of course, whether this difference would be sufficiently large to overcome the theoreti-
cal advantage of SELF under Bayesian responses is largely an empirical question. The
experiment reported in the next sections will shed some light on this question.
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5.4 Experimental Test
5.4.1 Main Task and Treatments
The experimental test of the model in Section 5.3 was performed on the online platform
Prolific, using the survey software Qualtrics. In total, 621 respondents were recruited
and divided into six different treatments with approximately 100 respondents each. 598
respondents completed the experiment. To ensure that respondents were able to follow
the instructions, the respondent pool was restricted to users with student status and UK
or US nationality.
The study follows a 3×2-design depicted in table 5.4.1. The first dimension differs in
terms of the meta-question that respondents are asked and the second in terms of the
information provided to them. In all treatments, respondents solved 20 inference tasks
which are each statistically equivalent to a binary decision in the binomial model with a
crowd size of n = 5. The statistical setting was translated by having two “urns”, Urn A
and Urn B, which each contain a number of yellow and blue balls.
In the private information treatments, one of these urns is selected to be the “true”
one with equal probability. By clicking on a button, respondents draw a ball from the true
urn (see Figure 5.4.1). They are told the color of the drawn ball, but not from which urn
it was drawn. The respondents are informed about the number of yellow balls in Urn A
(corresponding to the hit rate p in the binomial model) and in Urn B (corresponding to
the false alarm rate q). In the shared information treatment, the respondents additionally
see a “public draw” that was already made from the urn.8
8For this treatment, it was explained to respondents that the urns – before the public draw is made
– are equally likely to be selected. For determining the true urn in the experiment, the conditional
probabilities implied by the public draw were used to determine the true urn in each instance.
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Private Information Shared Information
Respondents Respondents Respondents Respondents
receive provide receive provide
THRESH urn properties; threshold urn properties; threshold
a private draw level private and level
public draw
PRED urn properties; prediction urn properties; prediction
a private draw level urn; private and level
public draw
CONF urn properties; confidence urn properties; confidence
a private draw level private and level
public draw
Table 5.4.1: The 3x2 design defining the six different treatments of the experiment.
For both private and shared information, the three treatments differ in the type of re-
sponse the respondents provide, with the different questions corresponding to the different
meta-questions discussed in Section 5.3:
1. In the threshold treatments (THRESH), respondents are asked to guess which urn
they think their ball was drawn from, depending on the draws of 4 other respondents.
Respondents are told that 4 other respondents will draw a ball from the same urn and
that they have to make an “adaptive guess”, depending on how many of the other
respondents received a yellow or blue ball. The adaptive guess elicits the individual
threshold level from Section 5.3.4 in strategic form: For each task, the minimum
number of yellow draws9 needed to make a respondent guess Urn A is interpreted
as that respondent’s threshold level. For this number to be well-defined, responses
are forced to be monotonic: A respondent can only shift their response from Urn
A to Urn B once. Forcing a unique switching point in THRESH has the advantage
that a single click was sufficient to fill out the table, which reduces the difference in
burden between the three different treatments. Figure 5.9.3 in Subsection 5.9 shows
9This number includes the respondents’ own signal, since respondents should take this signal into
account.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 5.4.1: The interface respondents of all three private information (a) and three
shared information treatments (b) see at the beginning of each of the 20 inference tasks.
By clicking on the Draw a Ball!-button, respondents receive a signal (a blue or yellow ball)
and are prompted to give a response, which differs by treatment.
an example of an admissable response and provides details on how the interface
behaved.
2. In the prediction treatments (PRED), respondents are asked to predict which ball
was drawn for four other, randomly determined respondents. To make the type of
task comparable to the one performed in THRESH, respondents were asked to select
a number of yellow balls ranging from 0 to 4.
3. In the confidence treatments (CONF), respondents report a probability with which
they believe that their ball was drawn from Urn A. This is done via a slider that
selects a value from 100 (Urn A for sure) to 0 (Urn B for sure).
For both private and shared information, responses from THRESH are used to evaluate
SELF and responses from PRED are used to compute responses for the SPA. Responses
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from CONF are used to compute responses for AVGCONF, CONFMAJ and majority
voting.
5.4.2 Experimental Timeline
All treatments started with the description of the task and an example problem. Fur-
thermore, the payment was explained using an example response. The instructions are
followed by the 20 inference tasks during which the full instructions are always available
to the respondents. After completion of the tasks, the experiment is concluded with a
survey which asks for age, gender and highest attained degree.10 Respondents were also
asked how clear the instructions were and whether they had followed a statistics course
(and if yes, when and on which level).
5.4.3 Payments
Payments were identical across the private and shared information treatments. In THRESH,
after all data were collected, each respondent was matched to 4 other respondents for whom
the same urn had been selected for this task. If the guess determined by the draws for
these 4 respondents was correct, a respondent received 30 pence for the task (and noth-
ing otherwise). This payment procedure was explained to the respondents before the 20
inference tasks were started. In PRED, the same type of matching as in THRESH was
performed after all data were collected. Respondents’ predictions of the draws for the 4





as the payment for each task. Instead of providing this formula, respondents were shown
in tabular form how their payment depended on the difference of their prediction and the
true number of other respondents who received a yellow ball. In CONF, payments for the
10The responses to these questions could be complemented and cross-verified with data provided by
Prolific.
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if UrnB is true
pence as the payment for each task. As in PRED, and similar to Offerman et al.
(2009), respondents were not given the payment formula but were provided with a table
that showed the payment for each combination of probability report and true urn. In
order to make the table easier to read, confidence reports were rounded to multiples of 5%
both in the presentation of the table and in the actual calculation of the payments.
In all treatments, payments were added over all inference tasks.
Figure 5.4.2: Scatterplot of the parameters chosen for the private information treatments
with the x-axis representing the number of yellow balls in Urn A and the y-axis representing
the number of yellow balls in Urn B. In all problems, Urn A contained more yellow balls
than Urn B. The plot is symmetric around the diagonal line because of counterbalancing.
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Figure 5.4.3: Scatterplot of the parameters chosen for the shared information treatments.
5.4.4 Parameter Choices
For each respondent, 20 inference tasks were selected from an overall number of 50 prob-
lems. In total, each inference task is answered by about 40 respondents per treatment.11
The order of the 20 tasks is randomized for each respondent individually. The number of
yellow and blue balls is counterbalanced.
Parameters were chosen to ensure that they reflect a variety of different theoretical
predictions. In particular, in the private information case, the Bayesian prediction for the
SPA is the optimal threshold in 20 of the 50 tasks, giving SELF potential to realize its
theoretical advantage. Bayesian MAJ and CONFMAJ are optimal for 10 of the 50 tasks,
in all of which the SPA is also optimal (which has to be the case, as per Proposition 13). In
the shared information treatment, the SPA is optimal for 20 out of 50 tasks, CONFMAJ
for 24, average confidence for 1 and majority voting for 30 tasks. The distribution of the
parameters is shown in Figure 5.4.2 for private information and in Figure 5.4.3 for shared
information.
11Across treatments, all tasks are answered by at least 37 and at most 42 respondents.
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5.5 Empirical Results
5.5.1 Difference in Perfomance
The crucial model prediction relates to the performances of Self-Aggregation (SELF),
Surprisingly Popular Algorithm (SPA), Average Confidence (AVGCONF), Confidence-
weighted Majority Voting (CONFMAJ) and Majority Voting (MAJ). Using the meta-
judgments provided by respondents, I estimate the probability P (C (X,Ym) = T ) on which
the performance relation %P from (5.3.3) was based in the theoretical section. Denoting by
Π̂A the sum of these probabilities for aggregation method A over all tasks (from both pri-
vate and shared information), I find that Π̂SPA > Π̂SELF > Π̂CONFMAJ > Π̂AV GCONF >
Π̂MAJ . The Bayesian model in contrast predicts the relationship mSELF %P mSPA %P
mAV GCONF ∼P mCONF %P mMAJ for all probability measures P given by the parameters
chosen for the experiment.
The estimated probabilities are obtained as follows: For every task and every method,
I draw random crowds of size n = 5 in the following way: letting k go from 0 to n, I
randomly select k respondents who answered the task and received a 1-signal (a yellow
ball) and 5−k respondents who answered the task and received a 0-signal (a blue ball).
For each method, the meta-judgments and signals of this crowd determine a decision in
favor of Urn A or Urn B. Repeating this procedure for 10,000 randomly composed crowds
(thus 50,000 in total for each method-question pair), I obtain an estimate for how often
the method will choose Urn A over Urn B when k respondents receive a 1-signal. Using
the parameters of the question, I can calculate from this the probability that the method
would choose the correct option.12 To calculate an “empirical” performance for majority
voting, I treat reported probabilities for Urn A larger than 50% as votes for Urn A.
12Note that the actual true urns that were generated for the respondents are irrelevant for this calcu-
lation.
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Empirical Performance
SELF SPA AVGCONF CONFMAJ MAJ # Tasks
Private 43.8 44.8 43.6 42.0 41.5 50
Shared 38.5 38.4 35.0 39.4 35.1 50
Pooled 82.3 83.2 78.6 81.4 76.6 100
Bayesian Prediction
SELF SPA AVGCONF CONFMAJ MAJ # Tasks
Private 46.5 44.8 44.8 42.6 41.5 50
Shared 40.6 38.9 37.2 39.4 39.6 50
Pooled 87.1 83.7 82.0 82.0 81.5 100
Table 5.5.1: Empirical performance in terms of estimated probabilities (Π̂)
compared to the Bayesian prediction.
Table 5.5.1 displays the estimated probabilities, as well as the predictions of the
Bayesian model. It can be seen that while SELF outperforms AVGCONF and major-
ity voting in the pooled data and CONFMAJ in the private information treatments, its
performance clearly falls below the one predicted under Bayesian responses. Another
large gap between predicted and actual performance can be found in the shared informa-
tion treatment for majority voting: While under the Bayesian prediction, MAJ is expected
to be the second-highest performing method after SELF, it performs substantially worse
than all other methods. In the private information treatment however, the empirical
performance of MAJ is identical to its Bayesian expectation.
Differentiating the performance between the shared and private information results,
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the biggest difference is in the performance of CONFMAJ and AVGCONF. In the shared
information treatments, CONFMAJ is the best performing method and performs signifi-
cantly better than both the SPA and SELF. In the private information treatments, it is
however only the 4-th best, performing worse than AVGCONF and only marginally better
than MAJ. AVGCONF in turn is the 3rd best method in the private information treatment
(on par with SELF), but the worst performing in the shared information treatments.
To test whether the differences in the estimated probabilities (across methods) differ
significantly from noise, I conduct a Wilcoxon signed rank test comparing the probabil-
ities for all 100 tasks, yielding a significant (at 5%-level) performance difference for SPA









where >∗ denotes a difference in performance significant at 10% level, >∗∗ at 5% level,
and >∗∗∗ at 1% level. I show all binary comparisons in table 5.5.2.
5.5.2 Response Characteristics
A “sanity check” of the individual responses in CONF is whether respondents, upon re-
ceiving a signal favorable for one of the urns (a yellow ball in case of Urn A or a blue ball
in case of Urn B), report a probability of at least 50% that the urn is the correct one. In
the private information treatment, this is overwhelmingly the case: in 98% of the cases
that a respondent received a 1-signal (i.e. drew a yellow ball), a probability of at least 50%
that their ball was drawn from Urn A is reported. Correspondingly, 92% of the 0-signals
(i.e. a blue ball) led to a probability report of at least 50% that the ball was drawn from
Urn B.
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Pooled (597 respondents, 100 tasks)
SELF SPA AVGCONF CONFMAJ
SELF X
SPA SPA >(∗∗) SELF X
AVGCONF SELF >(∗∗∗) AC SPA >(∗∗∗) AC X
CONFMAJ CM > SELF SPA > CM CM>(∗∗∗) AC X
MAJ SELF >(∗∗∗) MAJ SPA >(∗∗∗) MAJ AC >(∗∗∗) MAJ CM>(∗∗∗) MAJ
Private Information (297 respondents, 50 tasks)
SELF SPA AVGCONF CONFMAJ
SELF X
SPA SPA > SELF X
AVGCONF SELF > AC SPA >(∗∗∗) AC X
CONFMAJ SELF >(∗∗) CM SPA >(∗∗∗)CM AC>(∗∗∗) CM X
MAJ SELF >(∗∗) MAJ SPA >(∗∗∗) MAJ AC >(∗∗∗) MAJ CM >(∗∗∗) MAJ
Shared Information (300 respondents, 50 tasks)
SELF SPA AVGCONF CONFMAJ
SELF X
SPA SELF > SPA X
AVGCONF SELF >(∗∗∗) CM SPA >(∗∗∗) AC X
CONFMAJ CM >(∗∗∗) SELF CM >(∗∗) SPA CM >(∗∗∗) AC X
MAJ SELF >(∗∗∗) MAJ SPA >(∗∗∗) MAJ AVGCONF > MAJ CM >(∗∗∗) MAJ
Table 5.5.2: Pairwise Comparison with Random Groups of 5. The table depicts
the results of a Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test. The ">" gives the direction fo the test result
(e.g., SPA>SELF means that the mean of the signed rank is positive, i.e. favorable to
the SPA). Statistical significance is denoted by the (*)/(**)/(***)-superscripts with (*)
denoting significance at the 10% level, (**) at the 5 %-level and (***) at the 1%-level.
Significant comparisons on any of these levels are highlighted in bold.
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As a direct consequence, the simulated decisions for MAJ in the private informa-
tion case are practically identical to the decisions theoretically predicted by Bayesian
responses and the corresponding performance is identical to the expected performance in
the Bayesian model. In the shared information treatment however, only 76% of those
receiving a 1-signal and 72% of those receiving 0-signal accurately assign a probability of
50% to the urn favored by their signal. This pronounced difference between the two treat-
ments suggests that the additional piece of information (the initial public draw) makes it
considerably more difficult for respondents to make accurate probability judgments.
To get a more precise idea of how close reponses are to the Bayesian prescription, I
estimate the anchoring and adjustment model in Section 5.3.7.
Suggestive evidence for the presence of anchoring can be found in Figures 5.5.1 and
5.5.2 which plot the Bayesian threshold levels against the average threshold reported by
respondents in THRESH. We can see that responses are more closely centered around the
mid-point of the scale (3) than the Bayesian values. In order to provide an estimate of the
anchoring bias, and the corresponding ones for the prediction and threshold levels, one









I next run linear regressions on
yit−
1
2 = cm+ (1−αm) [m(P |Sit = sit)−0.5] + εit (5.5.1)
for the three different meta-questions (threshold, prediction and confidence levels) m.
In (5.5.1), cm is a constant and yit is respondent i’s answer to task t. The resulting
estimates for the αm are shown in table 5.5.3, separated for private and shared information.
Note that one model prediction of the specification in (5.3.22) is that cm = 0 for all m. As
can be seen from the regression results, while highly significant, the estimated intercepts
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Figure 5.5.1: Optimal threshold levels versus average thresholds provided by respondents,
for all 50 tasks in private information treatment. SELF visibly fails to take advantage of
tasks such as T1-10 in which the optimal threshold is at an extreme value (1).
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Figure 5.5.2: Optimal threshold levels versus average thresholds provided by respondents
in shared information treatment.
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in the regressions are small. Only in PRED, there seems to be an additional negative
bias, with estimates equalling −0.1 for private information and −0.07 for the shared
information treatments. The estimated values further confirm that confidence judgments
are considerably more difficult in the shared information environment, as the anchoring
parameter estimated for those tasks is much larger (0.33) than in the private information
case (0.08).
For both shared information and private information, the ordering of the estimated
anchoring parameter is α̂THRESH > α̂PRED > α̂CONF, suggesting that the confidence ques-
tion is easiest for respondents to answer. Thus, the anchoring parameters are consistent
with a higher performance of the SPA versus SELF, but do not explain why the SPA
outperforms AVGCONF in the private information case. The anchoring and adjustment




The model in Section 5.3 predicts most, but not all of the performance relations reported
in the previous section. In particular, under Bayesian responses, Proposition 13 should
apply in the private information setting. Instead I find SPA  SELF ∼ AV GCONF 
CONFMAJ  MAJ . The difference in prediction is compatible with anchoring as
discussed in Section 5.3.7, but it cannot give a full account of the data, as AVGCONF
performs worse than theoretically expected, even though it is not affected by anchoring in
my model. This shows that the theoretical advantage of SELF and SPA over confidence-
based methods is robust to behavioral bias, but also that the behavioral processes are
more complex than accounted for in Section 5.3.7.
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n observations 2000 2000
RMSE 0.145 0.227
Table 5.5.3: Parametric Estimates for Anchoring Parameter. Ordinary least
squares regression on equation (5.5.1). Standard errors in brackets. (*): significance at
the 10% level, (**) at the 5 %-level and (***) at the 1%-level.
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5.6.2 Experimental Design
With respect to the experimental design, the type of task chosen for my experiment merits
some additional discussion. The experimental task is of a different type than the ones used
in previous work by Prelec et al. (2017) and Lee et al. (2018). Previously, the SPA was
tested in tasks where a ground truth was either known to the experimenters or became
known to them during the course of the experiment (including trivia tasks, the monetary
value of different artwork, and NFL results). For such tasks, it is easy to see for respondents
that there is a true and a false answer and therefore experimental results may be expected
to have higher external validity with regard to the problems that judgment aggregation
methods are ultimately to be applied to.
However, for these tasks it is not possible to know the full distribution of individual
judgments. While the conditional distribution under the actual ground truth can be
estimated from a large respondent sample, the counterfactual distribution conditioning on
the counterfactual cannot be estimated. As a result, previous studies could not compare
different methods in their ability to provide the optimal Bayesian answer. This limits
comparisons of two aggregation methods to observing whether for a given task one method
correctly identifies the ground truth and the other does not. The statistical power of such
comparisons is low. For instance, in Prelec et al. (2017), a significant difference between
performance of SPA and MAJ was established when pooling the answers across 6 studies,
but did not hold for individual studies.
In my experiment, the full distribution of individual judgments is known both under
T = 1 and under T = 0 and thus responses translate directly to a probability of choosing the
correct option. These probabilities can then be compared per task, which is statistically
more powerful. As an illustration of the difference, suppose that responses were fully
Bayesian and that we compare the performance of SPA and SELF. Since SELF has a
higher probability than SPA of choosing the correct option in 32 tasks (and never has
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a lower one) in the private information treatment, we could even fix a significance level
as low as α = 0.001 and still power would be 100% (since responses are Bayesian and
therefore noiseless). In contrast, when a ground truth is randomly chosen for each task
and methods are only scored on detecting this ground truth per task, the performance
becomes random, even under noiseless, Bayesian responses. For instance, the statistical
power of the Wilcoxon signed rank test for the comparison of SELF and SPA (given the
standard significance level of α = 0.05) is only around 0.17.
It is possible however, that the statistical framing hurts the performance of SELF
somewhat, since it makes the description of the task in THRESH quite complicated. For
instance, it requires to explain to respondents that for the four additional draws, the true
urn is kept the same. When choosing a task of the type found in Prelec et al. (2017) or Lee
et al. (2018), this does not need to be explained since the ground truth is obviously the
same for all respondents. This concern is to some degree mitigated by the answers to the
final survey at the end of the experiment: The ratings respondents give to the instruction
clarity in THRESH are on average only minimally worse than the ones given for CONF
and PRED.
5.6.3 Possible Model Extensions
The estimates for the anchoring parameters in Section 5.3.7 suggest that confidence-levels,
predictions and threshold-levels lie on a scale of methods which are increasingly demanding
in terms of respondents’ meta-cognition. An interesting avenue for future research is to
establish whether there is some optimal level of demandingness that makes maximal use
of the information that respondents are able to process.
Furthermore, I have not tapped into the strategic aspects of using SELF in practice
when respondents may have an interest in misreporting their judgment. In contrast, the
SPA is founded in the incentive literature following Prelec (2004), which has focused on
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providing incentives for unverifiable judgment reports and, just like the SPA, made use of
predictions by respondents about the judgments of others. It may be an interesting new
impulse for the incentive literature to make other meta-cognitive aggregation methods
incentive-compatible.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have first proposed a theoretical model that extends Prelec et al. (2017)
by introducing some further uncertainty about the distribution of judgments. In this
model, their “Surprisingly Popular Algorithm” (SPA) still outperforms majority voting
and confidence-weighted majority voting in expectation, but may not be equal to the
optimal aggregation rule an aggregator who knows the whole statistical setting would
choose. If respondents have sufficient knowledge about the judgment distribution and are
Bayesian reasoners, it is an improvement over the SPA to ask respondents directly for
the optimal aggregation scheme, a method I call self-aggregation (SELF). I tested this
idea in an online experiment in which I implemented the model directly in a stylized urn
setting. The findings suggest that it is difficult for respondents to make full use of the
information provided to them, but that there is still a performance gap between the SPA
and SELF on the one hand and confidence-based aggregation rules on the other. This
shows that while responses are clearly non-Bayesian, there is still a considerable amount
of information contained in the responses given by the experiment participants.
With regard to potential applications, it is of course the ultimate aim that new aggre-
gation methods are applied to settings more complex than the binary decision problems I
studied. The theoretical properties of these methods may be cumbersome to study and the
corresponding questions might be even more difficult for respondents to answer. However,
as can be seen by the high performance of meta-cognitive methods in the experiment, the
reward may well be worth this extra cost.
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5.8 Proofs for Section 5.3
5.8.1 Proof of Proposition 11
First, fix some P . Clearly, 5.3.4 is maximized13 if
CP (x,y) =

1 ifP (T = 1 |X = x)> P (T = 0 |X = x)
0 ifP (T = 1 |X = x)< P (T = 0 |X = x)
Next, write g (z)≡ P(T=1 |X̄=z)
P(T=0 |X̄=z) , so that
P
(









T = 0 |X̄ = z
)
ifg (z)< 1
MLRP states that g is increasing in z and MLRP and signal decisiveness together imply
that g (1) > 1 and g (0) < 1. There must then be a zP such that g (z) ≥ 1 for all z ≥ zP
and g (z)< 1 for all z < zP .
2
5.8.2 Proof of Proposition 13
As mentioned in the main text, the main idea of the proof is to write each of the aggregation
methods in the form (5.3.5), where I denote the t-functions corresponding to the different
aggregation methods as tSELF , tSPA, tAV G, tCONFMAJ and tMAJ , respectively (omitting
the dependence on P for simplicity). I then show that for all P , either tSELF > tSPA =
tAV G > tCONFMAJ > tMAJ = 12 or tSELF < tSPA = tAV G < tCONFMAJ < tMAJ =
1
2 .
As a direct consequence of Proposition 11, choosing m(P |si) = zP and averaging these
13The decision can be arbitrary if P (T = 1 |X = x) = P (T = 0 |X = x).
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responses, as is done by SELF, is optimal. The exact value of tSELF given in the main
text is not needed, but it is derived in 5.8.4 for completeness.
I next show that if p > 1− q and π = 12 , then
tSELF > tSPA = tAV GCONF > tCONFMAJ > tMAJ =
1
2 (5.8.1)
which is the relation from Figure 5.3.2. The case of p < 1− q is analogous. Due to
MLRP, a threshold is then better the closer it is to tSELF . I next prove these relations,
starting with (5.8.1) and moving from the right to the left.
tConfMaj > tMaj : We have tMAJ = 0.5 by definiton. To derive tCONFMAJ , note that




i (1−xi)(1−yi). Replacing yi by P (T = 1 |xi) ,
we get that this holds with equality if
x̄= P (T = 0 |Si = 0)
P (T = 0 |Si = 0) +P (T = 1 |Si = 1)
≡ tCONF
and since P (T = 0 |Si = 0) = 1−q1−p+1−q and P (S = 1, T = 1) =
p
p+q , p > 1− p implies
that P (S = 0, T = 0)> P (S = 1, T = 1) so that tCONF > 0.5.
tSP A > tConfMaj : For the SPA, under Bayesian responses each respondent reports
yi = E [x̄ |xi] and therefore x̄≥ ȳ holds if
x̄≥ x̄E [x̄ |xi = 1] + (1− x̄)E [x̄ |xi = 0]
Note that the prior expectation E [x̄] equals P (Si = 1), the unconditional probability
that an arbitrary signal Si equals 1. We can then write
E [x̄] = P (Si = 1)E [x̄ |xi = 1] + [1−P (Si = 1)]E [x̄ |xi = 1] ,
so that the inequality above holds with equality when
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x̄= P (Si = 1)≡ tSPA
Thus, when individuals are truthful Bayesians, the implicit threshold associated with the
SPA equals the unconditional probability that Si = 1. Furthermore, we can rewrite the
threshold associated with confidence-weighted majority voting as follows:
tCONF =
P (T = 0 |Si = 0)












P (Si=0)P (Si=1) +
P (Si=1,T=1)P (Si=0)
P (Si=0)P (Si=1)
= P (Si = 1)
P (Si = 0, T = 0)
P (Si = 0, T = 0)P (Si = 1) +P (Si = 1, T = 1)P (Si = 0)
.
If
P (S = 0, T = 0)≤ P (S = 1, T = 1) ,
then we can replace P (Si = 1, T = 1) by P (Si = 0, T = 0) in the numerator, such that
tCONF ≤ P (Si = 1)
P (Si = 0, T = 0)
P (Si = 0, T = 0)P (Si = 1) +P (Si = 0, T = 0)P (Si = 0)
= P (Si = 1) = tSPA,
with the last equality because P (S = 0)+P (S = 1) = 1. This establishes that tSPA >
tCONF .
tSP A = tAV G : For the average confidence method, we get that the inequality ȳ ≥ 12
holds with equality if
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2 = π = P (T = 1) = P (Si = 1)P (T = 1 |Si = 1) +P (Si = 0)P (T = 1 |Si = 0)
= P (Si = 1)P (T = 1 |Si = 1) + [1−P (Si = 0)]P (T = 1 |Si = 0)
so that equation 5.8.2 solves for x̄= P (Si = 1) and thus
tSPA = tAV G = P (Si = 1)
.
tSELF > tSP A: Finally, note that in the binomial model:
P
(












qk (1− q)n−k if t= 0
where k = ns̄ is the number of respondents with a 1-signal. We can write the log-
likelihood for T = 1 and T = 0 as
l (s̄) = log
P
(




S̄ = s̄ |T = 0
) = k [logp− logq] + (n−k) log [(1−p)− (1− q)]
An optimal threshold is set such that this log likelihood ratio is positive for all s̄ above
the threshold and negative for all lower values. Due to MLRP, it is then sufficient to show
that for s̄= tSPA the log-likelihood ratio is negative. Writing p= tSPA+ε and q= tSPA−ε
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where ε= p−q2 , we get















is decreasing in x on x > c > 0,14 we get that (5.8.3) is negative if and
only if tSPA > 1− tSPA, which is equivalent to p > 1− q. This shows that tSELF > tSPA.
Together, these inequalities establish that tMAJ < tCONF < tSPA = tAvgConf < tSELF ,
which gives the weak ordering in terms of performance. The example in Figure 5.3.2
shows strict inequality, concluding the proof.
2
5.8.3 Proof of Proposition 14
The idea is to show the following. First, if tSELF > tSPA > 12 , then clearly
tSELF > αtSELF + (1−α)
1





Thus, by the same idea as in the proof of Proposition 13, we can conclude that ASELF 
ASPA if whenever p > 1− q:
tSPA,α < αtSPA+ (1−α)
1
2
To see this, I will show that whenever a method A can be written as:
tA =
mA (P (.|Si = 0))













− 2xc(x−c)(x+c) . Differentiating again gives
4c3
(x−c)2(x+c)2 > 0. Together with










< 0 for all x.
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then, in the anchoring and adjustment model tA,α < αtA+ (1−α) 12 whenever tA >
1
2
(and the reverse if tA < 12). This latter fact follows by straightforward calculation. For
















[α (u+v) + 1−α]
]
∝ (u−v)(1−α)(1− (u+v))
which is positive if and only if u+v < 1, i.e. if the denominator in the inital expression












X̄ |Si = 0
] ,
we can further observe that 1−E
[




X̄ |Si = 0
]
> 1 since E
[





X̄ |Si = 1
]
and we have that tSPA,α < αtSPA+ (1−α) 12 , as desired.
2
5.8.4 Deriving the optimal Threshold in the Binomial Case








S̄ = s |T = 0
) ≡ LR (s̄) =N [s̄ log(p
q
)





+ log( π1−π )
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5.9 Task Interface for CONF, PRED and THRESH
Figure 5.9.1: The interface in treatment CONF for shared information. For providing a
confidence level, respondents use a slider which moves from a probability of 100 (Urn A
for sure) to a probability of 0 (Urn B for sure).
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Figure 5.9.2: The interface in treatment PRED for shared information. For their predic-
tion, respondents can choose an integer value from 0 to 4.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.9.3: The interface in treatment THRESH in the private information case, with
part (a) showing the initial task a respondent faces and part (b) showing a possible re-
sponse. When a respondent selects one of the urns for a specific row, the interface au-
tomatically selects Urn A for all rows above and Urn B for all rows below. To produce
the pattern shown in (b), it is thus enough to select Urn A in the second row or Urn
B in the third one. This behavior ensures that responses can always be described by a
single threshold level and makes the task more comparable to other treatments in terms
of required effort.
The threshold level inferred from the response shown in (b) is 3. If the respondent’s own




This thesis discussed the properties and performance of various methods targeted at in-
creasing the performance of human crowds. All proposed methods were accompanied by
theoretical arguments showing optimality in some sense for a crowd of Bayesian decision-
makers. All methods also aimed to be relatively simple, so that they can be used by ‘real’
human beings, and not only by abstract Bayesian decision-makers.
Apart from those similarities, the exact target of each method, and the nature of the
results presented in each chapter, were quite different. Chapter 2 showed that the log-
arithmic market scoring rule (LMSR) proposed by Hanson (2003) is robust to strategic
manipulations in a setting in which information is received repeatedly. The LMSR is an
already existing method for incentivizing and aggregating forecasts about events which can
be verified in the near future. In contrast, Chapter 3 analyzed Baillon’s (2017) Bayesian
markets, a method which was proposed for incentivizing forecasts which can not be verified
in this sense, and related the method to aggregation. Chapter 4 proposed choice-matching,
which targets incentives in a more general way. In contrast to the methods in Chapter 1
and 2, choice-matching can be seen as a ‘class’ of methods: we gave numerous examples




A new method, self-aggregation (SELF), was also proposed in Chapter 5, which was
concerned with the aggregation properties of different ways of combining individual judg-
ments into a single decision. The chapter also has broader implications by demonstrating
the success of SELF and Prelec et al.’s (2017) Surprisingly Popular Algorithm (SPA). Both
of these ask members of the crowd to answer demanding meta-cognitive questions. The
space of such questions seems largely unexplored, with almost the entire previous liter-
ature focused on judgments of confidence. Chapter 5 suggests that there may be large
performance increases hiding in this unexplored area.
Moreover, while the contributions of Chapter 2 and 4 are theoretical – mostly using
tools from game theory – Chapters 3 and 5 also devote much effort to testing the methods
in practice. These empirical tests underline the importance of simple methods. While
in both experiments, the methods under investigation perform well in the aggregate, we
also see several deviations by individual decision-makers from the Bayesian prescription.
Developing a systematic framework of these deviations and how they affect the ranking of
different crowd methods looks like a promising direction of future theoretical work. Some
steps in this direction were made with the anchoring and adjustment model in Chapter 5.
Future applications of crowd-sourcing of the type suggested in the Introduction will need
to address all issues discussed in this thesis (and presumably many more). It is there-
fore natural to think of ways of combining the different methods proposed here into a
single application. For instance, in Chapter 4 it is suggested to link incentive schemes
for forecasts of verifiable and unverifiable events. Using the space mission example from
the Introduction, we could for instance ask a crowd to make forecasts about a successful
manned mission to another star system before the year 2200. Simultaneously, there could
be a prediction market (which could be of the type analyzed in Chapter 2) for verifiable,
short-term developments, such as the question whether there will be another Moon land-
ing, or a successful human Mars mission before the year 2035. For each individual crowd
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member, the payoff for their long-term, unverifiable forecasts could then be the average
payoff on the short-term prediction markets of those crowd members who made the same
long-term prediction as them. One could also try to find a market implementation for the
long-term forecasts, such as the ones discussed in Chapter 3. Chapter 5 in turn would
suggest that on such a market, it could be beneficial to trade assets which are more com-
plex then whether a certain event occurs or does not occur. For instance – as a market
analogy for the meta-cognitive statements discussed in Chapter 5 – one could allow the
trade of ‘derivatives’ in the market, such as predictions about the development of future
prices, or about the number of participants.
It is hard to think of the intergovernmental decision-making processes which determine
whether countries are at war or at peace with each other, how to combat climate change,
how to regulate new transformative technologies or how to conduct international trade
– and believe that these processes ensure all relevant perspectives are reflected in the
eventual decision. I suspect that the coming decades will see many innovations with
respect to collective decision-making and that most of these innovations will make use of
ever-more-powerful information technology to aggregate the knowledge and skill possessed
by millions of people in real-time. Ideally, the chapters in this thesis can contribute to our




This dissertation deals with various methods of rewarding and collecting judgments from
‘crowds’ (large groups of people). The two main challenges considered throughout this
thesis are the ‘incentive problem’ and the ‘aggregation problem’. The incentive problem is
the problem of choosing rewards for disclosing and acquiring information. The aggregation
problem involves mapping the individual judgments of all crowd members into one decision.
In Chapter 2, I analyze, using game-theoretic tools, the strategic aspects of the Logarithmic
Market Score Rule (LMSR). I extend existing theoretical arguments in favor of the LMSR,
in particular allowing for a dynamic in-flow of information. In addition to the formal
arguments, I also informally discuss various other practical aspects of implementing the
LMSR.
Unlike Chapter 2, Chapter 3 deals with beliefs about events that are not verifiable, i.e.
where there is no way to determine (later) whether an answer was correct or not. Just
as the LMSR discussed in Chapter 2 tries to simultaneously solve the incentive problem
and the aggregation problem for predictions of verifiable events, the Follow the money
(FTM) mechanism studied in Chapter 3 addresses these two problems for non-verifiable
events. We test the FTM in a large online sample of US students, using a task that ensures
that the informational assumptions of the model are met. The experiment shows evidence
that the FTM is successful in providing incentives for truth-telling and in aggregating




Chapter 4 continues the discussion on incentives for revealing unverifiable beliefs and
expansds the incentive scheme discussed in Chapter 3, allowing for any number of possible
answers. The idea is to link explicit opinions or judgments, which are responses to a
multiple choice question (MCQ), with an auxiliary task that reveals the respondents’
“types”, but only implicitly. We focus on a case where the auxiliary task asks respondents
to predict how often each answer option in the MCQ was chosen by the other respondents.
A respondent’s score is then a weighted sum of a prediction accuracy score and the average
prediction accuracy score of all respondents endorsing the same answer to the MCQ. We
show that under plausible assumptions about the updating process, truth-telling is a strict
Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Chapter 5 shifts the focus again to the aggregation problem. I propose “self-aggregation
” (SELF) which asks individuals to vote for one of two options while setting a threshold for
the number of people who would convince them of the other option. SELF then chooses
an option if the number of people voting in favor exceeds the average threshold in the
group. In a model in which individuals update their beliefs in a (roughly) Bayesian way,
I show that SELF is predicted to outperform the benchmarks. In an experimental test of
the model, respondents solve a binary decision problem in a stylized urn experiment, in
which reactions and aggregation results can be directly compared to the Bayesian prescrip-
tion. In the experiment, SELF compares favorably with confidence-based methods, but
does not realize its theoretical advantage over the so-called surprisingly popular algorithm
(SPA). The results show that although individuals’ metacognitive skills are challenged by
complex methods such as SELF and the SPA, the answers contain enough information to
outperform methods based on less challenging questions.
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Dit proefschrift behandelt verschillende methoden om oordelen van ‘crowds’ (grote groepen
mensen) te belonen en te aggregeren. De twee belangrijkste uitdagingen die in dit proef-
schrift aan bod komen, zijn het ’stimuleringsprobleem’ en het ’aggregatieprobleem’. Het
stimuleringsprobleem is het probleem van het kiezen van beloningen voor het vrijgeven en
verkrijgen van informatie. Het aggregatieprobleem omvat het in kaart brengen van de in-
dividuele oordelen van alle leden van het publiek in één beslissing. In het eerste hoofdstuk
analyseer ik met speltheoretische methodes de strategische aspecten van de Logarithmic
Market Scoring Rule (LMSR). Ik breid bestaande theoretische argumenten uit ten gunste
van de LMSR, in het bijzonder het toelaten van een dynamische informatiestroom. Naast
de formele argumenten bespreek ik ook informeel diverse andere praktische aspecten van
het implementeren van de LMSR.
In tegenstelling tot hoofdstuk 2, behandelt hoofdstuk 3 meningen over gebeurtenissen
die niet verifieerbaar zijn, d.w.z. waar er geen manier is om (later) te bepalen of een
antwoord juist was of niet. Net zoals dat de LMSR besproken in hoofdstuk 2 probeert om
tegelijkertijd het stimuleringsprobleem en het aggregatieprobleem voor voorspellingen van
verifieerbare gebeurtenissen op te lossen, behandelt het Follow the Money (FTM) mech-
anisme dat in hoofdstuk 3 wordt bestudeerd deze twee problemen voor niet-verifieerbare
gebeurtenissen. We testen de FTM in een grote online steekproef van Amerikaanse studen-
ten, met behulp van een taak die ervoor zorgt dat aan de aannames van het model wordt
voldaan. Het experiment toont aan dat de FTM erin slaagt om prikkels te geven voor
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het vertellen van de waarheid en om meningen te aggregeren, hoewel er ook substantiële
afwijkingen zijn van de theoretische voorspellingen in het gedrag van respondenten.
Hoofdstuk 4 vervolgt de discussie over prikkels om niet-verifieerbare overtuigingen aan
het licht te brengen en breidt het stimuleringsschema uit dat in Hoofdstuk 3 besproken
wordt uit, waarbij een groot aantal mogelijke antwoorden mogelijk is. Het idee is om
expliciete meningen of oordelen, die antwoorden op een meerkeuzevraag (MCQ) zijn, te
koppelen aan een bijkomende taak die de ’typen’ van de respondenten onthult, maar
alleen impliciet. We richten ons op een casus waarin de hulptaak respondenten vraagt
om te voorspellen hoe vaak elke antwoordoptie in de MCQ door de andere respondenten
is gekozen. De score van een respondent is dan een gewogen som van een score voor
voorspellingsnauwkeurigheid en de gemiddelde score voor voorspellingsnauwkeurigheid van
alle respondenten die hetzelfde antwoord op de MCQ geven. We laten zien dat onder
plausibele aannames over het updateproces, het vertellen van de waarheid een strikt Bayes-
Nash-evenwicht is.
Hoofdstuk 5 verlegt de focus weer naar het aggregatieprobleem. Ik stel ‘zelfaggregatie’
(SELF) voor, waarbij individuen worden gevraagd om voor één uit twee opties te stem-
men, terwijl ze een drempel instellen voor het aantal mensen dat hen van de andere optie
zou overtuigen. SELF kiest vervolgens een optie als het aantal mensen dat voor stemt
de gemiddelde drempel in de groep overschrijdt. In een model waarin individuen hun
overtuigingen op een (ruwweg) Bayesiaanse manier actualiseren, laat ik zien dat SELF in
voorspelling beter presteert dan de benchmarks. In een experimentele test van het model
lossen respondenten een binair beslissingsprobleem op in een gestileerd urn-experiment,
waarin reacties en aggregatieresultaten direct kunnen worden vergeleken met de Bayesi-
aanse aanbeveling. In het experiment steekt SELF gunstig af bij op vertrouwen gebaseerde
methoden, maar realiseert het zijn theoretische voordeel niet ten opzichte van het zoge-
naamde Surprisingly Popular Algorithm (SPA). De resultaten laten zien dat hoewel de
metacognitieve vaardigheden van individuen worden uitgedaagd door complexe metho-
188
BENJAMIN TEREICK: MAKING CROWDS WISER
den zoals SELF en de SPA, de antwoorden voldoende informatie bevatten om beter te
presteren dan methoden gebaseerd op minder uitdagende vragen.
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after the late Professor Jan Tinbergen, Dutch Nobel Prize laureate in economics in 1969.
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